[openpgp] Re: ML-KEM and ML-DSA secret key format

Michael Richardson <[email protected]> Fri, 28 Feb 2025 14:08:23 -0500

Newsgroups	gmane.ietf.openpgp
Message-ID	<[email protected]>

The reason why the PKCS8 discussion in LAMPS is relevant to OPENPGP is
because one can hope that there will be support in OPENPGP products for
smaller/personal HSMs (USB tokens).  The tokens might get used with a variety
of protocols.

Today, signing of software is largely a PGP thing not an S/MIME thing.
(It's different in the MS-MSI space)
Particularly when it comes to signing git commits.

My opinion is that there are very few situations where it's better to move a
private key rather than just have two or more signing keys be validated.
At least -- in an PKIX situation with a certification authority.
I think that YUM, and APT based systems can now specify a PGP keyring for
each source, and a signature from any key in that keyring is valid.
(And we've finally moved beyond mixing all the keys up for the different
sources)

Having a way to backup a private key from one token to another one seems
(rather than generating a new key) might be operationally important for in
the software signing space.
I don't think the same considerations apply to individual use personal keys.

I also think that OPENPGP key format allows us to have multiple private keys
attached to a single identity, and for those keys to reside on distinct
tokens.  I admit that I've never tried this, but I ought to already.


--
Michael Richardson <[email protected]>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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