BMCR 2009.05.33: Trepanier on Grabowski, Plato, Metaphysics and the Forms. Continuum Studies in Ancient Philosophy

Francis A. Grabowski III, Plato, Metaphysics and the Forms. Continuum
Studies in Ancient Philosophy.  New York/London:  Continuum, 2008.  Pp.
xi, 163.  ISBN 9780826497802.  $130.00.

Reviewed by Lee Trepanier, Saginaw Valley State University
([email protected])
Word count:  1215 words
-------------------------------
To read a print-formatted version of this review, see
http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2009/2009-05-33.html
To comment on this review, see
http://www.bmcreview.org/2009/05/20090533.html
-------------------------------

Grabowski approaches the Platonic theory of the Forms as an
epistemological problem where he rejects the Forms as abstract
universals and instead tentatively concludes that they are perfect
particulars. For Grabowski, the Forms are a combination of the
universals and particulars. However, as the author admits, Plato never
explicitly states whether the Forms are universals or particulars,
thereby making Grabowski's central argument inconclusive. Nonetheless,
Grabowski's book is valuable to consult because it runs contrary to the
conventional scholarship on the Platonic Forms as does his treatment of
Plato's theory of the Forms as an epistemological rather than
metaphysical problem.

The book has an introduction, conclusion, and three main chapters.
Chapter one reviews and criticizes the standard interpretation of
Plato's theory of the Forms as metaphysical abstract universals.
Chapter two sheds light on the intellectual background of Plato's
epistemological considerations by looking at his predecessors,
specifically Homer, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, all from
whom the author claims Plato derived many of his ideas. Chapter three
makes the argument that the Forms are perfect particulars and connects
Plato's epistemology and metaphysics. The book concludes that Plato's
epistemology is one of acquaintance with the Forms known through direct
contact rather than some discursive process. As perfect particulars,
the Forms therefore become a provisional solution to the
epistemological problem that Plato had confronted.

Grabowski examines how the Forms are known rather than how they exist.
Citing the Cratylus and Phaedo as well as passages from Aristotle's
Metaphysics, Grabowski contends that Plato's metaphysical theory was
developed as a result of his concern about knowledge, specifically how
someone could know anything in a world that continually undergoes
change. Plato believed that knowledge was possible, thereby committing
himself to the existence of eternal and unchanging entities. From this
epistemological premise, Plato arrived at the metaphysical conclusion
that the Forms must exist. But are these Forms abstract universals as
the standard interpretation claims?

For Grabowski, the answer is no, as demonstrated in the inconsistency
of how the Forms are referred to in the Platonic dialogues as both
collective and individual entities, as states both of being and of
becoming, and as both universals and sensible particulars. The Forms
are described as <greek>paradei/gmata</greek> in the Euthyphro (6e6),
Republic (472c4, 501s2-b7), and  Timaeus (28a6-b2). Instead of being
collective and abstract, the Forms for Grabowski are individual
different objects that have a sensible nature. They are concrete
standards, like the platinum-iridium bar housed at the International
Bureau of Weights and Measures is the concrete standard of one meter,
as opposed to the abstract criterion of the path of light travelled in
a vacuum during a certain time interval. As
<greek>paradei/gmata</greek>, the Forms therefore are not abstract
universals, which can exist at several places at once; rather, they are
sensible particulars that exist only singularly and independently of
each other.

This new understanding of the Forms stems from approaching Plato's
theory from an epistemological rather than metaphysical view. The
problem that Plato confronted was that, on the one hand, knowledge is
akin to sense perception, while, on the other hand, knowledge is also
permanent in its truth, like mathematics and logic. Grabowski's
contention that the Forms are concrete exemplars or perfect particulars
solves this problem: the Forms are known perceptually because they are
concrete, but they also are unchanging and therefore true. The
assumption that Grabowski makes is that Plato subscribed to an
epistemology of acquaintance: knowledge overall is perceptual in
nature, whether through personal experience, divine inspiration, or
telepathic cognition. But is this assumption correct?

Although Grabowski presents a series of pre-Platonic thinkers who
subscribe to this acquaintance mode of knowledge, the connection
between these thinkers' epistemology and Plato's is not evident. It is
possible, and most probable, that pre-Platonic thinkers influenced
Plato's epistemology, but the author fails to make that connection
explicit in chapters two and three. It is also strange that the author
substantially skips over the Parmenides, especially when trying to
establish the relationship between pre-Platonic thinkers and Plato. The
failure to make this connection does not eliminate the acquaintance
mode of knowledge for Plato; however, the gap seems to raise more
questions than answers about Plato's epistemology.

Grabowski is on firmer ground when the analysis turns to the Platonic
dialogues themselves. The evidence cited for an acquaintance mode of
knowledge is Plato's frequent use of direct-objection constructions
with verbs of knowing and the recurrent metaphor of the senses as the
way one acquires knowledge. Scrutinizing the terms
<greek>gignw/skein</greek>, <greek>ei)de/nai</greek>, and
<greek>e)pi/stasthai</greek> in the Theaetetus, Meno, Republic and
other dialogues, Grabowski argues that propositional knowledge did not
appeal to Plato, thereby leaving him with the choice that knowledge is
derived from words alone (which is rejected) or by direct experience
(the acquaintance mode of knowledge). Grabowski continues his
philological analysis with a look at <greek>du/namis</greek> in the
Phaedrus and Republic as the power or faculty to bring knowledge or
knowing into a person's mind. But this faculty of the mind for
Grabowski is not just a metaphorical way of speaking about knowledge;
it is literally an organ or power that directly touches the Forms for
knowledge.

This part of Grabowski's argument seems to me for the most part
correct, for Plato speaks of reason not only in its discursive aspect
but also in its intuitive nature. This is Grabowski's point: the organ
of the mind comes in direct contact with the Forms by intuition rather
than by discursive (abstract) thought. However, if Grabowski is correct
and knowledge is obtained by acquaintance, then how do humans acquire
mathematical and logical truths? We know mathematical proofs, for
instance, are true, but do we understand them through acquaintance or
through some other method, such as abstract reasoning? If it is the
latter, then what is the relationship between the mode of acquaintance
and the mode of abstraction in Plato's epistemology? Although Grabowski
does an excellent analysis on the acquaintance mode of knowledge, the
study leaves one asking about the place of other modes of knowledge,
specifically about mathematics and logic, in Plato's epistemology.

In spite of these questions, Grabowski's Forms are definitely not
abstract universals, for then they could not be seen or touched; rather
the Forms are a combination of eternal and sensible truth. They are
paradigmatic: the Forms are perfect, like mathematical truths, but also
sensible, allowing us to access them directly. Because we know sensible
things through personal acquaintance, and because we know the Forms
through a similar process with <greek>du/namis</greek>, the "mind's
eye," the objects of these similar methods are ontologically akin and
therefore concrete. The result seems to be that Plato's Forms are not
abstract and universal but concrete and particular.

Grabowski's study thus places the study of Plato's Forms in the context
of epistemology instead of metaphysics and rejects the standard
interpretation of the Platonic Forms. The study is not entirely
persuasive, as the author admits, for Plato himself does not make any
conclusive statement about the Forms. Nonetheless, Grabowski makes a
strong case for the consideration, or rather re-consideration, of
Plato's theory of the Forms with a potent combination of philological
analysis and cogent argument that runs counter to conventional
scholarship. His claim that Plato's Forms are perfect particulars
should prompt us to raise more questions about Plato's theory of the
Forms and explore where these questions lead.