Re: comments on draft-dupont-mobike-transport-00.txt
Francis Dupont <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.mobike |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
In your previous mail you wrote:
In general, I find the function proposed by this draft very
useful. Although its clear that more work is needed.
=> I know but I believe only the form (i.e., better wording,
clarifications, etc) needs to be improved.
In particular, we can be more concrete when the Mobike base
protocol exists.
=> IMHO we need only few properties of it, not a concrete proposal.
Some comments below:
> 3. Two examples
I did not understand the SCTP example. Can you expand on it?
=> I'll rework it (followup in private).
> IKEv2 and Mobike mechanisms do verify that the primary peer address
> (for IKEv2) and further alternate peer address (for Mobike
> mechanisms) are correctly authenticated and authorized, so they MAY
> safely be used for transport mode IPsec security associations as
> endpoint addresses.
I'd like to understand this better. Is it correct to say that
the folllowing issues are involved:
=> note that the verification is done by the Mobike protocol and
the details are not *relevant*.
o Verification that the claimed IP address actually exists.
FOr instance, the peer has not just manufactured a bogus
address. The IKE negotiations and/or address tests take
care of this.
o Verification that its really this peer that is behind
this IP address. It would be bad if I could grab
someone else's IP address because, say, if that someone
else needed to communicate with the node in future
but couldn't do so because I already had a connection
open with that address pair.
o Verification that a number of different addresses A,
B, C, etc. all are the same entity. This is actually
the main issue, right?
=> these are details so these are irrelevant: the Mobike protocol
is supposed to be safe.
> 2. Transport mode and addresses
Maybe I'm missing something obvious but I think we also
need a discussion on how this impacts upper layer protocols.
=> until an upper layer protocol will fully survive to address changes
we can assume there is no interest to transport mode to survive
to address changes.
I can see how SCTP and Mobile IPv6 can survive address
changes,
=> note this is not really true for SCTP: SCTP has only limited
readdressing support.
but is the proposal to limit this function to
those two examples, or be more generic?
=> the proposal is to do nothing today to solve the issue, i.e.,
to put transport mode stuff out of the immediate scope of Mobike.
> Using a Mobike peer address management (as in [ADDRMGT]) a mobile
Pending the appearance of a WG draft for the base MOBIKE solution,
I think it would be appropriate to list a couple of other alternative
address management protocol proposals too, just to make it clear
that what you say in this draft is not bound to [ADDRMGT] but could
also be used with the other drafts.
=> I give the reference only as an example, or in other words
the reference is here to avoid a long explaination about what I mean
by "peer address management".
Thanks
[email protected]