Addressing Backward Compatibility [was Re: SPF PASS]
"Hector Santos" <[email protected]> Thu, 26 May 2005 13:33:32 -0400
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.mxcomp |
|---|---|
| Organization | Santronics Software, Inc. |
| Message-ID | <008d01c56219$0ccd9030$6401a8c0@hdev1> |
----- Original Message ----- From: "Carl Hutzler" <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, May 26, 2005 11:39 AM Subject: Re: SPF PASS > I wish there was a way to utilize the relatively large number of SPF > records in a technology like CSV. > > -Carl The basic issue with all of this is not a specific methodology can work or not work, but rather the basic fact that none of it can be enforced. So even if all the kinks were solved in SPF, CSV, FUZZ, ABC or what have you, SMTP developers, such as yourself, myself and others will still be stuck with still ACCEPTING the non-compliant senders and/or dealing with legacy issues. It doesn't make sense. The only, and I mean only reason I implemented SPF was two reasons: 1) AOL.COM announced support from a domain standpoint. AOL being one of the greatest sources of spam (spoofed or otherwise), we need something from AOL to help all the other victim systems. So once AOL.COM announce SPF support by publishing a SPF domain, we immediately started to implement SPF, and guess what, the AOL announcement also made MICROSOFT jump and in my view, was the reason MARID eventually started 2) SPF would be part of a suite of other methods, in particular ONE method that has no dependency with "new" information being available - this is the CBV, the call back verifier. The CBV is 100% based on the idea that "ok, we don't have much to go on, but at the VERY least, from a SMTP BOUNCE compliancy standpoint, the return path must be valid. It may be spoofed, it may be a zombie, but it must be valid. It can not be junk." So we explored the CBV. I am not saying it is the "answer" but what it proved was one fundamental aspect of the problem we are trying to address: That indeed, the majority, by atleast 60-80% of all transactions are non-compliant from a SMTP standpoint. Period. No ands, ifs or butts. And it should not be a SURPRISE to anyone because it is the reason why we have the problem in the first place. So what's missing from the process? We need an anchor that exist today to address the backward compatibility issue. We don't really have a consensus on what uniquely identifies a MAIL sender or machine that is part of a mail domain. So we can debate, argue left and right, we are still left with the same old issue on how to address backward compatibility. Until someone can address this, all the proposals are for the most part worthless. This is the secret the spammers don't want us to discover and realize, because until we do, they have no reason for them to change or adapt. SPF can work if everyone was forced to use SUBMITTER like idea to address the transitional domain/ip changes. CSV can work if everyone was forced to use reliable client domain name. etc, etc, but as long as it is not "REQUIRED" or enforceable, it is all worthless. So Carl, how can we enforce these proposals? How do I enforce CSV support? No, I am not encouraging "POLICY" discussions. I am talking about how can we automate the framework of a mixed hetergeneous network of systems? I have a few ideas. -- Hector Santos, Santronics Software, Inc. http://www.santronics.com