BMCR 2009.02.40, John Frederick Phillips, Order from Disorder

John Frederick Phillips, Order from Disorder: Proclus' Doctrine of Evil
and Its Roots in Ancient Platonism. Ancient Mediterranean and Medieval
Texts and Contexts v. 5.  Leiden/Boston:  Brill, 2007.  Pp. ix, 280.
ISBN 9789004160187.  $153.00.

Reviewed by Todd Krulak, University of Pennsylvania
([email protected])
Word count:  1590 words
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Proclus has been the subject of intermittent attention over the past
century, but the last forty years have seen a gradual increase in
scholarly interest, evidenced by the translation of significant works
in his sizable corpus and the proliferation of detailed examinations
into various aspects of his philosophical ruminations.  John Phillips'
careful exploration of Proclus' doctrine of evil falls into the latter
category and offers to the reader a dissection of the sage's exegesis
of Plato and his appropriation or refutation of the interpretations of
those Middle and Late Platonists who precede him.  One of Proclus'
later works, De malorum subsistentia (DMS), is a treatise that focuses
solely upon the problem of evil and, for most readers, has served as
the final word on the subject.  Phillips argues that DMS is essentially
a synopsis of Proclus' doctrine of evil and that, to get a more
holistic picture of his thought, one must make a thorough accounting of
the way in which he and his Platonist forebears interpreted those
passages in Plato that speaks of evil.  It is Phillips' interest in the
exegetical tradition that is at the heart of his work, for while he
does not shy away from presenting Proclus' musings on evil, he is keen
to contextualize the Athenian philosopher in the light of previous
interpretations of Plato.

The book is divided into six chapters, beginning fairly broadly before
focusing on particular aspects of the relationship of evil to soul and
body.  The first chapter is an overview of Proclus' doctrine of evil.
Here the reader is introduced to the primary motivation behind the
sage's extensive treatment of the subject, namely the concern to retain
a form of monism in which the Primary Cause is entirely good. The
opponents are some gnostic philosophers and, closer to home, Platonists
like Plutarch, Numenius, and Atticus, who would argue for a dualistic
worldview in which there exists an evil world-soul that is co-eternal
with and independent of the Platonic Demiurge.  Proclus does not deny
the presence of evil in the world, but he is keen to absolve the Divine
of any direct responsibility.  This idea of "direct responsibility" is
key: Phillips demonstrates that, for Proclus, evil is not an entity
willed by the Divine but comes about as the result of disharmony at
lower ontological levels (e.g., a subversion of the proper relationship
between the irrational and rational souls).

Chapter Two delves deeper into the nature of evil, categorized by
Proclus as the privation of the Good.  Phillips highlights the two key
Platonic texts the philosopher interprets to be supportive of this
reading -- Theaetetus 176a and Sophist 257b-259b -- and then proceeds
to clarify how Proclus' position is formed in response to previous
thinkers, most notably Plotinus.  Both philosophers struggle to
formulate a concept of the nature of evil "according to which (a) it
exists and exists necessarily, (b) it exists as a special sort of
privation that exceeds that which is a mere absence of being, so that
it is an opposition to the Good and (c) nonetheless its opposition to
the Good is not so complete that the result is a dualistic doctrine"
(89-90); but Proclus differs from Plotinus on several issues,
especially on the latter's contention that the privation of the Good is
primary matter.  Phillips' detailed discussion of this point
demonstrates his mastery of the material and of the nuances involved in
the exegesis of the aforementioned Platonic texts.

Chapter Three is the first of two chapters to examine corporeal evil,
defined by Phillips as "privations of nature resulting both from the
mixture in them [bodies] of dissimilar elements and from what he
[Proclus] calls 'contrary form-principles'" (105) and as the "'chaotic
and disorderly motion' of the 'corporeal nature'" (106).  Proclus
understands this "corporeal nature," a term borrowed from Plato's
Statesman, to be the disorderly state mastered by the Demiurge as
described in the Timaeus.  Phillips again introduces the divergent
readings against which Proclus contends, focusing primarily on those
like Numenius and Plotinus who would see Matter as the Principle of
corporeal evil and on Porphyry who argues that evil is derived from
irrational, pre-cosmic bodies.  Proclus, however, argues for a median
state between these two poles, a proto-body introduced to matter by
vestigial traces of the Forms. This proto-body, disorderly and chaotic
in its motion, is the source of the evil found in natural bodies.

Chapter Four is an excellent discussion of the role of irrational
nature in the formation of bodies.  Phillips notes that Platonists
recognized the need to explain the disorderly state that existed before
the Demiurge fashioned the universe.  For dualists like Plutarch,
Numenius, or Atticus, this causes little consternation as they are able
to attribute this to an evil World Soul.  Monists like Proclus wish to
deny that soul could be the source of evil but were faced with the
difficult reality that the disorderly motion, though disorderly, is
indeed a type of motion which in Platonist physics is brought about by
soul.  Proclus finds his solution in a revision of Stoic physics in
which the lower, or irrational, nature, equated by the philosopher with
the "mortal form of soul" in Timaeus 69c, is posterior to soul but
capable of autokinesis.  The result is an ontological layer which,
though it has only the most tenuous connection to soul, is able to
impart an imperfect motion to the pre-cosmic soup. Yet this lower
nature also has connections to the higher orders which enable it to
serve as a conduit for the good things that descend from these orders.
Phillips' range is visible most clearly in this chapter as he capably
highlights the important differences between philosophers and the ways
that some of them utilize and manipulate Stoic principles for their own
ends.

The fifth chapter is the first of two chapters on evil as a privation
in the soul.  Phillips here notes the varying interpretations of Laws
896e, which serves as the foundational text for figures like Plutarch
and Atticus who would argue for an evil World Soul.  Phillips explores
the dualistic thought of these exegetes and enables the reader to
better understand why monists like Proclus would find it necessary to
reject any reading of Plato that suggests a principle of evil, and why
they would prefer instead to interpret the evil in the Laws passage as
representing a weakness of soul rather than as the product of an
independent entity.

In the final chapter, evil as the product of weakness in the human soul
is the topic, one that pits Proclus against Plotinus.  The two
philosophers agree that the soul's sinfulness is the result of an
inherent weakness, but the area of contention is the degree to which
Matter plays a role in the enticement of the soul to evil.  The role of
Matter in Plotinus' scheme has been noted above, but Proclus is
resistant to viewing it as a First Principle of evil that draws down
the soul, instead preferring to emphasize the soul's weakness as far as
the level of its activities. That is, evil is not essential to the
soul.  This position enables Proclus to find in the soul (without
having to adopt the dualistic tendencies of which Plotinus might be
accused) a deficiency that can cause it to act in ways that cause
disharmony and, thus, evil.

Phillips sifts through a significant amount of textual evidence that
has the potential to overwhelm the reader.  The author appears to
recognize this possibility and so, at the outset of every chapter,
provides a significant collection (usually anywhere between ten to
fifteen pages) of Proclus' writings pertinent to the chapter's subject
matter.  Unfortunately, this is less helpful than it might have been as
one is referred back to these excerpts relatively infrequently.  After
working one's way through these primary texts, it would have been
valuable to have had Phillips' expertise brought to bear more directly
upon them.  This is not to say that they are not mentioned at all, for
they find their way into footnotes and, less frequently, into the body
of the text itself, but more often Phillips' interests trend towards
previous interpreters of the Platonic texts, although he does not
always provide excerpts from their works in the body of the text).
Proclus' reactions to these philosophers are contained in the
preliminary excerpts, of course, but Phillips might have aided the
reader by commenting more overtly on them and indicating more clearly
how and why these contribute to his project.  Nevertheless, it is still
useful to have these texts collected in one place.

The one other minor issue that detracts from an otherwise excellent
book is the number of typographical and grammatical errors (e.g. a
sentence on page four reads, "My intention in the present study is
therefore not in the first place to present an analysis Proclus'
doctrine of evil..."). In one instance, too, I found, a citation in a
footnote for a work not present in the bibliography (242, n. 12).

These are all niggling issues, however, in the face of what is a strong
contribution to Proclean studies.  For those with an interest in
Neoplatonism, Proclus, and/or the manner in which late antique
philosophers grappled with the presence of evil in the physical world,
Order from Disorder is a valuable book, but it is also one that
requires a working knowledge of the Neoplatonists themselves, their
terminology, and, to a lesser extent, their ontologies.  Those who have
this data set will find their time spent reading Phillips' work to be a
wise investment.