BMCR 2009.05.03: Arabatzis on Motta, Il Contra fatum di Gregorio di Nissa nel dibattito tardo-antico sul fatalismo e sul determinismo. Studi sulla tardoantichita, 2

Beatrice Motta, Il Contra fatum di Gregorio di Nissa nel dibattito
tardo-antico sul fatalismo e sul determinismo. Studi sulla
tardoantichita\, 2.  Pisa/Roma:  Fabrizio Serra Editore, 2008.  Pp.
178.  ISBN 9788862270847.  EUR 38.00 (pb).

Reviewed by George Arabatzis, Academy of Athens
([email protected])
Word count:  1840 words
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Because of the particularity of its subject matter, this study of
philosophico-religious history, as Claudio Moreschini says in his
Preface, needs a special methodology and competence. Beatrice Motta
interprets Gregory of Nyssa's treatise against fate Contra Fatum as
part of the great discussion about fatalism in Late Antiquity and Early
Christianity. In fact, she aims to fill a gap signaled by David Amand
in 1973, when he argued that a monograph about this particular treatise
was a desideratum.[[1]] According to J. Gaith, the Contra Fatum is the
best treatise ever written on the question of fatalism by a Father of
the Church.[[2]] Motta is trying to demonstrate the originality of
Gregory's argument in relation to other Christian works such as Origen,
Philocalia, 23; Methodius of Olympus, Banquet, VIII; Basil of Caesarea,
Hexameron, VI, 4-7; Diodorus of Tarsus, Contra Fatum (see Photius,
Bibliotheca, cod. 223), and Nemesius of Emesa, De natura hominis,
35-38. For her philosophical analysis, Motta is discussing the
tripartite problem of determinism, fatalism and astrology, which has
dominated Greek philosophical literature for a long time.

Gregory's treatise is the description of a dialogue between a
philosopher and the Christian Father himself. Motta divides the Contra
Fatum in two parts: the philosopher's argument and Gregory's response
and counter-argument (p. 13). Yet, the division, as it is shown later
in the book and as it is clearly visible in the text of the treatise,
is more subtle: one should rather divide the treatise into four parts,
because of the philosopher's retorts and the development of Gregory's
counter arguments. We do not know whether the work depicts an actual
dialogue, and opinions of scholars on the subject are divided.
Regarding the date the work was written, J. Danie/lou has located it in
the years 379 to 387[[3]] but Motta follows the opinion of the Italian
editor Michele Bandini, who dates the work in the years between 379 and
384.[[4]] A large part of the first section of her book is devoted to
the question of the astrological theory and practice in Late Antiquity
and its refutation in Philo, De Providentia, I, 77-88, Origen,
Philocalia, 23, Basil of Caesarea, Hexameron, VI, 5-7 .

In the second section, Motta analyses the position of the philosopher,
the interlocutor of Gregory, who by and large accepts the theory of
astral determinism, which consists of a combination of astrological
practice and philosophical determinism. The philosopher's argument is,
according to Motta, of Stoic origin, and therefore she devotes a large
part of this section to the exposition of the theory of Stoic
determinism, which is in fact the stronghold of ancient determinism.
The relation of Stoicism to astrology is more difficult to delimit, in
spite of Bouche/-Leclerq's opinion that there was a natural alliance
between Stoicism and astrology (p. 39).[[5]] The textual evidence to
support such a position is rather sparse, and A.A. Long has raised
serious objections to it.[[6]]

The longest section of the book (pp. 43-103) is devoted to Gregory's
position in the second part of the narrated dialogue. Motta analyses
Gregory's thesis that there is no causal relation between celestial
bodies and human actions. She refers to Diodorus of Tarsus' Contra
Fatum, a primary source of Gregory's own treatise as Bandini has shown,
and also to Gregory's opposition to Aristotle's theory of the celestial
bodies' movement as cause of generation  (De gener. et corrupt. 10).
For Motta, this is not a direct anti-aristotelism, as Bandini has
thought, but rather a refutation of the implications of Aristotle's
position. As to the question of the genesis of the world, the author
sees a greater relation to Basil's argument from the Hexameron, I.
Motta shows also the presence of classical anti-astrological arguments
in Gregory, such as the one concerning the impossibility to determine
the exact moment of someone's birth, with special reference to Sextus
Empiricus, Adv. Math., V, 55-85, as well as Origen, Philocalia, 23, 17,
and Basil, Hex., VI, 4-9. Another of Gregory's arguments focuses on the
event of collective deaths that prove the non-existence of particular
destinies. Ptolemy's universal astrology in the Tetrabiblos leads to
Carneades' refutation of astrology. Carneades had said that even the
more barbaric laws and traditions exercise a much greater force on
human destiny than any movement of the stars. Gregory concludes that
destiny cannot be a god and states his conviction that godly nature
must be simple and immovable, insisting on its substantial sufficiency.

Section Four, the second largest of the book (pp. 105-147) deals with
the second stage of the dialogue between Gregory of Nyssa and the
philosopher, focusing on Gregory's discussion of nondeterministic
philosophical explanations of astrology. The reason for this turn to
Gregory's argument is that the philosopher supports the idea that the
validity of astrology may not be shown de jure but is evident de facto.
Gregory's refutation is now centered on the stoic notions of
possibility and necessity, drawing from Alexander of Aphrodisias' De
Fato and Cicero's De Fato. According to Gregory, the possible should
not be restricted to astrological linguistic ambiguity but should apply
also to the ontological level. Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos appears as a model
of nondeterministic astrology. A second approach of Gregory to the
notion of a possible astrology is based on Alexander of Aphrodisias' De
Fato. Motta deals with Gregory's opinions on the limits of a larger
debate on astrology where astrological fatalism, although
nondeterministic, still has some validity. Two approaches are
underscored here: the positions of Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos and Alexander
of Aphrodisias' De fato, which are very similar to each other, and the
Neoplatonism of Plotinus. The key notions are the
<greek>e)ndexo/menon</greek>  (=the probable), which in Gregory
replaces the notion of <greek>a)mfi/bolon</greek>  (=doubtful) used by
his interlocutor, and that of <greek>a)na/gkh</greek> (=necessity).
Motta examines the first notion in Alexander of Aphrodisias where we
see it closely related to the term of <greek>dunato/n</greek> (=the
possible). It is a term proposed also by Chrysippus in Cicero's De
fato, where divination gives validity to fatalism, a position very
close to Gregory's interlocutor. The relation of the notion of
<greek>a)mfi/bolon</greek> to prediction is the basis of Motta's first
interpretation of Gregory's idea about a nondeterministic astrology
that is not Stoic in its origin. In Ptolemy, such an astrology is a
natural science while astronomy is a mathematical one. The first is the
science of the unpredictable and the conjectural. The reference to
Ptolemaic astrology is reminiscent of a discussion in Origen's
Philocalia that has to do with the divine prescience of future events
and with the nature and contingency of these same events. In this
light, Gregory's objections may also have a different meaning: if we do
not consider astrology in deterministic terms, then we deal with a
completely different subject. Gregory avoids extensive discussion of a
nondeterministic astrological fatalism. The nondeterministic astrology
falls thus under the broader category of divinatory arts, which are in
Gregory the subject of a strictly moral refutation. Alexander of
Aphrodisias' De fato, 30, treats the theory that gods predict
contingencies qua contingencies, an idea that may clarify Gregory's
method of connecting prediction to possibility. To the question whether
Gregory's refutation of fatalism is influenced by Alexander's
anti-Stoic peripateticism, Motta's choice regarding Gregory's
anti-Stoic anti-deterministic position points rather to his Christian
philosophy. Here God is the initiator of a temporal seriality,
<greek>a)kolouqi/a</greek>, where human nature constitutes the final
stage, that of human liberty. Thus, Gregory's critique is shown to be
primarily addressed toward Stoic determinism, while the
nondeterministic astrological fatalism is not philosophically
elucidated in his Contra Fatum. Motta concludes that there is an
affinity between Gregory's positions and Plotinus' theory with regard
to determinism and astrology and the use of the concept of a
transcendental principle exposed in Ennead III, 1 on destiny and II, 3,
on the influence of the stars. The transcendental principle becomes in
Gregory of Nyssa a God that grants ontological liberty to human
creatures, a view leading to a deeply rooted refutation of every sort
of determinism.

In the fifth section, the author analyzes the idea of the de facto
validity of astrology in Gregory of Nyssa as the outcome of demonic
activity. This idea is part of Gregory's theory of evil as non-being
that may nevertheless accede to existence due to wicked humans and
fallen angels, i.e. demons. Motta provides a brief history of pagan and
Christian demonology, where the latter is seen as an important moment
in the confrontation between Pagans and Christians. Gregory inherits
the idea of divination as demonic work from previous Christian
literature and presents it not only in the Contra fatum but also in the
De pythonissa.

In conclusion, the author develops Gregory's confutation and refutation
of the concept of fate in the following manner: first, Gregory
criticizes the philosophical ground of astrology, i.e. determinism.
This is the most philosophical section of the treatise and includes a
discussion on fate in Late Antiquity. Second, Gregory seems to accept
the practical validity of the astrology, which from his point of view
derives from demonic action. The paradoxical conclusion is that Gregory
denies the deterministic basis of astrology but not the divinatory
practice in order to continue an anti-demonic polemic. On the
philosophical level, Gregory's refutation is based solely on anti-Stoic
anti-determinism without debating extensively the hypothesis of a
nondeterministic astrology. Gregory was aware of a nondeterministic
astrology and his acceptance of a limited value for astrology may be
close to Alexander's and Plotinus' theories. Thus, there are two kinds
of refutation in Gregory's treatise, a 'hard one' concerning
philosophical determinism and a 'soft one' with regard to practical
fatalism. The latter is subject only to a moral rejection and not to a
full philosophical refutation. Motta's opinion is that this choice has
been made in order to cut short a discussion that would have taken much
broader dimensions than a representative of the Church like Gregory of
Nyssa would have desired.

A list of Sources and a Bibliography of Secondary Literature conclude
the book, but a Table of Persons and a Table of Notions would also have
been very useful. As to the exposition of the general discussion on
fatalism in Late Antiquity, the author's effort is not exhaustive. A
comparison between Gregory's treatise and Hierocles', On providence and
On providence and fate (see Photius, Bibliotheca, respectively cod. 251
and cod. 214) would be fruitful, especially since J. Danie/lou has made
the hypothesis that Gregory of Nyssa was following a second tradition
of Neoplatonism represented by his successor Hierocles that had its
origins in the thought of Ammonius Saccas.[[7]] Motta's discussion of
philosophical determinism misses some interesting references like the
one to pseudo-Plutarch's, De fato, 1-2, 568 C-E, where we see a
distinction between fate's essence and fate's action that eventually
would serve the analysis of the author. The difference between Stoic
determinism and Stoic necessitarianism is not explored sufficiently,
while the final distinction between a philosophical refutation and a
moral rejection of fatalism in Gregory may be subject to objections.
Overall, however, Motta's book fulfills the desideratum for a monograph
devoted especially to Gregory of Nyssa's Contra fatum.


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Notes:


1.   David Amand, Fatalisme et liberte/ dans l'antiquite/ grecque,
Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1973, p. 423.

2.   Jerome Gaith, La conception de la liberte/ chez Gre/goire de
Nysse, Paris, Vrin, 1953, p. 92.

3.    Jean Danie/lou, La chronologie des oeuvres de Gre/goire de Nysse,
in: Studia Patristica. Papers presented to the fourth international
conference on Patristic Studies, ed. Frank Leslie Cross, Berlin,
Akademie Verlag, 1966, pp. 159-169.

4.   Gregorio di Nissa, Contro il fato, a cura di Michele Bandini,
Bologna, EDB, 2003, pp. 33-34.

5.   Aug. Bouche/-Leclerq, L'astrologie grecque, Paris, 1899, reimp.
Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1979, p. 34.

6.   A.A. Long, Astrology: arguments pro and contra, in: Science and
Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, ed. J. Barnes,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 165-192.

7.   See Jean Danie/lou, Gre/goire de Nysse et le e/o-platonisme de
l'E/cole d'Athe\nes, Revue d'e/tudes grecques, 80, 1967, pp. 395-401.
See also, L'Etre et le Temps chez Gre/goire de Nysse, Leiden, Brill,
1970, p. 13, which is a turn from Danie/lou's existentialism in the
Platonisme et the/ologie mystique. Doctrine spirituelle de saint
Gre/goire de Nysse, Paris, Aubier, 19532.