Re: Loops (RE: CPIM changes)

On the impact of end-to-end security requirements,

Derek Atkins <[email protected]> writes:

> I've actually thought about it and the approach I've come up with is
> that existing infrastructure is "unsecured".  Note that "mandatory to
> implement" does not imply "mandatory to use".  Gatewaying to existing
> systems would just imply not using the end-to-end security.  Users on
> legacy systems would not have keying information, so senders wont have
> any way to encrypt a message to them, and similarly those legacy users
> wont have the capabilities to sign/encrypt their own messages.

This very sounds interesting.  Maybe we should schedule some time in
the Atlanta meeting to discuss the specific topic of end-to-end
security.

John



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