Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls04
Tom Talpey <[email protected]> Fri, 6 Dec 2019 15:28:47 +0000
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> -----Original Message----- > From: nfsv4 <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Chuck Lever > Sent: Friday, December 6, 2019 10:11 AM > To: David Noveck <[email protected]> > Cc: NFSv4 <[email protected]> > Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [nfsv4] Review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls04 > > There is one comment that I would like to address via e-mail before > pursuing a fresh revision of rpc-tls. > > > On Nov 27, 2019, at 9:52 AM, David Noveck <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > 7.2. Multiple User Identity Realms > > I don't see how establishing an independent TLS session for each user identity > domain would prevent privileged users in each security realm from monitoring > RPC traffic emitted on behalf of users in other security realms on the same > peer. What am I missing? Are there some unstated assumptions about what > privileged users might be allowed to do? > > There is an unstated assumption. The requirement here is poorly stated, > and I'd appreciate help making this text more crisp. > > The main worry is in a virtualization environment: the host might be > inclined to share NFS resources amongst guests/tenants that access the > same server. Essentially, we want to require that the host separates > the encryption of each tenant's traffic. I don't think this is limited to a virtualization environment, or the behavior of the host partition/process. It's more generally a matter of key management, isn't it? The more general statement in that case might be that the key(s) used to protect the TLS connections MUST be managed in such a way that do not impact the privacy or integrity of one another. For example, if Coke and Pepsi were both guests of a single host, the keys used for their RPC/TLS mounts MUST NOT allow Coke to attack Pepsi. Hopefully there are better-worded normative examples of this language... > In this case, the privileged users on each tenant do not have any view > of the local activity of other tenants, but might have a view of other > tenant's network activity. This is a different matter, and not something introduced by RPC/TLS? Tom. _______________________________________________ nfsv4 mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/nfsv4