[openpgp] Re: WGLC for draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc [was: Re : I-D Action: draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc-08.txt]
Daniel Huigens <[email protected]>
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Hi Heiko, On Friday, May 2nd, 2025 at 16:23, Heiko Schäfer wrote: > I'll note that while this is not ideal for all scenarios, migrating to > post quantum encryption is possible without further clarifying subkey > selection, as follows: > > 1. Adding a PQC subkey > 2. Observing that this subkey is being (either exclusively or > additionally) encrypted to by all relevant peers, and then > 3. Decomissioning any pre-PQC encryption subkeys (by expiration or > revocation). Section 8.3, option 2 seems to imply that it should be possible to achieve post-quantum encryption security from new implementations _while_ being backwards-compatible with implementations that don't support PQC: > Implementations understanding PQ(/T) will be able to parse and use the > subkeys, while PQ(/T)-incapable implementations can gracefully ignore > them. Revoking or expiring the old subkeys obviously makes the certificate backwards-incompatible. So, I still think there's a contradiction between what the draft says and what's actually possible when using (2 out of 3 of) the current implementations of the draft. Best, Daniel _______________________________________________ openpgp mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]