BMCR 2009.02.25, Michael B. Cosmopoulos, Experiencing War

Michael B. Cosmopoulos (ed.), Experiencing War: Trauma and Society from
Ancient Greece to the Iraq War.  Chicago:  Ares Publishers, 2007.  Pp.
v, 288.  ISBN 0890056064978.  $25.00 (pb).

Reviewed by Heather Sebo, The University of Melbourne
([email protected])
Word count:  2480 words
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Table of Contents (http://lccn.loc.gov/2007281847)

This volume of ten essays derives from the conference, "Achilles in
Iraq: War and Peace in Ancient Greece and Today", held at the
University of Missouri-St. Louis in April 2004.  A sense of mission,
which no doubt reflects the atmosphere of the conference, is palpable
in the present volume, which editor Michael Cosmopoulos describes as,
"a contribution towards raising awareness about and promoting
understanding of the catastrophic impact" of war and violence "on our
individual and collective lives" (1).  Contributors are passionate
about the fact that the lives and well-being of young soldiers depend
upon the votes of a civilian population that is often ignorant of, or
apathetic about, the realities of (and reasons for and against) war.
Specifically, the collection aims to use ancient Greek understandings
to think about "the ways in which war affects our lives at the
personal, social, and political level" (3).  It draws on a diversity of
expertise--from eminent scholars in the field of ancient Greek and
Roman warfare, to non-classicist academics, to practitioners whose
primary commitment is to the prevention and treatment of psychological
injury in American soldiers.

It must be said that the topics covered do not accord with the brief as
Cosmopoulos states it, or with the promise of the title.  As a glance
at the table of contents will confirm, the emphasis is overwhelmingly
on army personnel and the conduct of war: five chapters (4, 5, 6, 7, 9)
deal with combat experience (this includes Col. Westhusing's chapter on
the moral stance of the ideal American warrior), five chapters (3, 7,
8, 9, 10) with the causes of psychologically disabling combat trauma
(with some overlap between the two groups), and two chapters (8,10)
specifically with its proper treatment and prevention.  The remaining
chapters (1, 2) are concerned with the American public's ignorance of
the realities of war and the kinds of rhetorical appeal which won
support for the invasion of Iraq.  Important though these issues are,
they do not constitute a consideration of the impact of war on "our
individual and collective lives".  For instance, there is no mention of
the economic, environmental, and social costs of war, or the strain on
communities and individuals of coping long-term with traumatized and/or
disabled family members, or the continuing danger to civilians posed by
the lethal debris of modern war.  A brief account of individual
chapters follows.

Thomas Palaima ("Civilian Knowledge of War and Violence in Ancient
Athens and Modern America") contrasts the American culture of
censorship and media "spin" with the unflinching truth of Homeric
depiction of death in combat or Euripides' confronting portrayal in
Trojan Women of the consequences of defeat for a civilian population.
He observes that in fifth-century Athens, where military service was
universal for all adult males, no one was exempt from the sacrifices
and suffering of war.

Palaima also offers a detailed discussion of the dishonestly
sentimentalizing media accounts of the death of 2nd. Lt. Therrel
'Shane' Childers, the first US casualty in Iraq.  However, he
represents the annual state funeral ceremonies held in Athens for the
war dead as an honest acknowledgement of casualties rather than, as I
suggest, the vehicle for a similar kind of spin.  The funeral oration
customary on these occasions, the epitaphios logos, is famously
concerned with the heroization of the warrior dead and the
glorification of the state in a way perhaps reminiscent of the media
and government establishment culture he critiques so powerfully.

Moon and Collins ("Moving the State to War") compare Thucydides'
account of the debate between Alcibiades and Nicias over whether Athens
should invade Sicily (215 BCE) with the differing approaches of George
W. Bush, the US Congress, and the UN in the dispute over pre-emptive
war against Iraq (2002-03 CE).  Their comparison is loosely informed by
Aristotle's analysis in On Rhetoric of the principles of successful
political persuasion and the role of emotion in the formation of
rational judgements.  The authors conclude that in both cases
rationally inferior arguments were successful because they were coupled
with emotionally powerful appeals; in fifth century Athens, to shame
and patriotism and in modern America, to fear and patriotism.
Possibly because too much is attempted in too short a space, the
language of this piece is frustratingly woolly, for instance, a speech
that relies on "empirical" evidence is described as a "logical proof"
(46); "logical" is used as synonymous with "rational" (51, 54, 55) and
"proof" as synonymous with "argument" (55).  There are also editing
issues, for instance, one reads "passivity" where sense demands a word
like "energy" (39), "ignorance" for "innocence" (49), "insure" for
"ensure" (50).

Nadejda Popov ("The Place of Soldier Speeches in a Democracy at War.
Aeschylus and Michael Moore") compares the Messenger's tale, at
Agamemnon 551-82, of his suffering at Troy with the complaints of
soldiers in Iraq compiled by Michael Moore in Will They Ever Trust Us
Again? Letters from the War Zone.[[1]]  This is potentially an
interesting discussion, especially as the Messenger's account of the
siege conforms to fifth-century, rather than Homeric, practise and (as
Popov notes) probably alludes to the contemporary Egyptian campaigns.
Unfortunately, instead of allowing the telling similarities in
soldiers' experience to emerge in full acknowledgement of the patent
disparity between the two "texts", the author spends a great deal of
time attempting to demonstrate that the "texts" themselves (she
persists in calling them "case studies") are equivalent.  Thus, for
instance, in Popov's view, Moore's edited collection of emails and
letters (with introduction) is "in many ways a literary creation"
which, in the (entirely hypothetical) circumstance that it were ever
made into a documentary film, would be comparable to Aeschylus' thirty
line passage (from the Messenger's 160 line, three-part speech), even
in terms of "performance...dimension" (64).

Popov's claim that Aeschylus' dual "purpose" in lines 551-82 was to
convince the Athenians not to go to war with Sparta and not to maintain
their empire is questionable in its implication that a conception of
Athenian empire existed in 458 BCE and indefensible in its assertion of
authorial intention (75).[[2]]  In her view, Aeschylus' "goal" is
analogous to Moore's attempt to influence the outcome of the 2004
presidential election.  With similar imprecision, Popov construes
Odysseus' silencing of Thersites at Iliad 2.225-42 as evidence for
censorship of soldier speech in democratic fifth century Athens and as
equivalent to the modern punishment of court marshal for public
criticism by soldiers of the military in times of war.  The essay is
also marred by infelicities of language, as for example, "amount of the
similarities" (63), feelings "hinted upon" (72), soldiers letters
"eradiate a uniform message" (75).

Kurt Raaflaub's discussion ("Homer and Thucydides on Peace and Just
War") is informed by the tragic observation that peace movements tend
to fail.  His teasing out of the complex factors that work against
arbitration between opposing armies in Thucydides' History of the
Peloponnesian War and Homer's Iliad emphasizes that, ironically, men
are spurred to fight by the notion of "just war", by the belief that
they are in the right.  Less idealistically, men also fight if they
believe they can win.  Raaflaub observes that the "deep yearning" of
the rank and file of both Greeks and Trojans for peace in the Iliad
does not lead to an end to fighting and, even more sobering, that the
eloquent opposition to war mounted by comic and tragic playwrights in
fifth century Athens failed to influence the political decisions of
their audiences.  His essay leaves the reader with a certain
hopelessness about the possibility of peace.

Friend ("The Notion of a Fair Fight in Ancient Greece and in Modern
Warfare") contrasts the Greek hoplite ideal of the disciplined phalanx,
hand-to-hand combat, and all-out decisive battle with the attritional,
or guerrilla, approach to war in which individuals do not scruple to
retreat and the aim is to wear down the enemy.  Friend emphasizes the
continuities between the values of ancient Greek and modern soldiers,
especially their common admiration for an enemy who "fights by the
rules".  However, the author appears far too invested in the honour
codes he describes and, finally, to betray a serious lack of
objectivity when he writes of the Viet Cong guerrilla: "He uses
cowardly tactics and tries to avoid battle. Just as the Greek hoplite
despised light troops because their refused to stand their ground, the
modern soldier hates guerrillas for the same reason" (113).  One cannot
help but wonder how fair a fight can be if one side is hopelessly
outmatched by the other in weaponry and war technology.

Col. Ted Westhusing's lengthy contribution ("The American Warrior.
Winning the Nation's Wars, for 'This We Will Defend'") is included,
almost unedited, in respectful tribute to his memory.  The essay is a
patriotic statement of the moral attitude of an ideally "virtuous"
American warrior.  Westhusing's major concern is to define an ethical
standpoint from which a warrior may violate societies' injunction
against the taking of life, and be the most effective possible fighter,
without relinquishing self-respect and humanity.  In his view, this
involves management of the passions and natural selfishness through the
education of reason, exhaustive physical training, embracing of
"communally sanctioned Law", and ability to see the integrity of
unfamiliar social structures.  Sadly, but perhaps inevitably,
Westhusing's high minded idealism is belied by the contemporary and
historical real world information so abundantly provided by Tritle,
Matsakis, and Chrissanthos.

Lawrence Tritle ("Two Armies in Iraq: Tommy Franks in the Footsteps of
Alexander the Great") tellingly compares the ongoing American led
invasion of Iraq with Alexander's lightning swift conquest in 325 BCE.
He demonstrates that after the conquest of Babylon/Bagdad Alexander
quashed the early stages of a widespread insurgency similar to that
which has proved crippling for the US and her allies.  He writes of the
suffering and large casualties in the civilian population past and
present.

Tritle also focuses on the brutalizing and desensitizing effect on
soldiers of prolonged military campaigning and the unspeakable terror
of constant exposure to violent death.  He proposes that the "explosion
of conspiracies, imagined or other, that emerge in the sources" is
evidence that Alexander himself was suffering from the paranoia and
distortion of judgement symptomatic of PTSD (179).  Tritle concludes by
detailing the statistics for PTSD, depression, and suicide in Iraq and
Afghanistan veterans, concluding that American troops "are experiencing
the same sort of trauma that Alexander and his army found there, and
has been the case in every war since" (183).

Matsakis ("Three Faces of Post-traumatic Stress: Ares, Hercules, and
Hephaestus") claims that these three mythic figures are psychic models
which can provide new insights into post-traumatic stress.  (The author
gives Ares and Hephaestus their Greek names, but uses the Roman form
Hercules and makes no category distinction between the gods and the
hero.)  Matsakis' concern is with the treatment of PTSD, especially in
veterans, and I am willing to accept that her approach may make for
effective therapy.  But her version of Greek myth is entirely a
therapist's artefact and is in no sense a dialogue with ancient
understandings.  Matsakis takes no account of the contexts for the
stories she chooses to tell, of the complexities of cultural
difference, or of the wider intellectual discussion about the nature of
myth.  She writes as though Ares, Hercules, and Hephaestus were
historical people with psychological autonomy and personal agency.  She
tells us that Heracles' "gluttony", "binge drinking", and sexual
promiscuity are "motivated by guilt" but that Hephaestus, who suffers
from "depression, rage and self-loathing" as a result of parental abuse
and rejection, is able to find an "outlet" in his creative work and
make "a positive contribution to society" (197, 212, 221).  She claims
(without any sense of incongruity) that Ares becomes the god of war
largely because of "being confined in a bottle for thirteen months as a
toddler" (201).

Chrissanthos' material ("Aeneas in Iraq: Comparing The Roman And Modern
Battle Experience") is similar to Tritle's (above).  He compares the
experiences of soldiers from WWI through to Vietnam with their
counterparts in Caesar's Roman campaigns (an exception to the volume's
focus on Greece).  Chrissanthos links the unspecified illnesses that
afflicted Caesar's "'whole' army" with the psychological and physical
malaise typically suffered by modern soldiers during and after active
service (238).  He broaches the issue of alcohol and drugs abuse, the
practise of self-harm and, at the other end of the spectrum, the
perpetration of atrocities on those perceived to be the enemy.
Chrissanthos discusses desertion, mutiny, combat refusal, and even the
murder of "incompetent or ineffective superiors" (245).  He also notes
the phenomenon, then and now, of veteran movements for peace, as an
entirely positive and constructive manifestation of battle trauma.

Jonathan Shay ("Homer's Leaders in American Forces: Leadership and
Prevention of Psychological and Moral Injury"), a psychologist and
advocate for the America's servicemen and women, takes the view that,
if we cannot abolish war, the next best way to reduce psychological
injury in soldiers after combat--he rejects the term PTSD--is to
establish a culture of trust, especially between service members and
their leaders (272).  By way of illustration, Shay compares the
leadership styles of Achilleus, Agamemnon, and Odysseus in the Iliad
and Odyssey.  Shay's account clearly has direct application to American
military practice, but this unapologetically didactic purpose leads him
to simplify and shift the emphasis of the Homeric portrayals.  Ignoring
Achilles' tragic indecisiveness, he describes him as a blunt, truthful
leader who cares for the men and who, if he had lived, would have
brought most of them "home alive and in good heart" (265).  Conflating
the somewhat different portrayals of Odysseus in the Iliad and Odyssey,
Shay represents him as, by contrast, one who habitually lies to his
men, will take them into danger for personal gain, and brings no one
home alive.  Finally, Agamemnon, the Commander-in-Chief, the "almost
perfectly bad leader", will take no responsibility for his failure
effectively to blockade Troy, violates the armies' "moral order" by
refusing to ransom Chryseis, and publicly humiliates Achilleus (266).
Shay interprets the stampede for the ships that follows Agamemnon's
trial of the armies' loyalty as a predictable loss of morale resulting
from this betrayal of "'what's right'" (264).

Apart from its narrowness of scope, my other criticisms of the
collection are, first, that contributors do not acknowledge the obvious
differences between ancient and modern war technology; that we moderns
have far greater destructive capacity, that modern war has a global
impact, and that the stakes are perhaps as high as the ultimate
survival of humanity.  A second, related, regret--as my comments on
individual chapters have no doubt indicated--is that many contributions
look for exact matches, or, equally misleading, straightforward
contrasts, between the ancient material and modern American cultural
templates.  Too few chapters rise to the opportunity genuinely to
"think with" the complexity, otherness, and nuance of the ancient
material and thereby to arrive at truly surprising, even paradigm
shifting, insights.

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Notes:


1.   M. Moore. Will They Ever Trust Us Again? Letters from the War
Zone. Simon and Schuster: New York, 2004.

2.   For the difficulties associated with the term "empire" in the
context of fifth century Athens--and of determining when Athens may be
said to lead an empire rather than an alliance, see: P. Low (ed.), The
Athenian Empire. Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 2008.