BMCR 2009.01.07, Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides

Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides: revised and
expanded edition; with a new introduction, three supplemental essays,
and an essay by Gregory Vlastos (originally published 1970).  Las
Vegas:  Parmenides Pub., 2008.  Pp. lix, 408.  ISBN 9781930972117.
$42.00 (pb).

Reviewed by Marina N. Volf, Novosibirsk State University, Russia
([email protected])
Word count:  3413 words
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To read a print-formatted version of this review, see
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Alexander Mourelatos's book The Route of  Parmenides does not require
any special introduction since it has become a classic in Parmenides
studies. Now, thanks to "Parmenides Publishing", we have both a new
reprint of this remarkable book and an opportunity to look at it from
new angles.

The Route, being already part of philosophical history, has a history
of its own. This explains its structure with a new preface and
afterword written for this edition and its overall composition. The
book has three parts with nine chapters, four appendixes and detailed
explanatory notes. The first part is a new edition of The Route
originally published in 1970. As Mourelatos explains, "the revisions
... are modest: mostly corrections of misprints; altering or adjusting
some misleading formulations; editing some egregiously dated
phrases;... and the like" (p. xi).

The Route starts with a detailed and informative table of contents
which allows easy navigation around the book. In the preface entitled
Returning to Elea: Preface and Afterword to the Revised and Expanded
Edition of "The Route of Parmenides" Mourelatos recounts the history of
his studying the Parmenidean poem and writing The Route, starting with
a critical discussion of the main ideas of his dissertation on
Parmenides written in 1963. Then he recounts the problems raised in The
Route and the initial feedback just after its publication (1963-1968).
He also considers transformation of some of his points of view
expressed in the 1970s. Finally, Mourelatos discusses the prospects of
the conception stated in The Routes of 2008. It is a very intimate
section of the book in which we get to know Mourelatos as a scholar and
a person.

As we can see from the preface (and, to some extent, from the
dedication of the book to Wilfrid Sellars, the first supervisor of
Mourelatos), the combination of a strict analytical approach with
classics methodology isn't accidental in Mourelatos's work. He was able
not only to successfully integrate the methodology of classics studies
and analytic philosophy which might seem incommensurable but also pass
on this new approach to his followers.

The genre of review doesn't allow mentioning all aspects and relations
between the terms, concepts, and their meaning which follow from the
analysis of the Greek text of the poem. Each reader has to do this work
and estimate the importance of Mourelatos's contribution to this field
on their own. We are able to offer only brief remarks and a general
conclusion on the content of the book.

Parmenides wrote not a philosophical treatise but a poem in hexameters.
And it is evident to Mourelatos that before analyzing Parmenides as a
philosopher we must put him in the contextual background of classical
texts of Homer, Hesiod etc. This could give us "a key toward
understanding the syntax and semantics,... the precise sense of his
metaphors and images, and the wider context of his mythical allusions"
(p. 1). This is the point of the first chapter "Epic Form" in which
Mourelatos analyzes composition, vocabulary, and epic phraseology and
points out some exact parallels with Homer (Iliad, Odyssey and Homeric
Hymns) and a number of other parallels similar to Homeric formulae.
Mourelatos also points out a number of epic motifs in the poem and
focuses on the The-Journey motif present both in Odyssey and in
Parmenides. Parmenides's hexameter is specifically analyzed in Appendix
I.

In the second chapter "Cognitive Quest and the Route" special attention
is given to fragments B2.3 and B2.5. Mourelatos thinks that, since
1960s, the interpreters of the poem have come to a consensus about this
fragment on three points: 1) <greek>e)sti</greek> and
<greek>ei)=nai</greek> have an existential force; 2) the absence of the
subject for these verb-forms; 3) these verb forms are not "impersonal"
(p. 47). The criticism of Mourelatos is directed against the
existential force of <greek>e)sti</greek>. The interpretations of the
subjectless <greek>e)sti</greek> is stated more extensively in Appendix
II.

Mourelatos formulates his objection analyzing different meanings of the
verb <greek>e)sti</greek>. First of all, it was a "veridical use of
'is'" formulated by Charles Kahn:  ("<greek>ei)=nai</greek> when used
without predicates does not mean 'to exist' but 'to be so', 'to be the
case', 'to be true'" (p. 48)). Secondly, he considers G. Calogero's
point of view who argues that "<greek>e)sti</greek> represents no more
than the form of "judgment" or "affirmation"" (p. 51). In the logical
sense it means that we don't have any proposition but just a sentence
frame. Calogero's position that "only positive propositions are
possible" is vulnerable as is vulnerable, according to Mourelatos, any
other interpretation "based on an initial confusion of copulative and
existential predication" (p. 54). Further, Mourelatos discusses
'speculative' predication. According to him, Parmenidean predication
must answer the question "What is it?", and thus mean "rather for a
complete exposure of, and insight into, the identity of a thing to such
an extent and in such a manner that no further questions with respect
to that thing need or may arise" (p. 57) and "the subject fully
explains itself, and in terms of itself. Predication so understood is
at once analysis, explication, and explanation" (Ibid.). Interpretation
like this deals with "reality" and is quite available for the
Parmenidean doctrine.

Next, Mourelatos considers the notions <greek>fu/sis</greek> and
<greek>a)lh/qeia</greek>. In his opinion, the latter is more suitable
for the Parmenidean doctrine. If the philosophy of Parmenides was a
cognitive quest, then its aim was inquiry into the
<greek>a)lh/qeia</greek> not the <greek>fu/sis</greek> which was the
aim of the previous philosophy. It also confirms etymology of the word:
"<greek>a)</greek> (privative) + <greek>lhq</greek> + noun-suffix: the
denial of a state or condition of <greek>lanqa/nein</greek>, "to escape
notice, detection"" (p. 64), i.e. non-latency. Thus it is the route
from "the proximate but "latent" to the transcendent but "non-latent"
identity of things" (p. 67). Although Mourelatos concludes that it was
better to translate this word as "truth" and it was a warranted and
common translation, his arguments show that <greek>a)lh/qeia</greek>
and <greek>to\</greek> <greek>e)o/n</greek> were equivalent in
Parmenides and he uses these words in the sense of "the real" and
"reality". He also discusses the use of the words
<greek>di/zhsis</greek> and <greek>noei=n</greek> as more suitable for
speculative predication. "The routes presented by the goddess are open
to mind (<greek>noh=sai</greek>) in its quest (<greek>di/zhsis</greek>)
for reality (<greek>a)lh/qeia</greek>)" (p. 70).

Finally, the last argument for the rejection of the existential force
of the verb "is" is the translation of "<greek>o(/pws</greek>
<greek>e)/stin</greek>" (p. 70-71). Usually, it was translated as "that
it is" and it was typical for the existential reading. Mourelatos
suggests the translation "how it is" and this variant takes us from
mere designation of the existence ("X exists") to the predicational
force of the statement ("X is Y" or "X is really F").

In the third chapter "The Vagueness of What-Is-Not" Mourelatos shows
why "the rejection of the negative route is not a rejection of negative
predication in general" (p. 75) and "it is rather a rejection of
negative attributes in answer to speculative, cosmological questions"
(Ibid.). Mourelatos considers "what-is-not" from the position of
literary analysis (p. 75-78), logical analysis (p. 78-80) and shows
that entities which can be invoked in answers to the speculative
question about reality cannot be opposites because if one of them
counts as <greek>e)o/n</greek>, "the other is no more than the
indefiniteness of empty, unbounded, range" (p. 80). Then, Mourelatos
analyzes the weaknesses of other translations of B8.54 different from
his own, and the problems related to the interpretation of the
Parmenidean doctrine as monism or dualism. Mourelatos offers his own
translation of B8.54 about two perceptible forms, "one of which it is
not right to name" and gives a detailed proof of this variant (p.
81-85).

In Chapter 4 "Signposts" Mourelatos examines B8. His purpose is to show
that all signs of "what-is" were included in the proof of the positive
route of "Truth" and they were "programmatic announcement" and proofs
for each sign. If the motion along the true route is possible only due
to special marks -- signposts or milestones in some sense, so what are
these marks? Parmenides used in B8 two types of arguments: the indirect
proof (which is the same as the reduction to absurdity) and the
diagnosis of infinite regress. The first proof is "Ungenerable" (p.
96-111). The proof has three stages and seven hypotheses (p. 99).
Exploring the structure of first stage, Mourelatos reconstructs and
presents a detailed scheme of the whole proof. The important point
which he substantiates is: "there are a number of uses of "is" which
are correctly understood as tenseless", i.e. truth contained in such
is-assertions is necessary like in the assertion "seven is a prime
number" (p. 103-104). If we add "was and will be" to these assertions
they will become meaningless. "The domain of tenseless propositions is
the domain of necessary truths, and so it includes definitions,
classificatory truths, and logical entailments" (p. 104). If
<greek>e)sti</greek> is tenseless, then these assertions must possess
the characteristics of speculative predication; they must be be
assertions about reality. Mourelatos argues that Parmenides not only
realized tenselessness of the <greek>e)sti</greek>, but intentionally
included this construction in his proof and it was probably in contrast
to B8.5 and B30 of Heraclitus and to a number of the epic formulae (p.
105-107). The second proof which Mourelatos examines in this chapter
was "Indivisible".

In the fifth chapter "The Bounds of Reality" Mourelatos continues
examining the arguments, notably the third proof "Immobile". First of
all, he pays attention to the analysis of the verb
<greek>kine/w</greek> and concludes that the meaning of this verb is
not "locomotion" but rather "egress" (= self-alienation) (p. 119). Next
he discusses the proof of "Complete" (B8.32-33 and B-38.42-49), shows
that here that we are dealing with a valid proof and demonstrates its
logical structure (p. 125). This passage contains four definitions of a
sphere, "unusual, but perfectly valid" (p. 127). Mourelatos shows that
"the comparison with a sphere becomes an argument for the completeness
of what-is" (p. 128) and argues that Parmenides "does not say that it
is a sphere" (p. 124). "Metaphor... is the appropriate concept" (p.
124). At the end of the chapter Mourelatos again raises the question
about Parmenidean monism or dualism (as a special case of pluralism)
and is in favor of monism, but such that is "compatible with numerical
plurality", i.e. "that it is "one", ... unique as an individual of
cosmic scale" (p. 133).

In the sixth chapter "Persuasion and Fidelity" Mourelatos analyzes "the
family of <greek>peiq</greek>-words" (p. 136) in Greek from Hesiod
where they first occur. These words have, according to Mourelatos,
"varying but logically distinct aspects of the relationship of
agreeable commitment" or "persuasion-compliance" relationship (p. 139).
Mourelatos counted six such aspects (p. 139-140). His diagram "The
logic of <greek>pei/qein</greek>" on p. 143 clearly shows the
relationship between these aspects. Then he begins the analysis of
<greek>pei/qein</greek> in Parmenides in order to demonstrate the
logical relation between <greek>pi/stis</greek> and
<greek>do/ca</greek>. The route of positive predication is the "course
of Persuasion" and the man following this course is "sensitive to the
<greek>peiqw/</greek> which the goddess <greek>*Peiqw/</greek> herself
has bestowed on the real" (p. 160). Mourelatos argues that the divinity
or goddess who leads Kouros on the route of truth and who controls the
reality of what-is has four faces or hypostases: Constraint
(<greek>*)Ana/gkh</greek>), Fate (<greek>*Moi=ra</greek>), Justice
(<greek>*Di/kh</greek>) and Persuasion (<greek>*Peiqw/</greek>) (p.
160). To avoid misunderstanding Mourelatos emphasizes that "this
analysis of <greek>peiq</greek>-words in Parmenides serves primarily to
articulate a speculative metaphor. The only reality for Parmenides'
metaphysics is the what-is. In none of her four faces or hypostases is
the goddess an element of the ontology. The four faces of the polymorph
deity are aspects of the modality of necessity that controls
what-is..." (p. 161). The many-faced deity guaranteed the reality of
what-is, so if we forgot our commitments we'd find ourselves on a route
of doxa and start wandering (p. 163).

In the seventh chapter "Mind's Commitment to Reality" Mourelatos
analyzes the most difficult fragment of Parmenides -- B8.34. In the
beginning of the chapter he discusses the function of <greek>noei=n
</greek> in Parmenides: noting that this is, first of all, epistemic
terms, not psychological ones. "To know" or "to understand" is a more
suitable translation for this term but Mourelatos prefers a more
familiar variant -- "to think". Then he provides a detailed analysis of
a number of difficulties in reading and translating B8.34-38 and
proposes his own interpretation by reduction of the fragment to a
logical structure of six steps, which resulted in this statement: "So
<greek>e)o/n</greek> is not only a possible but a necessary object of
mind" (p. 175). But Mourelatos asserts that even though we speak about
the "necessary" relationship between mind and reality, it is incorrect
to think that necessity attaches to what-is. Reality does not exist
alongside the mind; men should reach it through challenging argument.
Mourelatos clarifies his interpretation by some parallels with logical
atomism (pp. 177-178) and ancient parallels with Plato and Heraclitus
(pp. 178-180).

The next question of this chapter was a question of reading
<greek>o)no/mastai</greek> in B8.38ff. Mourelatos clarifies the logic
of the Greek concept of "naming" or "calling" (p. 183) and draws the
conclusion: "Parmenides is telling us: No matter what it is that
mortals say, they must say it with reference to what-is" (p. 185). He
also draws here on the parallel with Empedocles B8-9.

The next chapter "Doxa as Acceptance" is devoted to examining the
meaning of <greek>dok</greek>-words in Greek and in the Parmenidean
poem. So, the <greek>dok</greek>-words are synonyms of
<greek>fain</greek>-words, but <greek>fain</greek>-words have
phenomenological sense while the <greek>dok</greek>-words --
criteriological. Therefore, doxa isn't "appearance" or "opinion"; it is
"acceptance" and men have some criteria to accept it. Further in the
chapter Mourelatos discusses the sense of <greek>xrh=n</greek> in
B1.31-32, proposes his variant of translation of this fragment and its
philosophical significance.

In the next chapter "Deceptive Words" Mourelatos analyzes "amphilogy"
or "equivocation", "ambiguity" -- those words used by mortals. He
emphasizes that the goddess, characterizing doxa, used the same
deceptive words as the mortals but put some irony into them (p. 228).
The analysis of 8.53 shows that the irony was put by Parmenides into
the grammatical stricture of statement. There is ambiguity in B8.60,
too.

There are many illustrative tables in this chapter. First,  is the
extensive table "Verbal and Conceptual Contrasts between "Doxa" and
"Truth"" (pp. 232-234). The phrases and words of doxa are compared to
denials in truth (p. 232). Mourelatos presents the seventeen paired
ideas in opposition (p. 234). Another table is "Ambiguity in the
Attributes of the Contraries" (pp. 242-243) which provides analysis of
the notions Light and Night with their positive and negative
associations. The third table "One-Many Contrariety of the Attributes
of Lights and Night" (p. 245) presents the multiple meanings of those
attributes. The last table is "Similarities-with-a-Difference between
"Doxa" and "Truth"" (pp. 248-249). All the passages in the left doxa
column show verbal resemblance with passages from the right truth
column (p. 248). And, finally, the conclusion that the poem style and
the speculative use of ambiguity, paradoxes and irony reminds us of the
dialogic practice of Socrates or early aporetic dialogues of Plato (p.
263) looks quite convincing.

There are four appendixes at the end of the first part. Some of them
I've already mentioned. Appendix II seems to be very interesting
because here Mourelatos examines "logically possible constructions of a
bare (subjectless and predicateless) <greek>e)sti</greek> or "is"" (p.
269). Mourelatos considers six distinct patterns, analyzes them in
detail and exemplifies, when possible, those interpretations which
correspond to each of the six examples. Appendix IV contains the
fragments of Parmenides's Greek text of the poem. Supplementary List of
Works Cited in Part I ends the first part.

The second part is entitled Three Supplemental Essays. This part
continues and concludes the position stated in The Route. The first
essay "Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Nai+ve Metaphysics of Things"
goes on to discuss the question about the opposites raised in Chapter
Nine of The Route. Mourelatos introduces the concept Nai+ve Metaphysics
of Things (NMT) and defines NMT as "metaphysics of opposed and cognate
characters-powers, in three postulates or requirements: (a) thinghood;
(b) equality of status and independence; (c) recognition of affinities
and polarities" (p. 303). The author concludes that Heraclitus and
Parmenides would have had distinct reactions to NMT, but they would
have unmistakably recognized the NMT language-game as "paradigm of the
world view of "mortals"" (p. 306).

Mourelatos discusses some texts of Hesiod and Anaximander in which the
world's view as NMT is reflected to the best advantage, although
Anaximander's text was a philosophical text. These texts are clearly
contrasted with the doctrines of Heraclitus and Parmenides, but these
philosophers were also in contrast to each other. Heraclitus was an
anti-realist, and Parmenides was an extreme realist. "Doxa" is a
perfect model of NMT" (p. 324). After Mourelatos's arguments it is
impossible to speak about Doxa without its connection with Truth, so we
shouldn't understand the negative route as mere rejection of one of the
opposites. The negative route is "totally uninformative". Mourelatos
argues that from this point of view the Heraclitean logos became a very
important notion and is connected to the doctrines of these two
philosophers. The world, according to this conception, is not to be
understood as world of things, a mixture, or thinghood, but "the world
we reach through language", "a conceptual or logos-textured world...
articulated in logical space" (p. 328).

The next essay "Determinancy and Indeterminancy, Being and Non-Being in
the Fragments of Parmenides" continues the theme of Chapter Two and
Appendix II discussing the copulative, existential or veridical sense
esti in B2. Mourelatos considered that "Parmenides' subjectless esti in
B2 is best understood as (syntactically) a bare copula, with both its
subject and its predicate complement deliberately suppressed" (p. 334).
He analyzes arguments justifying this construction and discusses the
meaning of negative predication in Parmenides. Next, he examines a
variety of <greek>a</greek>-negative adjectival and nominal compounds
in the poem, and notes the similarity of these constructions with Greek
poetry, drama and rhetoric, pointing out that they were a commonplace
in Greek literature. Finally, he discusses the contrast between Truth
and Doxa.

In the third essay of this part "Some Alternatives in Interpreting
Parmenides" Mourelatos formulates four brief theses which, in the 1960s
and 1970s, formed a consensus in interpreting Parmenides in English
language scholarship. He defines the content of these theses as
"Standard Interpretation" (SI) and points out that the prototype of SI
was Owen's famous article "Eleatic Question" (1960). According to
Mourelatos, SI has some advantages but a weak methodology. He
formulates five theses pointing out these weak positions of SI (pp.
354-355). Then Mourelatos discusses his interpretation and those points
in which it differs from SI, and very briefly repeats the basic
statements of The Route.

The third part includes the previously unpublished essay of Gregory
Vlastos ""Names" of Being in Parmenides". In this essay, G. Vlastos
discussed B8.38-41, notably variants of reading <greek>pa/nt</greek>'
<greek>o)/nom</greek>(<greek>a</greek>) <greek>e)/stai</greek> or
<greek>pa/nt</greek>'  <greek>o)no/mastai</greek>, as "names" or "have
been named" and after discussing both variants argues for the second
one. Vlastos's position is close to Mourelatos's point of view
recounted in Chapter Seven. This essay supplements Mourelatos's
commentary about the significance of this reading. Mourelatos also
discusses why Vlastos never published this text although it was known
that he had sent a draft of the essay to many scholars.

The book ends with detailed Indexes including references to
Parmenides's fragments, other ancient texts, Greek words previously
discussed, and names.

This paperback edition is attractive-looking, is of excellent printing
quality and has a nice design. I found only one misprint on p. 208.

The book is of importance for all interested in Presocratic philosophy,
not only Parmenides and Heraclitus, their doctrines and notions but
also for later ancient philosophy and classics as well. It can also be
used by students as a great didactic manual for early Greek philosophy.
The book contains a great amount of Greek etymology, accurate, original
and well-founded translations, and some discussion of secondary
literature. All this remains topical now in spite of almost forty years
since the first edition. For those familiar with the first edition this
one is also of an exceptional interest because, in addition to the main
text, the reader gets extended commentary in the preface and the last
two parts of book, and has an opportunity to trace both the
transformations of the main theses of the book and their prospects.