BMCR 2009.07.47: Macedo on Ruiz Yamuza, Tres verbos que significan 'deber' en griego antiguo

Emilia Ruiz Yamuza, Tres verbos que significan "deber" en griego antiguo.
Zaragoza:  Libros Po/rtico, 2008.  Pp. 190.  ISBN 9788479560485.
EUR 25.00 (pb).

Reviewed by Jose/ Marcos Macedo, University of Sa~o Paulo, Brazil
([email protected])
Word count:  2643 words
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Emilia Yamuza's new book, Tres verbos griegos que significan "deber" en
griego antiguo, provides a detailed analysis of the use and meaning of
three ancient Greek modal verbs, <greek>o)phei/lw</greek>,
<greek>de/w</greek> and <greek>xrh/</greek>, all of them conveying the
idea of obligation.

Her diachronic analyses, which extend from Mycenaean Greek to the 2nd
century A.D., aim at a unified description of each of these verbs,
advancing the claim of an underlying unity along the process of their
grammaticalization. Working within the framework of Functional and
Cognitive Grammar, but never giving in to the temptation of obscure
jargon, Yamuza (henceforth Y.) sets up three main objectives: 1) to
examine whether the three verbs display deontic and epistemic meanings,
i.e. whether their use conveys, respectively, the idea of obligation
(ranging from necessity to a mere wish) or of presupposition (ranging
from inferred certainty to a mere possibility or even an assertion of
the non-reality of something); 2) to investigate the semantic shifts
undergone by these verbs; 3) to suggest, whenever possible, a
hypothesis of how these semantic shifts occurred, how the changes in
the structures took place.

The results are impressive, mainly because of the sophistication with
which Y. sets about her analyses, both descriptively and theoretically.
There are few books and articles on this specific subject, and Y.'s
work will surely call attention to many nuances that are not so easily
perceived, thus rendering one more attuned to the semantic detail in
the use of Greek modal constructions. All those interested in Greek
modality will profit from the book, but the conclusions drawn by Y.
will also have a bearing on modality studies in general.

The book is divided into four chapters, to which is added a brief
conclusion. The first chapter is an introduction setting out the
methodological patterns of the study, while the three remaining ones,
each of which devoted to one of the verbs in question, constitute the
bulk of the work.

As for the introduction, Y. makes clear her indebtedness to the
outstanding book by J. Coates,[[1]] whose findings illuminate many of
her conclusions. Y. follows in the footsteps of Coates on two major
issues. First, the categories to which deontic and epistemic modality
belong are not organized in polar opposition, but rather by degrees,
i.e. the elements expressing one of the modal meanings are articulated
in zones of proximity to, and distance from, the so-called prototype --
the best example. There is, in brief, a 'fuzzy-set' in which the
transition from one class to the other is gradual, not abrupt. All this
bears on the precise identification of an example as conveying deontic
or epistemic meanings, that is, on the correct interpretation of a
text.

Chances are that, there being a continuum between epistemic and deontic
uses, some instances would reveal an ambiguous meaning, where only the
context would be able to tell which one is more appropriate, although
sometimes not even the context would be of any help, both meanings
being acceptable at the same time ('merger'). This is the second point
in which Y. is indebted to Coates, and identifying some examples of
this phenomenon in Greek literature constitutes one of the strengths of
Y.'s book.

It is generally admitted that deontic meanings display an illocutionary
force as indirect orders. The prototypic instance would be one in which
the speaker, being hierarchically superior, asserts what he wishes to
the agent, who is able to carry out a specific action, most suitably a
telic one. However, since the category is structured by degrees, there
are in the peripheral zone examples which do not follow exactly this
pattern, yet fit in with what is reasonable to understand as deontic in
meaning. The speaker may, for example, not be a in a position of
command, his wish may boil down to a sheer advice; the situation may
concern not an action, but a process without specific agent, or even a
state; the agent may not be in the second person, but absent or even
inanimate, although states and inanimate subjects might point to an
epistemic meaning; negatives and past tense verbs may be found in both
categories, in spite of the fact that the epistemic use involves a
commitment of the speaker to the truth of the statement and is thus
naturally rooted in the moment of speech. In short, there is no clear
benchmark with which to gauge mechanically the difference between both
modalities: the limits are unsteady, not unusually overlapping, while
the meaning of a particular form may not be described in isolation from
the broader context in which it appears. And, as Y. hastens to point
out, the weight of the literary tradition complicates matters still
further, in so far as it blocks clear evolutionary paths: the forms
show distinct uses in the first stages, only to be replaced by a
uniform pattern, which becomes readily fixed.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, in which the standard handbooks are
seldom of any help, Y. argues her case convincingly, providing a
picture of these three modal verbs which is as intricate as
informative. In what follows I shall provide a brief sketch of each
chapter's conclusions, stressing what strikes me as most interesting
but leaving aside the minute details Y. goes into to prove her point.

<greek>o)phel-</greek>

The description is similarly structured in the three core chapters:
Homeric Greek, post-Homeric Greek, and New Testament Greek, to which is
added (when data are available) Mycenaean Greek. In each of these
chapters, the major insight is the identification of a pivotal example
on which hinges the whole description and the hypothesis put forward by
Y. for the semantic and syntactic evolution of the respective form (cf.
pp. 45-6, 89-90, 144-5).

As is well-known, the root in question may assume various meanings:
apart from conveying the idea of an obligation or of unattainable
wishes, it may mean either 'to increase', 'to owe a debt', or even 'to
sweep'. According to Y. the most basic meaning, common to all of these,
is 'to pile up'. This would account for the relationship between
sweeping and increasing, in a metaphorical shift of the type 'to pile
up is to increase'. There follows a series of further shifts, from
'increasing' to 'owing a debt', and from 'owing a debt' to an
obligation of doing something (i.e. deontic necessity), not to mention
the shift from the obligation of doing something to something having to
be (or not) the case (i.e. epistemic necessity). In all of these there
have been metaphorical 'leaps' linking one domain to the other, yet a
metonymical understanding (i.e. favoured by the context) must also have
played a role in the path that leads from the more concrete meanings of
the root to the more abstract ones.

This is most obvious in the transition from 'owing a debt' to the
'obligation of doing something', where the introduction of a purpose
infinitive is conducive to a modal understanding of the verb, fostering
a future-oriented scenario and lending a dynamic trait to the
structure. This infinitive would then be reanalyzed as the argument of
the verb, and not as an expression of circumstance: 'I owe 300 drachmae
to pay for the house' (purpose infinitive) > 'I must pay for the house
(with 300 drachmae)' (infinitive as the argument of the verb).

All of this is fairly well-known; what is new in Y.'s analysis is her
hypothesis on how the forms expressing unattainable wishes developed.
They are not, as one might expect, a by-product of the shift from
deontic meanings to epistemic ones, but follow a different process of
change. They result not only from the use of a past tense verb, but
also from the original meaning of the root (the notion of a desirable
thing is implicit in the idea of 'increasing'). Thus Y. is able to
account for the modal use of past tenses, known from various other
languages, and justify why this particular root was chosen to convey,
among other things, the idea of unattainable wishes, the finite verbal
form of which subsequently became fossilized as a lexical item and was
treated as an adverb.

Furthermore, Y. makes here many relevant remarks on the use of past
tenses and the aspectual distribution of infinitives, and the same
applies to the remaining core chapters.

<greek>de/w</greek>

The basic meaning of the verb is 'to lack'. 'Lacking' is just a step
away from the wish of putting an end to it, to the idea of 'having a
need'. Both meanings are fairly common crosslinguistically to convey a
sense of obligation, from which ensues their use as modal markers of
deontic and epistemic modality.

As a modal verb, Y. selects a significant example on which to base her
hypothesis of the origin of the form and its subsequent evolution. In
most cases, the verb <greek>deu/omai</greek> takes a genitive in Homer.
The structure may also appear, although rarely, with an infinitive of
purpose, as in Il. XVIII. 99-100: <greek>e)mei=o de\ dh=sen a)rh=s
a)lkth=ra gene/sqai</greek> 'and [he] lacked me as the protector of his
ruin'. The purpose infinitive, as Y. observes, is not yet an argument
of the verb, which still keeps its usual genitive
<greek>e)mei=o</greek>. Finite verb and infinitive are not perfectly
integrated. This structure is subsequently reanalyzed, whereby the
infinitive is understood as the argument of the verb. Later still,
there follows formal adjustments such as the omission of the genitive
and the impersonal use of the verb, as for instance Il. IX. 337:
<greek>ti/ de\ dei= polemize/menai *Trw/essin *)Argei/ous;</greek>
'what need is there for the Argives to fight with the Trojans?' Here
the verb is already construed with the infinitive, which displays a
distinct subject in the accusative.

Deontic and epistemic uses in post-Homeric Greek are analyzed by way of
a wealth of examples, including instances where it is impossible to say
which meaning is most appropriate ('ambiguity'), sometimes both of them
being equally possible ('merger'). Y.'s remarks on the issue are
particularly illuminating and may lead to a different interpretation of
how specific passages are usually understood. I found the most
interesting ones on Herodotus 5.31.15 (p. 115), Euripides' Andromache
252 (p. 129), and Sophocles' Philoctetes 416-8 (p. 128).

Much light is shed also on past tense forms. In both deontic and
epistemic meanings they may refer either to the past or to the present,
interacting with present and aorist stem infinitives to mark (or not)
relative time. The picture is complex, but the comments are on the
whole quite elucidating.

As for the development of the form, from its most basic meaning to its
proper deontic and epistemic meanings, Y. argues for a path marked by
conventionalization of implicature, i.e. metonymical or gradual
processes which would be able to account even for the meaning 'to ask'
assumed by the verb and for the meaning 'to attempt' or 'to order'
acquired by the combination <greek>oi)/omai dei=n</greek>.

<greek>xrh/</greek>

Here the first stages of development are not documented, so Y. is wary
of advancing a full reconstitution, but argues all the same for an
underlying unity of the forms.

As we are dealing with a noun, it is natural to regard as more basic
the structure with a genitive construction, not with an infinitive.
Even in this construction, we may have an accusative referring to the
human affected by the need, as in Il. VII. 109-110: <greek>ou)de/ ti/
se xrh\ tau/ths a)frosu/nhs</greek> 'nor this foolishness befits you'.
On this accusative hinges the subsequent development. In the primitive
accusative plus infinitive construction, so claims Y., the accusative
is an object of <greek>xrh/</greek> and the infinitive is epexegetic,
rendering clear what the obligation consists of. It stands to reason
that the only human mentioned would be also the agent of the action,
i.e. that the accusative refers to the agent of the infinitive as well:
<greek>ti/ se xrh\ tau=ta le/gesqai;</greek> 'what need (is there) for
you to say such things?' (Il. XIII. 275). But once the accusative is
detached from <greek>xrh/</greek> and is linked to the infinitive,
there must have occurred a reanalysis whereby the infinitive is viewed
as the subject of <greek>xrh/</greek>. Later still, the accusative is
construed as the subject of the infinitive and detached from the noun:
<greek>ou) xrh\ pannu/xion eu(/dein boulhfo/ron a)/ndra</greek> 'a
decision-making man is not obliged to sleep all night long' (Il. II.
24).

There are some excellent remarks on the use of past tense forms and on
examples halfway between deontic and epistemic meanings, such as
Pindar's Nem. 5.49 (p. 165s.) and Euripides' Medea 886 (p. 174s.).
Negatives and interrogatives receive their fair share of attention, as
well as the incipient use to denote 'unattainable wishes', which is
common to the three verbs at issue.

A few minor points:

(p. 44) Y. goes to some length to explain why in Il. XVIII. 364-7 the
deontic meaning is coloured by epistemic values. Ingenious though her
arguments are, they sound to me a bit far-fetched, as she contrives a
complex context in which to assess Hera's statement. Perhaps one might
read the passage in terms of a difference in illocutionary force.
Whereas the standard deontic meanings are 'performative', our example
would be arguably 'descriptive' (the terms are Sweetser's).[[2]] It
might be analyzed as an instance of what Willmott calls 'objective
deontic' modality,[[3]] and this would fit in with the interpretation
that Hera is at pains to distance herself from the obligation she
mentions. The same would apply to Il. I. 352-54, quoted at page 42, but
here the 'descriptive' use of the deontic modality by Achilles would be
a subtle way of pointing out Zeus' obligation and at the same time of
muting the force of his own assertion, lending it a tint of
objectivity. Another possible candidate is Aristophanes' Thesm. 216-17
quoted at p. 76.

(p. 133s.) Y. remarks that, as a rule, there are no future infinitives
used in the <greek>de/w</greek> construction. When the meaning is
deontic, the future would be redundant, so claims Y., for the
infinitive has a purely dynamic value. In the epistemic meaning, where
in principle the future infinitive would be perfectly acceptable for
inferences about the future, the future infinitive is not used
'probably under the influence of the overwhelming majority of deontic
constructions'. I am not able to come up with another answer, but I
think this syntactic peculiarity is in need of a better explanation.
All the more so because, in past time reference, it is not rare to find
modal verb and infinitive being redundantly used in the past, referring
jointly to the past time frame or else focalizing the past opinion of
the speaker.

(p. 53ss.) Y. draws heavily on an excellent article by
Lamberterie.[[4]] At times I found it hard to distinguish in Y.'s
description where Lamberterie's opinions end and where hers begin.
Compare for instance pp. 53 and 55 with Lamberterie's pp. 209 and 212.
One might have expected a more generous employment of quotation marks
in some passages.

Beyond the irritating presence in the Greek text of an inverted comma
whenever an apostrophe was due (for instance <greek>d( ou)de/</greek>
instead of <greek>d) ou)de/</greek>) I have noticed a few typos and
other minor slips.[[5]] The lack of an index locorum is to be lamented
and will be sorely felt by all those consulting the book.

This is an important book which I earnestly recommend. It comes as a
welcome contribution in a field (ancient Greek modal verbs) which tends
to receive far less attention than it ought to, given its relevance for
the correct interpretation of texts. It will be read with profit both
by a broad range of classicists and the general linguist (although not
the Greek-less one), and is a suitable match for another recent work on
modality, Jo Willmott's The Moods of Homeric Greek. One may only wish
that Y. keeps writing on the subject to make us more knowledgeable
about it.


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Notes:


1.   J. Coates, The Semantics of the Modal Auxiliaries (London/Canberra
1983).

2.   E. E. Sweetser, From Etymology to Pragmatics (Cambridge 1990):
65-68.

3.   J. Willmott, The Moods of Homeric Greek (Cambridge 2007).

4.   Ch. de Lamberterie, "Le proble\me de l'homonymie: les trois verbes
<greek>o)fe/llw</greek> en grec ancien", in La langue et les textes en
grec ancien: Actes du colloque Pierre Chantraine (Grenoble 5-8
septembre 1989) (Amsterdam 1992): 201-217.

5.   (p. 25, note 31) As far as I can see, reference should be made to
Eckardt, not to Traugott.
(p. 32, line 12 from bottom to top) 'a\', not 'a/'.
(p. 33, line 4 from bottom to top) 'subjetiva', not 'objetiva'.
(p. 46, note 63) 'ejemplos', not 'ejemplo'.
(p. 61, line 3 from top to bottom) <greek>met) a)ndrw=n</greek>, not
<greek>met a)ndrw=n</greek>.
(p. 67, line 6 from top to bottom) <greek>dikaiw/mata</greek>, not
<greek>dikaiw/ata</greek>.
(p. 70, line 10 from bottom to top) <greek>d) e)k</greek>, not
<greek>d e)k</greek>.
(p. 71, lines 10 and 11 from bottom to top) <greek>ou)
panta/pasin</greek>, not <greek>ou)panta/pasin</greek>, and
<greek>pa/nta to\n</greek>, not <greek>pa/ntato\n</greek>.
(p. 72, line 3 from bottom to top) Reference should be made to 'Hdt.
1.41.5-6', not to 'Hdt. 7.152.11-13'.
(p. 75, line 11 from top to bottom) <greek>kai\ th=s</greek>, not
<greek>kai\th=s</greek>.
(p. 76, line 10 form bottom to top) 'presente', not 'pasado'.
(p. 79, line 3 from top to bottom) <greek>o(</greek>, not
<greek>O</greek>.
(p. 90, line 11 from bottom to top) <greek>Trw/essin
*)Argei/ous</greek>, not <greek>Trw/essen Argei/ous</greek>.
(p. 100, line 12 from top to bottom) The word 'era' is missing between
'atenienses' and 'un hombre'.
(p. 104, last line) A colon is missing after "es conveniente".
(p. 111, line 3 from bottom to top) Delete the second 'al'.
(p. 116, note 160) A rather careless quotation of Schwyzer:
'Forderung', not Forderungen'; 'Angemessenheit', not 'Anngemessenheit';
'und', not 'un'; 'gebraucht', not 'gebrauch'; 'triffst', not 'trifts';
'solltest', not 'sollest'.
(p. 119, line 13 from bottom to top) <greek>e)piyhfi/zein</greek>, not
<greek>e)pyhfi/zein</greek>.
(p. 121, line 14 from bottom to top) <greek>pepragme/nois</greek>, not
<greek>pepragme/nos</greek>.
(p. 124, first line) <greek>po/lewn paro/ntwn</greek>, not
<greek>po/lewnparo/ntwn</greek>.
(p. 125, line 4 from top to bottom and line 10 from bottom to top)
<greek>presbute/rwn</greek>, not <greek>presbu te/rwn</greek>;
'parecen', not 'parece'.
(p. 127) The last sentence of the first Greek quotation appears twice:
delete lines 6 to 8.
(p. 127, note 167) 'werden', not 'warden'.
(p. 133, line 3 from bottom to top) 'numerosas', not 'numerosos'.
(p. 135, line 7 from bottom to top) Same as p. 124.
(p. 139, last line) <greek>oi)/omai</greek>, not
<greek>oi)omai</greek>.
(p. 141, first line) <greek>xrh/</greek>, not <greek>xrh(</greek>.
(p. 143, note 186) 'quitte a\', not 'quitte a/'.
(p. 163, second line from top to bottom) Delete the second 'a'.
(p. 169, line 7 from bottom to top) 'contexto', not 'cotexto'.
(p. 170, line 6 from bottom to top) Substitute a period for the comma.
(p. 173, line 12 from top to bottom) <greek>oi(=on fi/ltron</greek>,
not <greek>oi(=onfi/ltron</greek>.
(p. 179, note 227) 'unsichere', not 'insichere'.
(p. 184, line 10 from top to bottom) 'sentidos', not 'sentido'.