Re: A review of draft-ietf-hip-dex-02.txt

Hi Miika, all,

thanks for reviewing the draft!

In this email I address the first part of your comments. I will send
another email concerning the remaining comments by the end of the month
latest.

On Mon, Mar 28, 2016 at 10:05 PM, Miika Komu <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Hi,
>
> > 1.1.  The HIP Diet EXchange (DEX)
>
> > Data packets start to flow after the 4th packet.  The 3rd and 4th HIP
> > packets may carry data payload in the future.  However, the details
> > of this may be defined later.
>
> Similarly as in RFC7401, data packets start to flow...
>
> (I guess you could also mention RFC6078 as another further work item)
>

Changed. I didn't include RFC6078 as it appears to rely on signatures.


>
> > An existing HIP association can be updated with the update mechanism
> > defined in [RFC7401].  Likewise, the association can be torn down
> > with the defined closing mechanism for HIPv2 if it is no longer
> > needed.  HIP DEX thereby omits the HIP_SIGNATURE parameters of the
> > original HIPv2 specification.
>
> Why "thereby"? I don't see the connection.
>

Changed to "in doing so"


>
> > HIP DEX does not have the option to encrypt the Host Identity of the
> > Initiator in the 3rd packet.  The Responder's Host Identity also is
> > not protected.  Thus, contrary to HIPv2, there is no attempt at
> > anonymity.
>
> The anonymous bit still exists, so I suggest changing the wording:
>
> there is no attempt at anonymity -> such Responder anonymity is not
> preserved in HIP DEX.
>
>
The statement refers to both Initiator and Responder. I changed the
sentence as follows:
"Thus, contrary to HIPv2, HIP DEX does not provide for end-point anonymity
and any signaling that indicates such anonymity should be ignored."


> > 2.1.  Requirements Terminology
>
> In section 6.3, you are introduce also -> notation, which was
> not explained.
>

I didn't think an explanation of this formal notation was necessary as it
is also not further described, e.g., in RFC5869. What would you like me to
write here?


>
> > 2.3.  Definitions
>
> I suggest to add also the definitions of both MAC and CMAC because they
> are used throughout the document. They are also used in this section.
>
>
Thanks! We never really said what we meant by CMAC. I now added the
following definition:
"   CMAC:  The Cipher-based Message Authentication Code with the 128-bit
      Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) defined in RFC 4493 [RFC4493]."

I addressed the comment about the MAC by noting the abbreviation on first
use: "Still, note that CMAC is a message authentication code (MAC) ..."


> > 3.1.  Host Identity Tag (HIT)
>
> Just thinking aloud... should a DEX HIT have a different context ID?
> Probably not.
>

We decided against this as HIP DEX is a variant of HIPv2 and as such should
live in the same context.


>
> > 4.1.  Creating a HIP Association
>
> > The HIP Diet EXchange serves to manage the establishment of state
> > between an Initiator and a Responder.  The first packet, I1,
> > initiates the exchange, and the last three packets, R1, I2, and R2,
> > constitute an authenticated Diffie-Hellman [DH76] key exchange for
> > the Master Key SA generation.  This Master Key SA is used by the
> > Initiator and the Responder to wrap secret keying material in the I2
> > and R2 packets.  Based on the exchanged keying material, the peers
> > then derive a Pair-wise Key SA if cryptographic keys are needed,
> > e.g., for ESP-based protection of user data.
>
> (Suggest replacing "user data" with e.g. "data plane" in the entire
> document since you're talking about machines (sensors) that may not
> have a user)
>

If you don't object, I would prefer to keep it the way it is right now in
order stay in line with HIPv2.


>
> > In the I2 packet, the Initiator MUST display the solution to the
> > received puzzle.  Without a correct solution, the I2 packet is
> > discarded.  The I2 also contains a key wrap parameter that carries a
> > secret keying material of the Initiator.  This keying material is
> > only half the final session key.  The packet is authenticated by the
> > sender (Initiator) via a MAC.
>
> ...half *of* the...
>

Fixed.


>
> > The R2 packet acknowledges the receipt of the I2 packet and completes
> > the handshake.  The R2 contains a key wrap parameter that carries the
> > rest of the keying material of the Responder.  The packet is
> > authenticated by the sender (Responder) via a MAC.
>
> key wrap parameter -> parameter with encrypted contents
>

"Parameter with encrypted contents" is more generic than what key wrap
parameter (encrypted parameter with secret keying material) indicates. I
kept it as is.


>
> > 4.1.1.  HIP Puzzle Mechanism
> >
> > The puzzle mechanism enables a Responder to immediately reject an I2
> > packet if it does not contain a valid puzzle solution.  To verify the
> > puzzle solution, the Responder only has to compute a single CMAC
> > operation.  After a successful puzzle verification, the Responder can
> > securely create session-specific state and perform CPU-intensive
> > operations such as a Diffie-Hellman key generation.  By varying the
> > difficulty of the puzzle, the Responder can frustrate CPU or memory
> > targeted DoS attacks.
>
> ...can frustrate *an Initiator*...
>

I did not change the text as it is a straight copy/paste from RFC7401.
Moreover, "Initiator" would indicate to me that the adversary must be a
protocol-compliant entity. So, I would prefer keep this more general
statement here.


>
> > Conceptually, the puzzle mechanism in HIP DEX is the same as in
> > HIPv2.  Hence, this document refers to Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 in
> > [RFC7401] for more detailed information about the employed mechanism.
> > Notably, the only difference between the puzzle mechanism in HIP DEX
> > and HIPv2 is that HIP DEX uses CMAC instead of a hash function for
> > solving and verifying a puzzle.  The implications of this change on
> > the puzzle implementation are discussed in Section 6.1.
>
> The other difference is mentioned in section 6.1:
>
> "The only exceptions are that HIP DEX does not use pre-computation of
> R1 packets and that RHASH is set to CMAC.  As a result, the pre-
> computation step in in Section 6.3 of [RFC7401] is skipped in HIP DEX."
>

True. I added the pre-computation bit here as well.


>
> > 4.1.2.1.  HIP DEX Retransmission Mechanism
>
> > The potentially high processing time of an I2 packet at a (resource-
> > constrained) Responder may cause premature retransmissions if the
> > time required for I2 transmission and processing exceeds the RTT-
> > based retransmission timeout.  Thus, the Initiator should also take
> > the processing time of the I2 packet at the Responder into account
> > for retransmission purposes.  To this end, the Responder MAY notify
> > the Initiator about the anticipated delay once the puzzle solution
> > was successfully verified and if the remaining I2 packet processing
> > incurs a high processing delay.  The Responder MAY therefore send a
> > NOTIFY packet (see Section 5.3.6. in [RFC7401]) to the Initiator
> > before the Responder commences the ECDH operation.  The NOTIFY packet
> > serves as an acknowledgement for the I2 packet and consists of a
> > NOTIFICATION parameter with Notify Message Type I2_ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
> > (see Section 5.2.19. in [RFC7401]).  The NOTIFICATION parameter
> > contains the anticipated remaining processing time for the I2 packet
> > in milliseconds as two-octet Notification Data.  This processing time
> > can, e.g., be estimated by measuring the computation time of the ECDH
> > key derivation operation at Responder boot-up.  After the I2
> > processing has finished, the Responder sends the regular R2 packet.
>
> ( boot-up -> start-up procedures (it doesn't have to be a boot) )
>

Changed.


>
> > 4.1.2.3.  Simplified HIP State Diagram
>
> > The following diagram shows the major state transitions.  Transitions
> > based on received packets implicitly assume that the packets are
> > successfully authenticated or processed.
>
> Is the new NOTIFY illustrated also in the figure?
>

Fixed.

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