BMCR 2009.01.06, Pauliina Remes, Plotinus on Self

Pauliina Remes, Plotinus on Self: The Philosophy of the 'We'.
Cambridge/New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2007.  Pp. ix, 287.
ISBN 9780521867290.  $95.00.

Reviewed by Giannis Stamatellos, New York College, Athens and Doukas
School ([email protected])
Word count:  1680 words
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Table of Contents
(http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0808/2008270846-t.html)

During the last thirty years of scholarship considerable attention has
been paid to Plotinus' theory of the self. The first complete monograph
derives from G. O. Daly's influential study Plotinus' Philosophy of the
Self (published in 1973) and, so far, a considerable number of studies
have been published on Plotinus' conception of selfhood, with more
recently the work of Richard Sorabji Self: Ancient and Modern Insights
about Individuality, Life and Death (Oxford, 2006). Remes' book aims to
offer a new, complete and multi-angled study on Plotinus' philosophy of
the self 'not just for students and scholars of Neoplatonism but also
for readers interested in self and/or ancient philosophy in general,
but who may be unacquainted with the subtleties of the heavy
metaphysics of Plotinus' (p. 18).

Ancient philosophers constantly declared the importance of
self-knowledge and self-reflection. From the Presocratic and the
Socratic exhortation to 'know yourself', to the Stoic psychology of the
self, the concept of selfhood underlies not only the self-reflective
nature of psyche but also the perceptible and cognitive relation of
ourselves to the others. Plotinus develops the concept of selfhood in
different philosophical matters. Initially he notably prefers the
plural 'we' in place of a singular 'I' and poses, as Remes correctly
states (p. 9), the central philosophical aporia: 'Who are we?' (Ennead
VI.4.14.16). This question highlights the distinction between the terms
'person' and 'self'; whereas 'person' is a term related to the body,
preferences and responsibilities, the term 'self' is more directly
related to human soul.

Plotinus envisions psyche as having an amphibious nature (Ennead
IV.8.4); the human soul has a 'double life' and a 'double nature'
participating in both the intelligible and the perceptible realms
(Ennead IV.8.8.11-13). It occupies a 'middle rank' at the boundary
between the higher intelligible world of the Forms and the lower
corporeal nature of the perceptible reality (Ennead IV.8.7.5).
Plotinus' famous metaphor of the soul is that of a 'double city, one
above and one composed of the lower elements set in order by the powers
above' (Ennead IV.4.17.30 ff.). On this basis, Remes maintains that
Plotinus conceptualises two notions of the self: the higher rational
self and the lower corporeal self. Whereas the former marks soul's
goodness, knowledge and intelligence, the latter signifies imperfection
and opinion.  The author supports the position that, for Plotinus,
there is unsubstantiated connection between the higher self and the
faculties and capacities of the embodied self such as that of
sense-perception and phantasia. Remes correctly states that 'through
its share of these capacities, the lower part does tend towards a
rational organization even if it does not succeed in expressing this
tendency. The inner self is the spring of the self-conscious and
deliberative life of the composite. The rational or intellectual
dimension dominates the whole picture, but the bodily dimension is not
neglected' (p. 256).

Remes' monograph on Plotinus' philosophy of self is divided in two main
parts. After an informative introduction on the aims and the objectives
of the book, the first part investigates the internal nature of
selfhood with regard to the ontological relationship between
higher-intelligible self and the lower-embodied self; the self as
conscious center of awareness; self-knowledge and self-thinking as
integral capacities of selfhood. The second part investigates the
interrelated structure of the self between the perceptible world and
the intelligible world with special reference to the limits of the
self, self-determination, self-control and self-constitution. The book
is also supplemented by an index locorum.

Particularly, in the first chapter Remes focuses on Plotinus' ontology
of selfhood. The author correctly places this discussion within the
framework of Plotinus' metaphysics of being and the anthropology of
psyche. Plotinus' metaphysics entails a kind of anthropology of the
selves based on the ontological distinction between eternal universals
and temporal particulars. Whereas eternal entities persist in the
stable identity and unity of the intelligible forms, temporal beings
exist in the temporal flux and continuity of becoming. On this basis,
Remes maintains two kinds of selves: (1) the higher selves related to
the pure eternal life of the intelligible being and (2) the composite
soul-body selves related to the fluidity of temporal becoming. For
Remes, 'Plotinus seems to think that an entity in time is stretched
across episodes in analogy with the way an entity in matter has spatial
parts' (p. 13). However, Plotinus is careful to discriminate between
temporal and spatial existences. For instance, in Ennead III.7 Plotinus
criticises previous theories of time due to their association of
chronos with physical motion, bodily change or spatial properties. For
Plotinus temporal motion and spatial movements must be distinguished:
since motion occurs in time, time cannot be identified with something
occurring in it (III.7.8.45-47). Spatial movement can stop or be
interrupted, but temporal motion cannot (III.7.8.6-8).

Within the framework, the first chapter is further divided in two
parts. The first part (pp. 32-59) exposes Plotinus' metaphysical
discrimination between being and becoming, eternity and time. Remes
correctly highlights the ontological relationship between eternal
beings and temporal particulars by stressing their diverse metaphysical
unity, identity and persistence throughout the hypostases of being. The
author appropriately maintains that Plotinus' metaphysics and ontology
is an essential prerequisite for understanding his philosophy of self
and the possibility and structure of self-knowledge (p. 55 ff.). In the
second part (pp. 59-91), Remes focuses on human individuals and
individuality in relation to Plotinus' notion of self. The discussion
is based on two extremes (p. 60 ff.): on the one hand, there is an
argument that human individuality justifies, in metaphysical terms, the
existence of forms of individuals and, on the other hand, that the
'fall' of the soul from the higher realms of existence causes a
deficient temporal existence of individuality. On this Remes offers an
enlightening discussion on Plotinus' understanding of the Platonic
forms and their metaphysical connection to soul-forms, logoi and
individuality. The author concludes that an embodied self is a
deficient entity due to disunited psychic individuality compared to
higher self that persists in the perfect unity and stability of
Intellect.

Remes frequently speaks of 'embodied selves' or 'embodied souls';
however, it has to be mentioned, that Plotinus usually describes psyche
to animate or illuminate perceptible bodies through logos (IV.3.10):
soul is not conceived as present in the body but the body as present in
the soul. Therefore, for Plotinus, it is more appropriate to speak of
'ensouled bodies' rather than 'embodied souls' (IV.3.22-23). Following
this rationale a questions must be posed: is it 'we', as Remes
maintains, that find ourselves as composite and embodied individuals
(p. 85), or is it 'we' that recognize ourselves as intelligible
ensouled beings?

In the second chapter, Remes focuses on Plotinus' analysis of awareness
and consciousness as centers of the self. This chapter is divided into
two parts by offering two different perspectives of selfhood related to
'body' and 'mind'. The first part (pp. 96-110) exposes 'bodily
self-awareness' (sunaisthe^sis) with special reference to the concepts
of 'immediacy' as the directness of the way knowledge is gained by the
self; 'unity' of the experiencing subject and 'ownness' of experience
at a first-personal level. In this part Remes correctly highlights and
properly justifies the Stoic influence in Plotinus' conception of
bodily proprioception. The second part (pp. 110-124) focuses on the
inquiry of personal identity as mental connectedness with special
reference to the relationship between memory and consciousness related
to the temporal self; the problem of double-selfhood between personal
identity and the inner self is also discussed. For Remes,
self-awareness characterizes all levels of selfhood, and on this basis
a metaphysical connection between the higher self and the lower self
could be established.

In the third chapter, Remes investigates Plotinus' reflections on
rational self and its knowledge of itself. For the author the higher
self and the animated self are interrelated through an innate exercise
of reason, consciousness and self-reflection. The embodied self is able
through self-knowledge and reasoning to actualize intellection and to
integrate itself to the higher reality of the Forms. Through this
process human psyche realizes unity and coherence beyond multiplicity
and plurality. The dianoia leads the soul to awareness of its own
intelligible capacities and ascends through self-knowledge to reason to
the higher reality of nous. On this issue, Remes correctly notes that
Plotinus foreshadows Edmund Husserl's view of the self as being subject
and object of the world simultaneously: "Plotinus demands that true
self-knowledge ought to reveal the self not just qua the object, but
qua the subject of thinking. There is an aspect of subjectivity that
persistently flees the objectifying gaze" (p. 15).

Chapter four opens Remes' section on the construction of selfhood
between the world and the ideal. In this chapter, Remes focuses on the
ways and faculties through which selfhood is realized in real life with
special reference to self-determination, self-control and
self-constitution as 'acts' of the self that relate to human freedom
and emotions. Through these 'acts' the self realizes its ideal core and
integrates with its supreme intelligible origins. On this basis,
chapter 5 is an exposition of the role of the self as moral agent.
Remes discusses Plotinus' ethics of disinterested interest in
connection to virtue and moral action. Finally, in chapter 6, the
author offers a discussion on the limits of the self. Remes describes
the experience of self beyond the search for knowledge but the
identification with the supreme unity of the One.

In conclusion, Remes' monograph is a well-structured and informative
study on Plotinus' philosophy of self. The author uses in an
enlightening and scholarly way both primary and secondary sources,
deriving from ancient and modern inquiries about the self, on Plotinus'
theory of selfhood. Remes' most important contribution is that places
Plotinus' theory of the self within the Western philosophical tradition
and reestablishes the importance of the Neoplatonist in the history of
ideas. The author appropriately shows that Plotinus' psychology on the
reflective nature of selfhood opens a new direction in the ancient
philosophical speculation of the self, but also foreshadows eminent
philosophical figures of later philosophical tradition such as Saint
Augustine, Rene^ Descartes, John Locke and Edmund Husserl.