BMCR 2009.05.44: Blomqvist on Kuzminski, Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism. Studies in Comparative Philosophy and Religion

Adrian Kuzminski, Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented
Buddhism. Studies in Comparative Philosophy and Religion.  Lanham:
Lexington Books, 2008.  Pp. xiv, 155.  ISBN 9780739125069.  $65.00.

Reviewed by Jerker Blomqvist, Lund University
([email protected])
Word count:  2650 words
-------------------------------
To read a print-formatted version of this review, see
http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2009/2009-05-44.html
To comment on this review, see
http://www.bmcreview.org/2009/05/20090544.html
-------------------------------

[Table of contents at the end of the review.]

According to his own preface (pp. x-xi), the author of the book under
review here, Adrian Kuzminski, had been intrigued by the ancient
Pyrrhonists since early years. The idea to trace similarities between
Greek and Indian philosophy was the result of two travels, one to
Benares, India, and the other to a number of Greek sites in Italy,
Turkey and Greece itself, where "ruins of mostly sacred architecture
reminded me that ancient Greek culture was more steeped in
soteriological concerns than we normally assume." Further inspiration
came from an article by Everard Flintoff,[[1]] and Kuzminski fittingly
recognizes his indebtedness to its author by dedicating the present
book to his memory. He also thanks a number of colleagues, in
particular C.W. Huntington, Jr., for their assistance. An article by
Kuzminski from 2007[[2]] could be regarded as a preliminary treatment
of the subject; its contents have been integrated with ch. 2 of the
book. Kuzminski is now a research scholar in philosophy at Hartwick
College at Oneonta, in upstate New York. He is active in local
politics, involved in ongoing debates in the media, and author of a
book on today's populism in a historical perspective.[[3]]

Beyond Kuzminski's own preface, a Foreword by Huntington, a short
bibliography and an index (mainly of names and philosophical terms),
the book consists of four chapters. The first chapter, 'Why Pyrrhonism
is not scepticism,' claims that it is necessary to differentiate
between two strands of Western philosophy that have essential elements
in common and therefore have been confused with each other under the
common designation "scepticism." Kuzminski calls these varieties
"Pyrrhonism" and "scepticism," respectively. In his terminology,
Pyrrhonism is in antiquity represented by a series of philosophers
starting with Pyrrhon of Elis and including among others Sextus
Empiricus, whose philosophical writings have in part been preserved and
serve as an important source of information on ancient philosophy in
general and on Pyrrhonism/scepticism in particular. The only ancient
philosophers who deserve to be designed as "sceptics" in Kuzminski's
meaning of the word were the members of the so-called New Academy, that
is, Arcesilaus, Carneades, Clitomachus and others who flourished in the
third and second centuries B.C. The terminology here becomes slightly
confusing, for Sextus, who is one of Kuzminski's Pyrrhonists, calls
both himself and Pyrrhon skeptikoi -- as Kuzminski is well aware  (p.
5) -- and, as one might add, the Neo-Academics are never called
skeptikoi in any ancient text known to us. When Sextus and other later
followers of Pyrrhon chose to denote themselves as skeptikoi, they used
the word in the sense of, approximately, 'searchers,' as being derived
from the verb skeptomai 'to search, inquire.' The point of choosing
this designation was that the "sceptics," in their search for truth,
although recognizing the futility of all dogmatic philosophies, did not
declare truth impossible to attain but continued searching for it. By
this designation they wished to differentiate themselves from  the
Neo-Academics, who made dogmatic assertions to the effect that true
knowledge is unattainable and that, consequently, searching for
knowledge is futile.

As Sextus himself points out,[[4]] his own philosophy was confused with
that of the Neo-Academics already in antiquity. Sextus himself even
recognizes some sort of affinity with Arcesilaus, who declared that
philosophy aimed at "suspension of judgment" (epoche^) which, according
to Sextus, would result in the desirable state of "tranquility"
(ataraxia).[[5]] According to Kuzminski's interpretation, the
Pyrrhonists "did accept the testimony of what is evident, that is, of
the immediate, involuntary experiences we have of sensations and
thoughts, and they accepted reliable inferences from these to other
immediate involuntary experiences" (p.1), whereas the real sceptics,
i.e. the Neo-Academics, "question evident things as well as those
nonevident, claiming that our senses deceive us" and assert that "we
can know nothing at all" (pp. 3-4). When concluding from this that no
knowledge whatsoever is possible, the Neo-Academics represent a
negative dogmatism. The Pyrrhonists avoid that by refusing to make
assertions about what is non-evident and by relying on sensatory
experiences for what they are, i.e., precisely sensatory experiences
and not more or less misleading evidence for something beyond the
sphere of immediate sensations and thoughts.

Kuzminski substantiates this distinction in his first chapter, mainly
on the basis of quotations from Sextus and his own comments on them. He
also tries to show that the confusion between Pyrrhonist scepticism and
Neo-Academic dogmatism that occurred in antiquity, as testified by
Sextus, has been perpetuated by most scholars in later times, i.e. from
the rediscovery of Sextus' writings in the sixteenth century. As
evidence for that continuing confusion Kuzminski quotes passages from
David Hume's An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding and Friedrich
Nietzsche's Der Wille zur Macht, where Pyrrhon is called a nihilist and
his followers are said to "remain in total lethargy" and to "live a
lowly life among the lowly." Among contemporary scholarly literature he
singles out, in this chapter,  two works by Myles Burnyeat and Martha
Nussbaum, respectively,[[6]] and subjects them to detailed criticism
(pp. 16-24).

The second chapter, 'Pyrrhonism and Buddhism,' is devoted to showing
that Pyrrhon's teaching was inspired by contacts he had with Buddhists
when he visited India as a member Alexander the Great's entourage.[[7]]
Since "he worked in a wholly Greek idiom," Kuzminski chooses to call
Pyrrhon's Buddhist-inspired teaching in his native country "a
reinvention of Buddhism ... rather than a transmission" (p. 5).
Kuzminski's reasoning is based on a conglomeration of similarities
between Greek Pyrrhonism and Indian Buddhism, in particular the
Madhyamaka variety of Buddhism known from writings ascribed to the
second-century AD philosopher Nagarjuna. Kuzminski's inspirer Flintoff
had pointed out three such similarities, the "suspension of judgment,"
a general trend towards non-dogmatism apparent also in Indian
philosophy, and the appearance of wandering holy men, of which Pyrrhon
was regarded as the earliest example on Greek soil. Kuzminski makes a
few additions to Flintoff's list. More specifically, he identifies five
"key areas" which are thought to prove his thesis (pp. 51-60):

(i) The testing of more or less dogmatic assertions on the nature of
things by a method that consists in setting out the oppositions and
contradictions involved in them, leads to suspension of judgment, and
brings about tranquility or a comparable state of mind.

(ii) The refusal to accept beliefs in an ultimate reality that lies
behind appearances and that explains what the appearances really are.

(iii) The importance of "suspension of judgment," which according to
Kuzminski has a parallel in the Madhyamaka concept of sunayata
'emptiness.'

(iv) Tranquility, which in Pyrrhonist thought is the automatic effect
of suspension of judgment, has a parallel in the absence of anxiety
experienced by the Buddhist sages.

(v) The attitude to what Kuzminski calls appearances, which are
regarded as at the same time self-evident and "real" in some sense of
the word but without foundation in any non-evident reality of a higher
order.

Much space in this second chapter is devoted to polemics against three
scholars: McEvilley,[[8]] who noted the similarities between Pyrrhonism
and the Madhyamaka but denied their interdependence (pp. 48-50);
Bett,[[9]] who thought contacts between Pyrrhon and the Indians
unlikely and was not prepared to ascribe an entirely undogmatic stance
to Pyrrhon (pp. 37-41); and Burton,[[10]] who classifies Nagarjuna as a
dogmatic (pp. 61-64).

Ch. 3, 'The evident and the nonevident,' consists of a more detailed
discussion on the fifth of the "key areas" of parallelism between
Pyrrhonism and Madhyamaka Buddhism as defined in ch. 2. Although the
main focus of this chapter is on Greek Pyrrhonism, further analysis of
the Buddhist tradition underscores the similarity of the two. Kuzminski
suggests that the Madhyamaka concept of 'emptiness' could be
interpreted as an analogy of Pyrrhonist ataraxia and subjects the two
terms to an extended analysis. It is important to his argument that
this Pyrrhonist concept is a distinctive feature of Pyrrhonism, not
present in other ancient systems of philosophy (it should of course not
be confused with Stoic ataraxia). In both thought systems this state of
ataraxia is achieved by the individual's refusal to take a stance on
questions regarding what is not evident to the senses. Kuzminski quotes
(p. 98) an illustrative utterance of Nagarjuna ("'Empty' should not be
asserted. 'Nonempty' should not be asserted. Neither both nor either
should be asserted"), to which the sceptic standard phrase ou mallon
provides a striking parallel. From this refusal the coveted ataraxia
follows "by chance" (tuchiko^s) or "as a shadow" to use Sextus'
phraseology.[[11]]

Kuzminski devotes the last part of the chapter (pp. 104-110) to the
question "what kind of way of life anyone seeking to follow these
nondogmatic soteriological practices could lead." How would, e.g., a
Pyrrhonist respond to demands of a tyrant or those "of a modern
totalitarian regime such as the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany?" (p.
107). Sextus provides an answer: he denies that the Pyrrhonist will be
"confined to a state of inactivity or inconsistency" because of his
refusal to define what is morally good and evil. Instead, Sextus
recommends the sceptic "to follow ancestral laws and customs," which,
presumably, will not disturb his ataraxia. According to Sextus, the
Pyrrhonist will adapt himself to the society in which he lives and to
the conditions of human life, not aim at being liberated from it. This
optimistic position is not quite without parallels in Buddhist
philosophy, but Kuzminski produces only few analogies of Sextus' active
philosopher and observes that "much of [Buddhist literature] strikes a
decidedly ascetic tone" (p. 109).

The fourth chapter, entitled 'Modern Pyrrhonism', starts with the
assertion that "Pyrrhonism as a tradition has fared poorly in modern
times" and ends with an expression of the author's belief that, in our
time, the "middle path" of genuine Pyrrhonism and its Buddhist
counterpart would be a safer road to a prosperous future for the world
than the two now dominant alternatives, radical scepticism and
fundamentalist belief in religious or political dogmas. Kuzminski
recognizes the increasing interest in Buddhism and other Eastern
thought systems that has become apparent in the Western world in the
last half century. However, in the process of popularization, Buddhism
has become adulterated and now appears either as a new dogmatic
religion or as that sort of radical agnosticism which Kuzminski
associates with Neo-Academic scepticism. Kuzminski gives credit to
Stephen Batchelor for trying to save Buddhism from dogmatism[[12]] but
criticizes him for not avoiding the danger of radical scepticism. Among
leading modern philosophers, Wittgenstein is, according to Kuzminski
(pp. 131-138), practically the only one who has taught and practiced a
philosophy close to that of the ancient Pyrrhonists, although he may
have been unaware of his potential forerunners, both in Greece and
India.

Huntington, in his Foreword, expresses his misgivings that, since
Kuzminski's book is a work of comparative philosophy and consequently
embarks on the areas of expertise of both classical philologists and
indologists, both these groups of scholars "will find reason to
criticize this book" (p. xiii). Being a classical philologist myself, I
am prepared to agree with Huntington on this point, for the book
unfortunately displays an irritatingly great number of blunders (typos,
questionable dates, incorrect references, names confused, careless
reading of ancient testimonies, etc.) which tend to obscure its real
qualities. Leaving aside these minor flaws, I can see three major
problems with Kuzminski's theses regarding the supposed relationship of
Pyrrhonism to Buddhism:

(i) Kuzminski assumes that "Pyrrhonism," as defined by him, remained
the same philosophy without essential changes throughout antiquity,
from Pyrrhon to Sextus. This is hardly in accordance with scholarly
consensus today. Popkin's description of Pyrrhon as "not a theoretician
but rather a living example of the complete doubter," which Kuzminski
criticizes (p. 117),[[13]] may be fairly correct, but it certainly
could not be applied to Sextus. A recent publication chooses to speak
of "scepticisms" in the plural rather than scepticism,[[14]] implying
considerable differences, not only between Neo-Academics and those who
called themselves sceptics, but also among those who professed
themselves to belong to the Pyrrhon-Aenesidemus-Sextus tradition. On
the testimony of his immediate follower Timon of Phlius, Pyrrhon may
even have shown dogmatist tendencies (which Sextus of course
denies).[[15]]

(ii) Kuzminski's insistence that modern scholarship has mostly failed
to distinguish between Pyrrhonism, as he defines it, and Neo-Academic
scepticism goes too far. This distinction is not a recent discovery. I
made my first acquaintance with Sextus and his writings in the early
1960's, and the authoritative works on ancient scepticism that you were
supposed to consult in those days, some of them exponents of
nineteenth-century scholarship,[[16]] recognized the distinct,
dogmatist position of the Neo-Academics as a well established fact. In
my view, Kuzminski's criticism of, among others, Burnyeat, Nussbaum and
Popkin goes too far.

(iii) Can Sextus' "Pyrrhonism" be described with the adjective
soteriological? Kuzminski uses that word repeatedly about the Buddhist
philosophy and eventually also about Pyrrhonism: "Pyrrhonism, if my
analysis in the preceding chapters is correct, seems to be the sole
Western expression of a kind of nondogmatic soteriological practice
found more widely in the East" (p. 113). As "evidence for
Pyrrhonist-type views in India" Kuzminski quotes (pp. 46-47) a fragment
of Megasthenes stating that the Brahmins "believe that the life here
is, as it were, that of a babe still in the womb, and that death, to
those who have devoted themselves to philosophy, is birth into true
life." In another context  (p. 95) Kuzminski speaks of "the liberation
from suffering promoted by both Buddhists and Pyrrhonists." He also
finds an analogy to Pyrrhonism in Nagarjuna's statement "The root of
cyclic existence is action. Therefore the wise one does not act" (p.
57). "Liberation" and "salvation" (if that is what is meant by
soteriological practice) may be the proper words to use when describing
the goals of the Madhyamaka philosophers, but the teachings of Sextus
are different. What he strives for is not liberation or salvation from
the necessities that govern the lives of humans; what he can promise is
a fairly tolerable existence under those conditions. The key word is
metriopatheia 'moderation of feeling' or 'moderate suffering.'[[17]]
Nor does Sextus avoid action. He was a doctor by profession and
defended his philosophy against the allegation that scepticism would
result in an inability to act or to function as a member of society.
Since dogmatist philosophy failed to provide guidance, the sceptic
would follow "ancestral laws and customs" and, by acting according to
them, he would lead a happier life than the dogmatist.[[18]] Sextus'
sceptic philosopher belonged to this world; the followers of Madhyamaka
strived to liberate themselves from it. If Pyrrhon held the same views
as Sextus in these matters, he must have missed or rejected a
fundamental element of what the Indian gymnosophists may have taught
him.

Despite these reservations, I do not hesitate to recommend the book,
not the least to classical scholars like myself. Undoubtedly, Kuzminski
raises an important question regarding the ancestry of Western
philosophy. He records an impressive number of parallels between Greek
and Indian philosophy, and in particular his analysis of the analogy
between Pyrrhonist/sceptic ataraxia and Nagarjuna's "emptiness" is
notable. However, analogies, similarities, parallels or whatever you
will call them are one thing, concrete proof of influence and
interdependence is another. We do not know enough about the contacts
between Greece and India in order to make the interchange of ideas a
proven fact. Explicit references in the preserved texts are missing
and, unlike durable artifacts, ideas leave no traces in the
archaeological remains. Traveling between the two regions obviously did
take place. It is not unlikely that it had an impact in the
intellectual sphere too, so, like genuine followers of Pyrrhon, Sextus
and their adherents, we have reason to continue searching (skeptesthai)
for reliable knowledge in these matters. Kuzminski's book points the
way.

CONTENTS:
Preface
Foreword by C.W. Huntington, Jr.
Why Pyrrhonism is not scepticism
Pyrrhonism and Buddhism
The evident and the nonevident
Modern Pyrrhonism
Bibliography
Index
------------------
Notes:


1.   'Pyrrho and India,' Phronesis 25:2, 1980, pp. 88-108. Two earlier
scholarly works on the same subject are not mentioned by Kuzminski:
Aram M. Frenkian, Skepticismul grec si filozofia indiana. Bucharest,
1957, and Jean Grenier, 'Sextus et Nagarjuna, E/tude d'un exemple de
paralle/lisme philosophique,' Revue philosophique 160, 1970, pp. 67-75.
All the works in Kuzminski's bibliography are either written in English
or translated into the language.

2.   'Pyrrhonism and the Madhyamaka', Philosophy East & West 57:4,
2007, pp. 482-511.

3.   Fixing the System. A Brief History of Populism, Ancient and
Modern. New York: Continuum, 2008. ISBN: 978-0826429599.

4.   Pyrrhoneioi hypotyposeis 1.220.

5.   Pyrrhoneioi hypotyposeis 1.232.

6.   M.F. Burnyeat, 'Can the sceptic live his scepticism?,' in: Doubt
and Dogmatism. Ed. by M. Schofield et alii. Oxford, 1979, pp. 20-53;
Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in
Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton University Press, 1994.

7.   As reported by Diogenes Laertius 9.61, citing Alexander
Polyhistor. Kuzminski accepts this report as reliable evidence without
discussion and identifies Ascanius of Abdera as the source of Diogenes
(p. 36).

8.   Thomas McEvilley, The Shape of Ancient Thought. Comparative
Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies. New York: Allworth, 2002.

9.   Richard Bett, Pyrrho, his Antecedents and his Legacy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000.

10.   David F. Burton, Emptiness Appraised. A Critical Study of
Nagarjuna's Philosophy. Richmond: Curzon, 1999.

11.   Pyrrhoneioi hypotyposeis 1.25-29. Cf. Diogenes Laertius 9.107.

12.   Stephen Batchelor, Buddhism without Beliefs. A Contemporary Guide
to Awakening. New York, 1997.

13.   Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism. From Savonarola to
Bayle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. xviii.

14.   Carlos Le/vy, Les scepticismes. Paris:  Presses Universitaires de
France, 2008.  Review: BMCR 2009.01.09.

15.   Svavar Hrafn Svavarsson, 'Pyrrho's dogmatic nature,' Classical
Quarterly 52.1, 2002, pp. 248-256. Sextus discusses Timon's testimony
in Against the Ethicists 18-20.

16.   Albert Goedeckemeyer, Die Geschichte des griechischen
Skeptizismus. Leipzig, 1905, Victor Brochard, Les sceptiques grecs. 2nd
ed., Paris, 1932, Le/on Robin, Pyrrhon et le scepticisme grec. Paris,
1944.

17.   Pyrrhoneioi hypotyposeis 1.25, 1.30. 3.235. 3.236, Against the
Ethicists 11.161.

18.   Against the Ethicists 162-166 "... one also needs to look down on
those who think that [the sceptic] is reduced to inactivity or
inconsistency ... if compelled by a tyrant to perform some forbidden
act, he will choose one thing, perhaps, and avoid the other by the
preconception which accords with his ancestral laws and customs; and in
fact he will bear the harsh situation more easily compared with the
dogmatist, because he does not, like the latter, have any further
opinion over and above these conditions" (translation: Sextus
Empiricus, Against the Ethicists. Translation, commentary, and
introduction by Richard Bett. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). Cf. also
Pyrrhoneioi hypotyposeis 3.235-236, Against the Physicists 1.49.