RR checks to avoid DoS attacks

Hi,

I am not sure whether the DoS attack you mention is realistic.  Consider 
a malicious host that wants to trick a high volume sender into DoSing a 
third party.  Why would it want to carry out such an attack while it can 
be tracked?  It would at best be a one-time affair, if the attack has 
any significant impact.  I contend that the attacker has no incentive to 
carry on the attack after authenticating itself to a server that is 
going to be encrypting all that traffic.

regards,
Lakshminath

Bill Sommerfeld wrote:

>>Another thing I would like to bring up is that I would think this
>>"path failover" with RR should only be done when necessary e.g. if
>>an INFO-EXCH of address update is received, I would think there is
>>no need for RR in this case.
>>    
>>
>
>Absent something like an owner-of-address certificate infrastracture
>we need to do RR tests to prevent a malicious client from tricking a
>high volume sender (e.g., video-on-demand server) into DoSing a third
>party.
>
>						- Bill
>
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