BMCR 2009.08.23: Phillips on Marin, Blood in the Forum: The Struggle for the Roman Republic

Bryn Mawr Classical Review <[email protected]> Mon, 10 Aug 2009 08:57:49 -0400 (EDT)
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Pamela Marin, Blood in the Forum: The Struggle for the Roman Republic.
London/New York:  Continuum, 2009.  Pp. xix, 198.  ISBN 9781847251671.
$29.95.

Reviewed by Darryl A. Phillips, College of Charleston, South Carolina
([email protected])
Word count:  1639 words
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The history of the last century of the Roman Republic is well worth
relating.  Land reform efforts, political bloodshed, shifting loyalty
of soldiers, the rise of the urban plebs, provincial conquests, piracy,
and open civil war make for an exciting narrative.  In this book Marin
takes us through the history of Rome from 133 - 44 B.C. with an
emphasis on the last four decades.  This story, of course, has been
told many times before.[[1]]  Marin's innovation is to focus the later
part of her work on Cato the Younger, to whom she assigns a leading
role in events.  Marin's recent Ph.D. dissertation on "Cato the
Younger: Myth and Reality" no doubt provided much material.  The
present work, however, is much more ambitious in scope than her
dissertation as it aims to provide a complete overview of the century
and is clearly aimed at a wider audience.  The book partially succeeds
by providing a fresh focal point for examining the late Republic, but
too much emphasis on Cato at the expense of a more balanced narrative
leaves much of the story untold.  The argument for Cato's crucial role
is unconvincing.

Chapter 1, "What it Was to be Roman," provides an introduction to the
work as a whole.  Discussions of Roman political and social
institutions, aristocratic values, religious practices, and specialized
terminology prepare the readers for what follows and suggest that the
book is aimed at undergraduate students and general readers.  The
material is clearly and succinctly presented.  A brief discussion of
Roman views of suicide offers a hint at where the narrative is headed.
The author notes that she consciously avoids the labels "optimates" and
"populares" that dominate most modern narratives of the period, and
instead will focus on individuals and their actions.

The book progresses in chronological order.  Chapter 2, "A Blueprint
for Civil War?  Sulla and the 80s BCE," begins with the land reform
efforts of Tiberius Gracchus and ends with the dictatorship of Sulla.
Chapter 3, "The Up and Coming Generation: Rome in the 70s BCE,"
presents the continuing campaign against Mithridates, emerging problems
with pirates, and the revolt of Spartacus, ending with the consulship
of Pompey and Crassus in 70 B.C.  Chapter 4, "Hope for the Future: Rome
in the 60s BCE," discusses further problems of piracy and Mithridates,
and ends with a close examination of the election of magistrates for 63
B.C.  These chapters provide a useful survey, generally presenting the
events in clear prose and logical order.  Quotations from a range of
primary sources are incorporated into the narrative to illustrate and
expand upon the main text.  Notes are kept to a minimum throughout,
although both the notes and bibliography that are included point to
major primary sources and English language scholarly treatments of
topics.  In these early chapters, Marin's account is without
controversy, except perhaps for her final analysis of Tiberius
Gracchus' tribunate.  Marin comments that "his methods were
unconstitutional, or at the very least, against tradition" (p.32).
Regrettably, this opportunity to explore the failure of the Roman
"constitution" and to explore in greater depth the conflict with
tradition is not taken up, and readers interested in political history
will be left unsatisfied.  Marin's remark here is nonetheless
revealing, as we see early on that this history is going to take the
Senate's side.

In Chapter 5, "Rome in Crisis? The Catilinarian Conspiracy of 63 BCE,"
and Chapter 6,"A First Triumvirate? Rome in the Early 50s BCE," the
value of Marin's approach is best seen.  As she explores the complex
relationships among Catiline, Cicero, Cato and Clodius, Marin takes a
close look at the individuals while avoiding any notions of larger
"parties".  She cautions us not to take Cicero at face value as she
reassesses the relationship of Cato and Clodius.  Marin argues that,
viewed as independent agents, both Cato and Clodius benefitted from
Cato's assignment in Cyprus  orchestrated by Clodius.  She argues that
Clodius should not be dismissed as a mere tool of the triumvirs.  While
engaging with the standard Cicero-centered narrative of this period,
Marin provides a fresh perspective on the events in Rome in the late
60s and 50s B.C.

Chapter 7, "Violence in Republican Rome: The Truth of the Late 50s
BCE," and Chapter 8, "Civil War and Caesar's Dictatorship," trace the
turbulent decade ending with Caesar's assassination in 44 B.C.  Three
pages of concluding remarks sum up the discussion and point ahead to
the domination of Octavian/Augustus.  In addition to the body of the
book, a time line and several maps are included at the front.
Endnotes, lists of primary and secondary sources, and an index are
found at the back.

As a second-string player in affairs, Cato could usefully serve as a
focal point for analysis, especially to help us understand how a
conservative aristocrat's life and career were affected by the upheaval
of this period.  This book, however, goes a step too far by assigning
too much importance to Cato.  After recounting Caesar's victories at
Pharsalus and Thapsus as a prelude to a lengthy narrative of Cato's
suicide, we find some rather far-fetched historical speculation:  "One
could question whether it [suicide] was the right decision, as Cato
could have continued his protests against Caesar, perhaps even to
joining Pompey's son, Sextus Pompeius or even, by force of personality,
have driven Caesar out of Rome with his own troops (p.159)."  Marin
quickly acknowledges that it is doubtful that Cato could have
succeeded, and indeed her own narrative has given little evidence to
support this scenario.  The speculation, however, points to a problem
with the overall construction of the book.  While Cato may usefully be
viewed as a foil for understanding the events of the period, he was not
as important a figure in dictating the course of events as were Caesar
and Pompey themselves.  He was not their equal in rank, military skill,
or popular influence.  Cato did not lead an army against Caesar, and it
was on the field of battle where Caesar won the day.  The reader will
come away from this book with a rather inflated sense of the importance
of Cato, and a rather deflated picture of others.

Cato's appointment in Cyprus in 58 B.C. offers another example.  Marin
devotes more time to discussing this administrative position than to
Caesar's decade-long command in Gaul.  Marin argues that the Cyprus
appointment would have conferred "great honour and prestige" on Cato
(p.125) and that he returned to Rome in 56 B.C. with his "reputation at
an all-time high (p.131)."  Yet upon his return Cato was unsuccessful
in his bid for the praetorship in 55 B.C., a loss that Marin
attributes, with little elaboration, to the machinations of the consuls
Pompey and Crassus.  Cato's failure in this election and his later
failure to win election to the consulship certainly need more critical
analysis.  While Cato's status is overstated, Caesar suffers the
opposite fate.  Catullus 57 is taken as general evidence of "Caesar's
continued unpopularity" (p.134) in the mid-50s B.C.  But for both Cato
and Caesar we need a context to understand what is meant by "prestige"
and "popularity."  Even if we are to avoid the terms "optimates" and
"populares," there is a need to acknowledge multiple points of view and
the relative status of the players.  A reader well versed in the
history of the period can place Marin's observations in their proper
context, but the general reader will be left with an unbalanced view.

The focus on Cato without an acknowledgement of other viewpoints means
that this book ultimately tells the story of the late Republic only as
Cato would have had it remembered.  At the critical moment in January
49 B.C., Marin suggests that Caesar presented his case for crossing the
Rubicon not "for any evil purposes, but merely to protect himself"
(p.154).  She quotes directly from Caesar's Bellum Civile 1.22, but
does not discuss this pivotal passage in which Caesar himself presents
multiple reasons for his actions, including not only protecting himself
(as Marin notes), but also upholding the rights of the tribunes of the
plebs and freeing the Roman people from the domination of a faction.
Caesar did not overtly aim to overthrow the Republic, as Marin suggests
(p.155).  The story is much more interesting than that.  He aimed to
further his form of the Republic, one that was fundamentally at odds
with the Republic envisioned by Cato and the boni.

A number of errors of fact and omission detract from the work as a
whole.  To cite a few examples: Cicero is referred to as a "young,
honest quaestor" when he was asked to take on the prosecution of Verres
(he had been quaestor four years earlier); the so-called
"Commentariolum Petitionis" is presented as a letter written by Cicero
to his brother Quintus (not the other way around); Pompey's sole
consulship in 52 B.C. is repeatedly referred to as a "dictatorship";
and Lucius Junius Brutus is said to have assassinated (not expelled)
the last king of Rome.  Oddly missing from the discussion of the start
of the Mithridatic wars is the massacre of Romans and Italians in the
east that was carried out with the help of Rome's former allies.  The
omission is especially strange as the campaigns against Mithridates and
other provincial matters play such a prominent role in the book.

Provocative works and studies that approach old problems in new ways
can play an important role both in scholarly discussions and with wider
audiences.  Generally, such works are most successful when they openly
engage opposing views.  Works directed to a general audience lose their
value if they present only a narrow perspective.  Press materials for
this book provocatively claim that it presents "the tragedy of the
Roman Republic in its true light."[[2]]  Had he lived long enough, Cato
the Younger would certainly approve.  Caesar and many others would not.

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Notes:


1.   D. Shotter, The Fall of the Roman Republic, London: Routledge,
1994 (2nd ed. 2005), offers an account that parallels Marin's work in
length, scope, and intended audience.  Among the many other works, The
Cambridge Ancient History Volume 9: The Last Age of the Roman Republic,
146-43 BC (2nd ed. 1994), especially chapters 9 & 10 by T.P. Wiseman
that cover the 60s and 50s B.C., provides a detailed chronological
survey and thorough analysis.

2.   http://www.continuumbooks.com/books/detail.aspx?BookId=130989
(http://www.continuumbooks.com/books/detail.aspx?BookId=130989) .