BMCR 2009.03.29, P. A. Meijer, Stoic Theology: Proofs for the Existence

P. A. Meijer, Stoic Theology: Proofs for the Existence of the Cosmic
God and of the Traditional Gods: Including a Commentary on Cleanthes'
Hymn on Zeus.  Delft:  Eburon, 2007.  Pp. xii, 256.  ISBN
9789059722026.  $39.00 (pb).

Reviewed by Marcelo D. Boeri, Universidad de los Andes, Chile
([email protected])
Word count:  3671 words
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To read a print-formatted version of this review, see
http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/2009/2009-03-29.html
To comment on this review, see
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It is a very well known fact that the works of the Older Stoics are
lost; their remains, spread and scattered as they are, are so many that
the researcher sometimes feels intimidated when attempting to account
for some particular issue in their thought.
So by gathering in a single book some of the main arguments the Stoics
designed to prove the existence of the cosmic god and the traditional
gods, Meijer ("M.") has produced a welcome addition to the growing
stock of studies devoted to the Stoics. This is a rich book full of
appealing suggestions and sometimes provocative readings; given its
length (256 pages of small and condensed type), however, I shall limit
myself to a brief consideration of some points of detail.

M.'s main purpose is to present "the Stoic arguments and the
counter-arguments against the existence of the Stoic cosmic god and the
traditional gods put forward by the adversaries of the Stoa" (p. xii).
The book also provides three appendixes (a translation and running
commentary of Cleanthes' "Hymn to Zeus"; a discussion of whether or not
Chrysippus situated the cosmos in the centre of the void; and an
examination of Alexinus' mocking parodies of Zeno's arguments), and
several indexes (of themes, of names, and of places). Although from the
very beginning the discussion is very technical, the introductions to
each chapter are quite useful for understanding the focus of the
chapter as a whole and the value of each argument within it. The book
may thus turn out to be appropriate for undergraduate students
interested in the foundations of Stoic theology. However, the work is
basically aimed at scholars with a good knowledge of the issues under
discussion.

As M. rightly remarks, some of the Stoic proofs involve the existence
of a cosmic god, i.e. the cosmos as a rational and wise being. This
implies that the Stoics were willing to defend a monotheistic stance,
although the alleged proofs for the existence of a cosmic mastermind do
not strictly speaking aim at proving the existence of the cosmic god,
but rather at proving that the cosmic god is rational, animate, and
wise. In fact, one of the major purposes of M's book is to argue that
the Stoic arguments presuppose the existence of a cosmic god (cf. p.
11; 24).

M. proceeds to develop his project by a critical exposition of some of
the key passages we have for reconstructing the Stoic doctrines. Thus
he quotes extensively many passages taken from Sextus Empiricus,
Diogenes Laertius, and Cicero, among others. For the most part, he
offers the original texts in Greek or Latin along with an English
translation in the footnotes.[[1]] M.'s translations are usually very
accurate, although I have some doubts about his rendering of logikon by
"logical". It seems a little weird to say that the cosmos is a
"logical" thing (see Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 9.104; quoted on
2).[[2]]

Chapter 1 is focused on Zeno's proofs of the existence of god (or
gods'); M. attempts to show that the Stoic acceptance of a highest
cosmic entity does not necessarily imply the existence of polytheistic
gods. M. is keen to show that, the Stoics did not deny the existence of
the traditional gods, but were more interested in showing that such
gods were not outside their physical system (see Zeno's proof for the
traditional gods on p. 1-2). Although M.'s case for this view sounds
reasonable ("they are manifestations of the great powers that permeate
the world" [p. 1]. . . "The tradition only needs physical support and
[. . . ] etymological explanation which shows their physical aspect or
essence" [p. 1]), it is no less certain that, using the names of the
traditional gods, did not stop the Stoics from giving them a new
meaning. This being so, it might be argued that the Stoics kept the
names of the traditional divinities, but the gods they had in mind were
entirely different, insofar as they were gods completely rationalized
and deprived of the non philosophical aspects of gods in the
traditional approach. (This is partially acknowledged by M. when he
claims that "Stoic physics is the instrument one needs to see through
the mythological veil" [p. 103], or that the traditional gods "were
reconsidered from a Stoic point of view"; p. 193). Thus in the Stoic
view Zeus becomes a name to refer to the rational principle that rules
and pervades the whole.

The focus of M.'s argument in this chapter, however, is that Zeno was
not particularly interested in proving the existence of gods or that
the cosmos is a god, but rather that the cosmos is animate and
"logical" or rational (24-25; see also 122). The point is relevant,
since if M. is right one should infer that Zeno took the existence of
the cosmos (which, according to Chrysippus, is god himself peculiarly
qualified, and consists of the entirety of substance; see DL 7.137, and
Stobaeus, Eclogae 1.184, 8 ff. ed. Wachsmuth = SVF 2.527; this is a
stance accepted by M.; see 54) to be a matter of fact, and hence
thougth that what one should do is to explore which kind of existent it
is (animate and rational). The other important feature in M.'s
reconstruction is focused on his analysis of Sextus' assertion that
Zeno took Xenophon as his starting-point. After an extensive
examination of Xenophon, Memorabilia I 4, 2-9 and 12-14, M. reasonably
concludes that the comparison between Xenophon's excerpt and Zeno's
argument is at best that a universal mind is present in both authors,
but while in Zeno the cosmos is a thinking mind, in Xenophon such a
mind is in the cosmos, apparently as something different from it (25).

The brief Chapter 2 deals with the role the traditional gods played in
Zeno's system. Zeno identified his philosophical god with the fiery
mind, and, as M. emphasizes, he appears to have rejected the idea that
the cosmos is god (32). Guided by his general thesis that the Stoic
proofs did not demonstrate the existence of gods, M. argues that the
only thing that Zeno proves is that the cosmos is a "logical thing" as
well as the cosmos is the ousia of god. The innovative aspect of this
chapter is found in the evidence provided to try to show that Zeno was
worried about introducing the traditional gods into his system (33-34).
But as M. himself recognizes, there is a problem here, since Cicero
reports that Zeno did away with people's ordinary ideas about god,
which seems inconsistent with Zeno's proofs of the existence of the
traditional gods (discussed on 2-3). M. solves the problem by
suggesting that the speaker in Cicero De natura deorum 1.36 (hereafter
ND) is Velleius, an opponent of the Stoics who is summarizing Zeno's
view (35). This is a nice way out, although the strong argument M.
offers is that it is questionable, if not improbable, that Zeno was
willing to state that the gods were lifeless and mute things. In fact,
neither air nor fire (ingredients with which Stoic gods are frequently
associated) are assumed to be lifeless (36).

Chapter 3 tackles Cleanthes' proofs of the origins of the notion of god
(as reported by Cicero, ND 2.13-15), and deals with the four causes
explaining the formation of the ideas of a highest power: (i)
foreknowledge of future events, (ii) the temperate climate and
fertility of the earth, and abundance of commodities, (iii) terrifying
phenomena, and (iv) the uniform and beautifully ordered motion and
revolution of the heavens. Once again, M. is particularly interested in
proving, contrary to the prevailing scholarly view, that these
Cleanthean causes are not arguments for the existence of gods:[[3]]
they "aim at understanding the growth of the concept 'god' rather than
the idea of existence" (38; see also 41).

I think M.'s view is right, as Cicero's text explicitly maintains that
"our own Cleanthes said that the notions of the gods (deorum notiones)
are formed in men's souls by four causes" (my translation), and there
is no trace in Cicero's report of arguments intended to prove the
existence of the gods (Cleanthes' conclusion is not "so god exists",
but "so the notion of god arises" [47]).

Although all M.'s interpretations of the four causes are interesting, I
find the analysis of cause 4 (see 45-52) especially important. Here M.
offers some arguments to show that all four of Cleanthes' causes are
derived from an Aristotelian background (cf. 100; this is a thesis that
already had been advance by Dragona-Monachu, as M. says). However, the
fact that some of his evidence presented is based on the testimony of
later authors[[4]] makes me think that we have reasons to suspect that
the "Stoic evidence" M. sees in the fragmentary Aristotle is actually
due to the probable Stoic influence on those authors, who are often
influenced by Stoic ideas. A more promising view might be to think that
the author behind Cleanthes is Plato, as M. in fact suggests when
quoting the Laws and its assertion that the belief in god is explained
by the priority of the soul with respect of the body and the beautiful
order in the universe (see p. 51, n.285). M. insists that, given his
own arguments that the cosmic god and the popular gods are clearly
distinguished in the early Stoa, Cleanthes must be seen as considering
the notion of 'god', rather than the notion of 'gods', as Cicero and
other sources note (52). By defending the thesis that god and the
cosmos do not coincide (as Chrysippus later assumed), Cleanthes would
thus have accepted what M. calls "a cosmic dualism", i.e. a sharp
distinction between god and the cosmos (54).

In one of the final sections of the chapter, M. attempts to show again
that Cleanthes was not interested in demonstrating the existence of
nature (understood as a power trying to bring itself to perfection),
but rather that such a nature is intelligent and wise (60-61). This is
clear, M. argues, because the existence of god is tacitly assumed in
the argument (see Cicero, ND 2.33-36, cited in full in 59-60). I'm
convinced that Cleanthes is not interested in proving the existence of
god; however, within the Ciceronian passage reporting Cleanthes'
arguments that the cosmos is intelligent and wise, it is said that god
is the universe (ND 2.34: supra hominem putanda est deoque tribuenda,
is est mundo, [quoted again and commented on by M. on 61]). If I
understand the passage correctly, Cleanthes seems to be saying that god
and the cosmos (themundus) are the same. This reading challenges M.'s
assertion that, unlike other "later Stoic texts", Cleanthes maintained
a dualism whose components were god and the world (54, referring to SVF
528; 636). In his comments on this line in Cicero, M. claims,
strikingly, in my view, that the thesis that the cosmos is god is not
present in Cleanthes (although he allows that it is present in Cicero;
see 67). As far as I can see, there is a sort of "hermeneutic circle"
here, insofar as M. treats Cicero as a reliable source while
reconstructing Cleanthes' arguments that the world is intelligent and
wise, but as unreliable when he suggests that Cleanthes might have
thought (as Chrysippus did) that the world is god. It is true that we
know from other sources that Cleanthes identified god with the ether
and maintained that Zeus leads the world. But this is not enough to
disqualify Cicero's report attributing to Cleanthes the view that the
cosmos is god (see 69-70).

Chapter 4 parallels Chapter 2 in being concerned with Cleanthes'
attitude towards the traditional gods. M. highlights the fact that,
like later Stoics, Cleanthes applies the etymological method to account
for Homer's gods. Conveniently M. shows that, although Zeus might be
taken to be the sun, in Cleanthes' "Hymn to Zeus" he handles the
thunderbolt, and therefore, cannot be identified with the sun (72). In
any case, the merit of this chapter is to remind us of the way in which
Cleanthes incorporated some traditional divinities into his
philosophical version of the gods (73-74). In this connection M.
stresses that Cleanthes' religious attitude must have been acceptable
in the eyes of the Greek people, although one may suspect that "the
Greek people" did not share or fully understand the philosophical
framework Cleanthes used to re-present the traditional gods. As I
suggested above, however, it does not matter that Cleanthes kept the
names of the traditional gods; what he is presenting under such names
is a highly refined and philosophical version of the traditional gods.
If this is right (and I think it is), I am not so sure that Cleanthes
would not be willing to deny the existence of the traditional gods: if
he just kept the names but understood them under different descriptions
(as I think he did), I cannot see how putting in doubt the existence of
the traditional gods would affect his highest God (76).

Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to Chrysippus' proofs and his treatment of
the traditional gods, respectively. Chrysippus' proofs, as reported by
Cicero (ND 2.19; 37-39), are presented and divided into three
arguments. Unlike Cleanthes (his predecessor), Chrysippus was
interested in proving the existence of god (the first argument
concludes by saying "therefore god exists"). But, as M. is keen to
show, Chrysippus was not only interested in the existence of the cosmic
"supergod". In fact, he was also worried about his properties, as
argument 2 shows (81). One of the properties the cosmos (which is now
identified by Chrysippus with god) has is perfection: the cosmos is
perfect because it lacks nothing and embraces all things. Since this
is, as M. says, an idea that cannot be found earlier in the Stoa,
Chrysippus must also be the person who introduced the argument for the
wisdom of the world based on the principle that what is mature is
better than the imperfect (a sort of scala perfecti, see argument 3;
82-3). The novelty of M.'s approach here is to consider arguments 2 and
3 as a whole, which yields a nice reconstruction of what Chrysippus
seems to have thought about the properties of his cosmic god. In his
comments on one of the premises of argument 3, M. remarks that "The
Stoic God has much in common with the wise man, who has absolute
virtue" (83; M.'s emphasis). Actually, the order is, it seems to me,
the opposite: the wise man has much in common with the Stoic God,
insofar as a wise person is a microcosmic part of what the whole is. In
fact, the inner rational harmony is the same for the individual and the
universe, but the former is subordinated to the latter. The last part
of chapter 5 deals with the important theme of pneuma, an issue whose
importance in Stoic physics and cosmology cannot be exaggerated. M.
thinks that the concept of pneuma is characteristic of Chrysippus'
thought (89); the point is relevant insofar as the notion of pneuma
allows to account for the Stoic thesis that the cosmos is a unified
body and an entirely coherent system (M. discusses both matters on
85-88).

Chapter 6 is devoted to explain the place of the traditional gods in
Chrysippus' system. M. believes that Chrysippus was interested in the
existence of traditional gods, but he recognizes that some of the
arguments we can find are extremely condensed (see on 95: "There are
gods, because there are altars", quoting SVF 2.1019). As a result, he
proposes to reconstruct the argument, which must have been something
like Zeno's proof (96). M. makes the interesting point that what
concerns Chrysippus here is not a matter of definition but of the
existence of god. This is a nice suggestion; however, if this is the
case, it is hard to understand some of the arguments from the accidens,
which seem to be Chrysippean.[[5]] The other important point stressed
by M. is that in theses arguments what emerges is not the cosmic god,
but the traditional gods (98; Cic., ND 2.17). Like Cleanthes,
Chrysippus applies the etymological and allegorical method to interpret
the traditional gods.

Chapters 7-9 are focused on other Stoic proofs, some further apparently
Stoic arguments supplied by Sextus, and some polemics against the Stoic
arguments for the existence of god. (The treatment of Alexinus' parody
of the Stoic arguments in Chapter 9 is especially rich.) An important
point stressed by M. is that one of the arguments presented in chapter
8, like some other arguments already discussed in previous chapters,
concerns the traditional gods rather than the Stoic cosmic god (118;
see also 147, n.772). M. also shows that the cosmic god is implied in
the arguments where the conclusion is "therefore, there is god" -- i.e.
the singular is usually connected with the cosmic "supergod" (98; 148).
(M.'s translation of Sextus, Adv. Math 9.132, cited on 145, is
mistaken. Where he renders "the signs given to men by god, the Greek
reads "given to men by gods: <greek>u(po\ qew=n</greek>.) A third set
of passages such as Sextus, Adv. Math. 9.75-76 (cited and commented on
by M. at 123-124) concentrate on the account of the Stoic cosmic god as
a "self-moving power", which also provides arguments attempting to
prove its existence. At the end of chapter 8 the author offers a
general conclusion which is valid for almost all the previous chapters
(126-128).

The five final chapters (10-14) deal with Sextus' responses to the
Stoic arguments, i.e. a set of arguments against the existence of god,
including Carneades' use of the sorites. I cannot go into the details
of these rich chapters; I will just note, as M. points out, first, that
the bulk of such arguments reach the conclusion that the gods are
perishable (149), and, secondly, that there is no trace in Sextus'
arguments that they are directed against the cosmic god (193). To the
first objection the Stoics might reply that, even though the celestial
bodies "disappear" during conflagration according to Chrysippus, there
is no destruction in the strict sense. Chrysippus is said to have
argued that the cosmic fire (conflagration) is not different from god,
but a phase in god's life. The permanent passing away of the cosmic
order is thus not destruction; if death is the separation of the soul
from the body, the world soul is not separated form the world body --
rather, it goes on growing until it becomes co-extensive with the
matter. Therefore, the world is not destroyed (Plutarch, Stoic. repug.
1052c). M. remarks that in Plutarch we find the duo Zeus and the cosmos
as two different things; but as the argument summarized above shows,
there are other passages in Plutarch where they seem to be the same (as
M. also notes on 150). In the conclusion of the chapter, where the
so-called "atopical arguments" for the existence of the gods are dealt
with, M. claims that for the Stoics the existence of virtue presupposes
the existence of the gods (146). Perhaps I did not understand M.'s
remark, but I cannot find a Stoic passage where this is clearly
established, and I see no argument by M. for this claim.[[6]]

I would like to conclude this already long review by briefly commenting
on Appendix 1, where M. offers a running commentary on Cleanthes' "Hymn
to Zeus". This -- along with J.C. Thom's papers (see note 8 below) --
is, to my knowledge, the most detailed examination of the Hymn to date.
M. begins by pointing out the advantages of making use of poetry to
explain the relations between the cosmos and man: "Poetry is nearer the
divine" and it is easy to memorize (209). M. is right to stress that
Cleanthes' work is vital not only because it is the only complete text
we have from the Old Stoa, but also because it contains important views
about providence which cannot be found elsewhere. M. suggests that
under the "hymnical style" there is "Stoic stratum" that has to be
taken into consideration, because nearly all the traditional words
admit of a Stoic interpretation (210). M. proposes a reasonable
methodology for reading the Hymn, consisting of a balanced
philosophical and philological approach. But there is a familiar
problem here. As he has elsewhere, M. quotes the Greek text of the Hymn
in the footnotes and the translation in the body of the text (210, and
n.1074).[[7]]

Let me list some remarks from M.'s commentary: (i) The epithet "Chief
of nature" for Zeus is a genuinely Cleanthean name which indicates a
Stoic flavor. (ii) M. points out that there is no trace of
conflagration in the Hymn; this is important since it shows that the
epithet "most honored of the immortals" cannot be explained by arguing
that Zeus is the only god that survives conflagration. (iii) M.
continuously shows the Homeric and Heraclitean background of the Hymn.
In my view, this is important since it reminds us of Cleanthes'
interest in giving certain features of the traditional divinities, on
the one hand, and in offering an entirely new version of Zeus, on the
other hand. M. suggestively shows that the thunderbolt is not only
Zeus' weapon, as traditionally understood, but also a bearer of Logos
in Cleanthes' redefinition of Zeus (214). There are many other
important points in M.'s remarks on the Hymn, but I need to stop here.

The book has a full bibliography (though see the two important papers
by J. C. Thom on the "Hymn to Zeus" cited in note 1).[[8]] Although in
general the volume is well produced, I have detected a few
misprints.[[9]]

I have no doubt that M. has provided an aid to our understanding of
Stoic theology by offering a comprehensive exposition, account, and
discussion of the Stoic arguments on the issue. No matter how much we
may disagree with M., we should recognize that his views are supported
by accurate readings of the texts and are well argued.[[10]]


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Notes:


1.   One detail that may be misleading is that the citations of
original texts often include lines that are not translated in the main
text (see 14, n.67; 17, n.78; 18, n.82; 151, n.794; et passim). M.'s
intention was probably to translate only what he regarded the authentic
words of each philosopher, but this sometimes complicates the
identification of the original Greek or Latin, especially when he cites
long portions of the text.

2.   M. argues that the neuter form logikon in Zeno's conclusion points
out that the world is assumed to be a logical thing, and that Zeno did
not have a god in mind, but his interest was confined to the world and
its "logical' aspect" (11). But this is, to some extent, circular and
derived from M.'s own interpretation of the Greek logikon. If one
renders logikon with the more conservative 'rational', it is much
clearer in what sense Zeno might have assumed the cosmos to be a
logikon: it is a rational thing because it is an ordered structure (a
meaning of logikon admitted by M. in 126).

3.  He is mainly thinking of the seminal work by Dragona-Monachu, The
Stoic Arguments for the Existence and Providence of the Gods, Athens
1976, which M. cites extensively.

4.   Such as Sextus or Philo (see M.'s discussion of frr.12a, 12b, and
13 of Aristotle's On Philosophy).

5.   Such as the one cited on 97, from Cicero ND 2.12; cf. 97 and
n.508).

6.   M. is probably thinking of some passages, such as SVF 3.149 (see
also SVF 3.248; 250; 251; 370), where virtue is said to be proper to
human beings and gods; but it seems to me that this does not imply that
the existence of the virtues demands the existence of the gods.

7.   Unfortunately, however, although he prints the controversial verse
4 (p. 210, note 1074: <greek>h)/xou mi/mhma laxo/ntes</greek>), he
translates his conjecture: "who have the honor of logos" (<greek>lo/gou
ti/mhma laxo/ntes</greek>), but the reader learns about M.'s conjecture
of this verse on 212 (M. devotes a two-page appendix to this
controversial verse 4 of Cleanthes' "Hymn to Zeus" (see 227-228).

8.   "Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus and Early Christian Literature", in A.Y.
Collins and M.M. Mitchell (eds.) Antiquity and Humanity. Essays on
Ancient Religion and Philosophy (presented to Hans Dieter Betz on his
70th Birthday), Tuebingen 2001, 477-499. "Doing Justice to Zeus: On
Texts and Commentaries", Acta Classica XLVIII (2005), 1-21.

9.   E.g.: Halm instead of Hahm (8, n.43); compos rationis instead of
conpotesque rationis (90); Sedly instead of Sedley (148); "do not join
in in the song" (212). There are also some mistakes in the Greek:
<greek>e)/mquxon</greek> for <greek>e)/myuxon</greek> (3); <greek>e)n
au)t</greek>" for <greek>e)n au)tw=|</greek> (6); <greek>noero/s
a)/ra</greek> instead of <greek>noero\s a)/ra</greek> (14 and 28);
<greek>e)pagwgikw/s</greek> instead of <greek>e)pagwgikw=s</greek>
(15); <greek>sumbebeko/tos</greek> instead of
<greek>sumbebhko/tos</greek> (95-96); and <greek>pra/gma</greek>
instead of <greek>pra=gma</greek> (96, n.498).

10.   I am grateful to the anonymous referees for their improvements to
my written English and for urging me to clarify some points of detail
in this review.