Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-krb-wg-des-die-die-die-02.txt
Simon Josefsson <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.krb-wg |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Tom Yu <[email protected]> writes: > Simon Josefsson <[email protected]> writes: > >> Tom Yu <[email protected]> writes: >> >>> Changes since -01: >>> >>> Deprecate "export strength" RC4-HMAC-EXP. This requires a normative >>> downref to RFC 4757 (though a trivial one because its purpose is to >>> deprecate part of the downref). >> >> To me, deprecating RC4-HMAC-EXP but not RC4-HMAC implies that we regard >> non-export strength RC4-HMAC as secure. I think this is unfortunate. > > We already address RC4-HMAC in the Security Considerations. That section reads: RC4, used in RC4-HMAC, is considered weak; however, the use in Kerberos is vetted and considered secure for now. Any references to this vetting? Even RFC 4757 published 6 years ago appears to me to say that the cipher SHOULD NOT be used for high-volume connections, citing RC4 vulnerabilities as a reason. To me, this new document implies RC4-HMAC is stronger than we thought it was before, which seems surprising. > Keep in mind that RFC 4757 is Informational, so a standards-conforming > implementation isn't required to do anything with it anyway. That is why I propose that this document does not discuss RC4 at all. >> I'd prefer that we deprecated both RC4-HMAC and RC4-HMAC-EXP. Second to >> that, that we say nothing at all about RFC 4757 and let readers pass >> their own judgement on it. > > There's been text in the Security Considerations about RC4-HMAC since > before my edits. The document simply neglected to cite RFC 4757 > previously. Are you suggesting that we remove the preexisting text > from the Security Considerations? Also, RFC 4757 itself recommends > not using RC4-HMAC if stronger enctypes are available. The document title currently is "Deprecate DES support for Kerberos", so yes, I suggest to remove the deprecation of RC4 from the document. /Simon _______________________________________________ ietf-krb-wg mailing list [email protected] https://lists.anl.gov/mailman/listinfo/ietf-krb-wg