BMCR 2009.02.41, Erik Eliasson, The Notion of That Which Depends

Erik Eliasson, The Notion of That Which Depends on Us in Plotinus and
Its Background. Philosophia Antiqua, v. 113.  Leiden/Boston:  Brill,
2008.  Pp. xii, 253.  ISBN 9789004166141.  $148.00.

Reviewed by Richard Dufour, Bibliothe\que de l'Universite/ Laval
([email protected])
Word count:  1534 words
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This book is based on a doctoral dissertation presented in 2005 at the
University of Uppsala, Sweden. The main purpose is to discuss Plotinus'
doctrine of "that which depends on us," both in light of the previous
scholarship and of the philosophical tradition preceding Plotinus. The
study divides itself into three major sections: the previous
scholarship on this topic in Plotinus (chap. 2), the ancient tradition
(from Aristotle to the Middle Platonists) (chap. 3-5), and the
reconsideration of Plotinus' doctrine (chap. 6). The end result is not
altogether satisfying. We get the impression that the subject under
examination, as far as Plotinus is concerned, cannot sustain a whole
doctoral thesis and that the examination of the tradition has been
grafted on to obtain a more substantial work. The section on the Middle
Platonists occupies nearly as much space with its 50 pages as does the
section on Plotinus (76 pages). The dissatisfaction grows as we
virtually race through the various figures of the tradition: Aristotle,
Aspasius, an Anonymous, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Chrysippus, Seneca,
Musonius, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Philo of Alexandria, Plutarch,
Alcinous, Ps.-Plutarch, Nemesius, Calcidius, Apuleius and Maximus of
Tyre. This survey is conducted at too fast a pace to be really useful
and it is rarely mentioned or used in the final chapter on the
reassessment of Plotinus' doctrine.

The investigation starts on a good basis. Eliasson (E. hereafter)
considers that the first philosophical use of the notion of what
depends on us appears in Aristotle. This usage is unsystematic and
closer to common usage. Chrysippus will make a more technical use of
the notion and it becomes in itself a point of debate and a subject of
study. Subsequently the notion mingles more and more with associated
topics such as destiny, providence and free will. This fact still has
repercussions today. As E. explains, the modern interpretations fail to
distinguish these notions and often take them as synonymous. The
literature on that which depends on us is thus to be found in studies
devoted to free will, providence and so on.

In an attempt at systematization, E. tries to group the modern
scholarship on these themes into five categories: the freedom
interpretation, the free choice interpretation, the free will
interpretation, the free action interpretation and the
self-determination interpretation. It is useful to map the various
solutions adopted by modern commentators, but we must be cautious,
since a single scholar can be put in several categories.[[1]] It
remains to be decided if these categorizations do justice to the
scholars thus classified. E. draws two conclusions from this
preliminary study.  First, Plotinus extends the notion of what depends
on us by applying it to the Intellect and to the One.  But, secondly,
he also narrows it. Where the Aristotelian notion was inclusive--the
action depends on us if it originates from the agent, no matter how it
originates--Plotinus, according to E., restricts its applicability to
the knowledgeable actions of virtuous agents.

We then begin our journey through three traditions: Aristotelian, Stoic
and Middle Platonic. In his analysis, E. is keen on imposing a
distinction of his own making: the inclusive versus the exclusive
notion of what depends on us. The inclusive notion applies when the
agent performs an action, even though this action is not prompted by a
rational agency. The exclusive notion applies when the agent acts
according to a rational agency. This distinction does not fit every
philosopher. Aristotle, for example, can be said to use both notions
(p. 60). Each philosopher under examination is more or less fitted into
one of these categories: Aspasius (inclusive), Alexander (exclusive),
Chrysippus (exclusive), and so on. The survey, as we said before, is
fast-paced, dry and superficial at times. A scholar already familiar
with this topic will not gain much. We may also question the necessity
of discussing Musonius, who makes a single reference to what depends on
us, or Marcus Aurelius, who devotes a single page to the notion and
whose interpretation can be summed up as "much like Epictetus", or
Philo, who uses the expression three times but proposes no theory on
the subject. In some of these cases, E. seems to extract much from a
text that says very little.

Plotinus' doctrine of what depends on us comes back again in chapter 6.
Attention is focused on this notion outside Enneads VI, 8 (39), namely
in: III, 1 (3); I, 4 (46) and III, 2 (47). It is not clear that these
passages say enough about what is up to us to warrant such extensive
examination.  E.'s verdict on III, 1 (3) is that the doctrine is
unclear. In I, 4 (46), Plotinus explains that if someone is not happy
being a war-slave, it is up to him to depart, i.e. commit suicide. E.
once again goes beyond the text. This casual use of what depends on us,
in my opinion, does not deserve the complicated analysis that E.
provides: "The point then, seems to be that in this setting, non-wise
agents come as close as they can towards acting in the way the wise man
acts" (p. 181). The single occurrence in I, 4 (46) is not that
informative. E. likewise overanalyses the single occurrence found in
III, 2 (47). He admits that the doctrine here is "not made explicit"
(p. 183) and he uses expressions which show a high degree of
conjecture, such as "if we extract a condition". He goes well beyond
caution when he concludes that it "seems safe to say" that all these
treatises could have contained in their title the expression "on that
which depends on us". These treatises, with their one and only
occurrence of the expression, could have been ignored, in the same way
that E. ignored the only occurrence found in On numbers, VI, 6 (34).
When concluding chapter 6, E. cannot go beyond saying that these
treatises "tend to" promote an exclusive use of the notion, since all
occurrences do not concur to an exclusive notion (p. 186). Thus, the
question is problematic (p. 186-187). Even if E., in his concluding
chapter, gets more confident in his accomplishment: "His [i.e.
Plotinus] notion of <greek>e)f' h(mi=n</greek> outside Ennead VI.8
clearly tends towards an exclusive notion" (p. 219), we believe that
there is just not enough evidence in Plotinus to warrant such a
conclusion.

When we read about Plotinus' doctrine on what depends on us, the main
focus is always on treatise 39, On the free will of the One. This
treatise is the only one which contains a detailed analysis of the
notion. E. is then bound to emphasize the doctrine presented in VI, 8
(39).[[2]] The introduction notice and several notes of this French
translation are devoted to what depends on us in Plotinus. E. roughly
follows the progression of Plotinus' doctrine in each chapter of VI, 8
(39). The notion of what depends on us is successively applied to the
individual soul, the Intellect and the One. According to E., Plotinus
dismisses the inclusive notion when he refutes Aristotle. The Plotinian
doctrine is even more exclusive than tradition would grant: not only is
rationality required for an activity to depend on us, but we must also
have a normative knowledge of what we should or should not do (p. 195).
What depends on us belongs to wish (<greek>bou/lhsis</greek>), when
this wish is placed in right reason and rational knowledge. This is, in
the human soul, the self-determined principle derived from Intellect.
Plotinus "gives a condition demanding that the agent (i) is virtuous,
(ii) thus thinks and contemplates, regarding e.g. what one ought to do,
and (iii) when acting, is not concerned with the outer consequences of
the actions, but with the inner perfection of the soul" (p. 206). As
for the Intellect, it is by its own wishes and for its own good that it
is turned toward itself. Its activity and its aim are the same and it
depends on no other. Finally, it is almost impossible to apply the
notion of what depends on us to the One. This is the general theme of
the impossibility of describing the One by means of language. But on a
more positive note, Plotinus recognizes that the One is master of
itself, since its own being depends on itself.

The overall conclusion of the investigation is that Plotinus holds an
extremely exclusive notion of what depends on us. He goes far beyond
what is traditionally conceived as an exclusive notion, i.e. linked to
rationality. Plotinus' innovation would be the self-directedness of the
activity when something depends on us. This is true at the level of the
individual soul, the Intellect and the One. No similar doctrine can be
found in the tradition.

The book closes with an extensive bibliography and an index locorum.
The bibliography is alphabetical and presents no subdivision between
editions of Plotinus' treatises, translations and studies on specific
themes. An index of modern authors would have been welcome.

As alluring as they sounded, the premises of this book did not hold
their promises. Even though the erudition is undeniable, the author
seemed trapped in a subject that could have sustained a long and rich
article but not a whole book.


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Notes:


1.   This is clearly the case of G. Leroux, who can be found in many of
these categories: Leroux, G. Plotin. Traite/ sur la liberte/ et la
volonte/ de l'Un [Enne/ade VI, 9 (39)]. Introduction, texte grec,
traduction et commentaire. Paris: Vrin, 1990.

2.   The major modern translation of and commentary on this treatise is
the one published in 1990 by G. Leroux. His manuscript probably being
already with the publisher, E. could not benefit from the most recent
annotated translation on VI, 8 (39) by L. Lavaud in the Garnier
Flammarion series In Plotin. Traite/s 38-41, traductions sous la
direction de L. Brisson et J.-F. Pradeau. Paris: Flammarion, 2007.