Re: Review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls04

There is one comment that I would like to address via e-mail before
pursuing a fresh revision of rpc-tls.

> On Nov 27, 2019, at 9:52 AM, David Noveck <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 7.2.  Multiple User Identity Realms
> I don't see how establishing an independent TLS session for each user identity domain would prevent privileged users in each security realm from monitoring RPC traffic emitted on behalf of users in other security realms on the same peer.  What am I missing?   Are there some unstated assumptions about what privileged users might be allowed to do?

There is an unstated assumption. The requirement here is poorly stated,
and I'd appreciate help making this text more crisp.

The main worry is in a virtualization environment: the host might be
inclined to share NFS resources amongst guests/tenants that access the
same server. Essentially, we want to require that the host separates
the encryption of each tenant's traffic.

In this case, the privileged users on each tenant do not have any view
of the local activity of other tenants, but might have a view of other
tenant's network activity.


--
Chuck Lever



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