Re: rough sketch of a potential solution
Keith Moore <[email protected]> Sun, 23 Nov 2003 20:06:51 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.imaa |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
> Suppose Alice and Mallory are two > unrelated people. Alice gets an email account from example.com, > and gets a certificate from some CA. She doesn't trust example.com > nearly as much as she trusts the CA, but example.com is limited to > denial-of-service attacks; it can divert her incoming or outgoing mail, > but because it doesn't know her private key, it can't forge signed mail > from her, and it can't read encrypted mail to her, so she's willing to > use an email account from this not-really-trusted entity. only example.com can really say who [email protected] is; example.com is free to change this binding anyway. so any certificate from an external CA that makes assertions about who [email protected] is is meaningless. > Maybe there's a way to fix this, but I think we're all leaning toward > the multiple-addresses-in-the-certificate approach anyway. me too. > When you say "issued in the same domain", do you mean that the > addresses > have the same domain-part (the part after the at-sign)? Or are you > referring to some PKI-related concept of "domain"? > > If you mean that the addresses have the same domain-part, I think that > restriction would destroy our whole motivation for alternate addresses. > The point is to have one address that's memorable for users of one > script, and another address that's memorable for users of another > script. The two addresses will obviously contain distinct IDNs. we can do that if we have a way to declare that the two IDNs are equivalent. what we don't want to do is build a mechanism that can map an arbitrary email address onto another arbitrary email address. that's opens Pandora's box. >> we want people to be able to transcribe the addresses that are >> displayed to them, or use the addresses stored in their address books, >> which in either case may be alternate addresses rather than fallback >> addresses. > > Agreed. > >> So we want to ensure that sending to an alternate address has exactly >> the same result as sending to a fallback address. > > But I still don't see a need to do more than one lookup in the address > mapping service. When I send mail, I can put whatever address I like > in > the From field and the Reply-To field. It's not the originator fields that are the problem so much as the recipient fields. A's MUA needs the address mapping service to obtain alternative addresses for B and C so that each address will be maximally transcribable by all recipients.