BMCR 2008.10.18, Samuel C. Rickless, Plato's Forms in Transition

Samuel C. Rickless, Plato's Forms in Transition. A Reading of the
Parmenides.  Cambridge/New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Pp. 272.  ISBN 978-0-521-86456-5.  $90.00.

Reviewed by Mauro Tulli, University of Pisa ([email protected])
Word count:  2396 words
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By means of the characters of Adeimantus and Glaucon, who together with
Socrates create the theory of forms in the Republic, the frame (126
a-127 a) indicates the weight that Plato claims for the Parmenides: the
effort is great, poly ergon. In his praiseworthy and original
monograph, R. immediately refers to the result of the effort: the
theory of forms undergoes an evolution here, which is indispensable for
the last phase of Plato, for the Sophist, the Statesman, and the
Philebus. But it is difficult to establish an evolution without
contradiction or to postulate for the theory of forms an evolution that
can withstand scrutiny. From the early phase to the text of the Laws,
Plato does not reveal a coherent theory of forms.[[1]]

The Parmenides receives from modern-day critics either a logical
interpretation or a metaphysical one. The logical interpretation, from
Ryle to Owen and Vlastos, either detects in Plato a polemical goal,
that of demolishing the result of Parmenides, or a more positive goal,
that of raising a solid basis for semantic research. This array of
scholars finds its most recent exponents in Allen, Sayre, Meinwald,
Moravcsik, Turnbull and Scolnicov. R. borrows method and material from
this interpretation and freely acknowledges his debt.[[2]] He offers a
logical interpretation in a positive direction: the Parmenides not as a
field of semantic research, but as a meticulous discussion of the
theory of forms. There is an immense distance to a metaphysical
interpretation, either the great theme of Halfwassen that the
Parmenides is a colossal monument to the one beyond being, or to the
reconstruction of Migliori and Horn that the Parmenides is a
prefiguration of the one and the dyad, the doctrine of oral
communication documented by Aristotle.[[3]]

In his analysis, R. recalls the theory of forms that Plato offers in
the central phase, in the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Republic (10-52).
Of course, it is not difficult to perceive the theory of forms already
in the aporetic phase, in the need to find the definition of eusebeia
or the definition of sophrosyne. But here Plato does not explain the
status of the forms, their relationship with becoming, and he does not
see the forms as a peak of knowledge.[[4]] The theory of forms is born
from the substitution of a method with a polemical function, the
elenchos, by a method with a positive function, the hypothesis. And it
is born by means of axioms and auxiliaries, which R. wishes to
distinguish: two axioms--One-over-Many and Itself-by-Itself--and seven
auxiliaries--polarity between properties, polarity between forms, the
necessary consistency between properties and things, the transmission
theory, the intrinsic ambiguity of things, knowledge in relationship
with its aim, knowledge in noetic perspective. With axioms and
auxiliaries, Plato is said to weave a sequence of fourteen assertions
of central weight, for example, the existence of the forms, their
uniqueness, their participation, self-predication, non-contamination,
non-identity, accessibility and separation. R. has abbreviations for
all: for the axioms, OM and II, for the auxiliaries, CON, PC, NCC, TT,
IS, SOK and PHK, and for the fourteen assertions, E, NMTO, U, C, BP,
SP, P, P*, O, NI1, KF, S, NSP and NSE.

R. begins with the famous answer of the young Socrates to Zeno's book
and the monistic conception of Parmenides, in which he illustrates the
forms in relationship with the many (127 a-130 a). R. detects here the
higher version of the theory of forms, and offers a subtle examination
of it. He divides the speech, and recognizes in the last section a
Radical Purity, RP, beyond P and P*, which derives from P. This is the
negation of an identity of the forms with the opposite properties, and
is reconcilable with a positive method, the hypothesis, in the
Republic: if it is not possible to say that one of the forms, as one,
contains the many in itself, then we may exclude the opposite
properties in the forms.

But the highest theory of forms, the highest for its Radical Purity,
has a weak nature that Parmenides quickly indicates (130 a-134 c).
Parmenides rejects the relationship between the axioms or between the
auxiliaries and one or more of the fourteen assertions. Here Socrates
recognizes eight situations of aporia. In his second chapter R. sums
them up in his abbreviations (53-94). For example, for the "third man":
it is the combination of OM, SP, NSP, O and RP in the presence of an
insuperable resistance to the combination of OM, SP, NSP and U. The
reflection on the "third man" starts in the Phaedrus, the Republic and
the Timaeus. But is it correct to underline the function both of OM and
of SP, both of NSP and of O, both of RP and of U? Does Plato choose the
route that R. outlines? Clearly, the problem is the participation of
the many in the forms. But R. indicates more than one combination that
does not find adequate support in the text.[[5]]

Immediately afterwards, the Parmenides has a section dealing with the
method that may be useful to save the theory of forms, checking the
force of the refutation (134 c-137 c). R. offers a reconstruction of
this in his third chapter (95-111). It is not possible to admit a
drastic solution, the refusal of One-over-Many and Itself-by-Itself,
the starting axioms: without One-over-Many and Itself-by-Itself, the
theory of forms vanishes. But, without the theory of forms, it is not
possible to develop the inquiry R. does not forget the definition
suggested by Book VI of the Republic: the inquiry transcends the
sensible, with its method, hypothesis;it advances among the forms, and
in the forms finds knowledge. This leads in the Parmenides to a
technical interpretation of gymnazesthai. Here the inquiry is to apply
to the forms, and not to the sensible. But in order to understand
gymnazesthai, the value of pros in relationship with hen and polla is
undoubtedly a problem. Quite rightly, R. rejects the
hypersemanticisation that critics mostly prefer, the Meinwald Reading:
pros has the common value, the value that the Parmenides indicates, the
value fixed in the Symposium, by Diotima, or in the Hippias Major.

The sequence of the eight deductions occupies the fourth, fifth, sixth,
and the seventh chapters, with the last covering the last four
deductions. The asymmetry is striking, but it is coherent with both the
number of pages that Plato offers for the eight deductions, and the
value that the last four deductions possess for the
reconstruction.[[6]]

R. advances along the rugged paths of the one (112-137). And he
observes the separation between the one and the many, between the one
and to holon, the arche or the teleute, between the one and peras,
kinesis, rotation, the similar and the tauton, between the one and the
time, between the one and the becoming, between the one and the
knowledge as science or as an opinion (137 c-142 a). The result is
commendable, because it enables us to understand the connection between
the arguments. Quite rightly, R. affirms that the connection between
the arguments is lacking for the one. But he burdens the system of
abbreviations for axioms, for auxiliaries and for the fourteen
assertions with a further web of abbreviations for the arguments. Hence
the style: "assuming RP, if the one is, then the one is not in time
(DIA16C), i.e., does not partake of time (by SBP)". Clearly, RP has a
decisive function: the status of the one, Plato recognizes, is not
reconcilable with Radical Purity.

Among the eight deductions, the second occupies fully fourteen
Stephanus pages (142 b-155 e). The aim is to demonstrate by
thirty-three arguments that it is not possible, for the one, to exclude
the presence of the opposite forms. The strength of the arguments gives
rise to more than one contradiction: the theory of forms is considered
to be at risk. R. proves that here, Plato rejects Radical Purity to
save the theory of forms. The relationship that Plato has here with the
poem of Parmenides, with his sequence of aletheia (8, 1-49 Diels-Kranz)
is evident. But the discussion that R. offers, though excellent, does
not place the text in a historical perspective (139-187). Not
surprisingly, there is no reference to the Theaetetus (147 d-48 e), at
a short distance from research on the one as regards the mathematical
arrangement, or to the Philebus (23 c-31 b), if not for the one and the
dyad, for the function of the peras. And there is no reference to
Aristotle's Physics (226 b-227 a), which recalls the Parmenides for the
hapsis and the arithmos. R. does not renounce the outline of the
thirty-three arguments. As a positive result, he describes the weak
characters of D2A4, D2A12, D2A14: want of consistency, lacunas, flimsy
relationship with axioms or auxiliaries, flimsy relationship with the
fourteen assertions. But the force of D2A3 is great, with the many that
invades the status of the one. Quite rightly, R. discovers here that
the support both of P, Purity, and of U, the correspondence of the
forms to their properties, is undermined.

It is difficult to distinguish the kind of articulation that Plato
indicates for the Parmenides. The result will always reveal an
interpretation of the research on the one. Among the scanty words, a to
triton emerges for the section on the exaiphnes, the fundamental and
elusive moment that witnesses the becoming of the one (155 e-157 b).
But R., in the sixth chapter, affirms that the section has a marginal
status (188-211). However, the section on the exaiphnes proceeds by
means of the inextricable combination of four arguments that Plato
offers: D1A1, D1A17, D2A3, and D2A5. Without Radical Purity, the
section undoubtedly does not show the force to crush the theory of
forms. R. immediately indicates the problem: Radical Purity is not
reconcilable with time, the inexorable dynamics that participation
requires. Plato arrives at the difficult relationship with things,
talla, in order to demonstrate that the one gives rise to the existence
both of the forms and of the opposite forms (157 b-159 b). Soon the
result is turned upside down (159 b-160 b). Hence a contradiction that
finds an evident solution: time. But, it is obvious, time is not
reconcilable with Radical Purity.

For the last four deductions, Plato offers no more than six Stephanus
pages (160 b-166 c). The style, with rapid words mainly in an
elliptical sequence, derives from a tiredness that by itself hinders
the peaceful investigation of the first two deductions. But R. observes
them scrupulously: this is the seventh chapter (212-239). For the fifth
of the eight deductions, Plato indicates a new basis: the negation of
the one. But the aim is similar, because the negation of the one
immediately indicates the existence both of the forms and of the
opposite forms. It is possible to detect in embryo here the perspective
that inspires the reflection against Parmenides, the "patricide" in the
Sophist (241 d-242 b and 258 c-259 d). But R. proceeds with his web of
abbreviations. He obscures the result of the sixth: the existence of
the one, existence that requires time, which is indispensable for
assuming both participation and non-participation. R. affirms here that
the existence of the one proves by itself the existence of the forms.
But is this an obvious "exercise" for the addressee? The refusal both
of P, Purity, and of U, the correspondence of the forms to their
properties, prompts a solution to overcome the problem of the
"Piece-of-Pie", the image for the highest theory of forms. The
existence of the forms soon arrives, as the result of the negation of
the one. But the negation of the one makes more than one contradiction
between appearance and reality inevitable. In his commentary, Damascius
(IV 128, 17-129, 11 Westerink) indicates the relationship with the
Timaeus (48 e-56 c). It is not difficult to think of Book V and Book VI
of the Republic (478 c-480 a and 522 e-526 c). But this is not the
purpose: R. here regards the Parmenides as a monument of a sterile
consistency. Not surprisingly, the style of the section dealing with
the passage where Plato affirms that the negation of the one prevents
knowledge is flat.

In the last chapter, R. reaches the ambitious goal of his
reconstruction (240-250). The idea that Plato does not play is
plausible in itself: Plato discovers that, in order to save the theory
of forms from refutation, it is necessary to renounce auxiliaries or
one or more of the fourteen assertions.[[7]] But the result, which is
perhaps reconcilable with the need for order, for mathematic sapheneia,
is repellent: "at the apex of the theory stand the two axioms, OM and
II, II entails S, NSP and NSE, OM entails both O and E and ... NMTO (O
also follows from the conjunction of PC and CON)".

The list of References is extensive and very useful: more than 125
works, essays and reviews. Apart from the comment by Wundt, of 1935,
all are in English.

At the end of this densely reasoned monograph, it is difficult to
detect the research of Plato, his concrete, laboured effort to conquer
the theory of forms. It is true that for the axioms or auxiliaries, and
for the fourteen assertions, R. recalls, all in English, the words of
Plato. But is it right to understand the Parmenides only with axioms or
auxiliaries and to postulate in Plato a consciousness of the fourteen
assertions? The web of abbreviations is too thick for a reconstruction
faithful to the text. Among the fourteen assertions, there emerges KF,
Knowledge of Forms, which substantially recalls PHK, at the end of the
auxiliaries, and among the fourteen assertions, there is no precise
motivation for the presence, after NMTO, No More Than One, of U or of
O. R. then claims a central value, among the fourteen assertions, for
P*, too similar to P, and hides, without any abbreviations, both the
non-mutability suggested in Phaedo (78 b-80 e) and the eternity
suggested in the Timaeus (27 d-29 d and 37 c-38 c). The non-sensible
nature of the forms is considered as a "refrain", which, however,
divides them from material reality. In the adoption of abbreviations,
an extreme subjectivity is obvious and inevitable. But R. proceeds
against the text of the Parmenides in order to enclose within the terms
of a theory the ever-changing dynamics of research.[[8]]


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Notes:


1.   One indispensable datum is undoubtedly missing: the sequence of
the works. For example, the problem of the Timaeus is well-known. R.
insists on the short distance from the Republic. And not by chance: the
initial dialogue (17 a-20 d) recalls the Republic. But critics mainly
drift towards the Laws, apart from the stylometric question, for the
relationship with the sensible or for the conception of mimesis. Cf. M.
Erler, Die Philosophie der Antike 2/2, Platon, Basel 2007, 262-272.

2.   C. H. Zuckert, "Plato's Parmenides: A Dramatic Reading", The
Review of Metaphysics 51 (1998), 875-906 should be added to the
References along with A. Graeser, who, with his contributions "Wie
ueber Ideen Sprechen? Parmenides", in T. Kobusch, B. Mojsich (ed.),
Platon, Seine Dialoge in der Sicht neuer Forschungen, Darmstadt 1996,
146-166, and Platons Parmenides, Stuttgart 2003, 3-84, recalls the
study of Speusippus on the one and the debate in the Academy.

3.   Cf. L. Brisson, Platon, Parme/nide, Paris 1994, 293-306, and F.
Ferrari, Platone, Parmenide, Milano 2004, 9-18.

4.   Cf. M. Erler, Platon, Muenchen 2006, 101-124.

5.   Cf. L. Brisson, "Come rendere conto della partecipazione del
sensibile all'intelligibile in Platone?", in F. Fronterotta, W. Leszl
(ed.), Eidos - Idea, Platone, Aristotele e la tradizione platonica,
Sankt Augustin 2005, 25-36.

6.   It is difficult to establish the text of the passage from which
the sequence of the eight deductions derives. R. expunges, with Wundt,
the second hen from eite hen estin eite me hen, on the basis of the
content. But he neglects the weight of B, of T, of W, of a mediaeval
tradition which offers undoubtedly the second hen. Cf. A. Carlini,
"Marsilio Ficino e il testo di Platone", in S. Gentile, S. Toussaint
(ed.), Marsilio Ficino: fonti, testi, fortuna, Roma 2006, 25-64, and
for the Parmenides, "PVindob G 3088 and PDuke G 5", in Corpus dei
Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini, I 1***, Firenze 1999, 146-154.

7.   The idea that Plato does not play clearly entails the refusal of
an ironic interpretation, the refusal of Cherniss or of Calogero, who
gives a more fruitful interpretation for the aporetic phase. Cf. G.
Giannantoni, Dialogo socratico e nascita della dialettica nella
filosofia di Platone, Napoli 2005, 89-140.

8.   Other reviews of the book: J. Palmer, Philosophy Reviews
2007.11.20, K. M. Sayre, Journal of the History of Philosophy 46
(2008), 169-170, K. Thein, Rhizai 2 (2007), 339-349.