[Fwd: RE: COPS-over-TLS v05 draft review]
Uri Blumenthal <[email protected]> Fri, 28 Feb 2003 16:00:35 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.rap |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
[ post by non-subscriber. with the massive amount of spam, it is easy to miss and therefore delete posts by non-subscribers. if you wish to regularly post from an address that is not subscribed to this mailing list, send a message to <listname>[email protected] and ask to have the alternate address added to the list of addresses from which submissions are automatically accepted. ] Folks, This is from your friendly Security Advisor. (:-) And since I'm not the member of this mailing list, please kindly copy me on the relevant e-mails that might occur in response to this posting. (:-) Regards, Uri. -------- Original Message -------- From: "Hahn, Scott" <[email protected]> ...I think this should be posted to the list for discussion. -Scott > From: Uri Blumenthal [mailto:[email protected]] > > Here are the issues I see with the draft > "draft-ietf-rap-cops-tls-05.txt". > > First, overall I want to see how it ensures that when both client and > server can do security, it will be enabled. For example, a > man-in-the-middle can modify the traffic to convince one party that > the other one doesn't support security ("bid-down") and thus force > them to establish an insecure connection even though they both are > capable of secure communications. I would like to see a capability > to enforce secure mode. > > Also, I would like to see scenarios based not [only] on whether > client/server SUPPORTS security - but also on whether its POLICY > REQUIRES secure connection to a given peer. If it was meant so, > it isn't clear from the document. > > > Details by sections: > > 4.2. So what should the client do after receiving the error? > > 4.3. So the server MAY send a ClientClose... Anything else > it "may" do? Nothing it "should" do in this case...? > What should an implementor do here? > > 4.4. Same as above. > > 4.7. Why is this subsection here? I'd say - remove it. > > 8. It is good to require PKI - what happens if CA isn't > available, isn't accessible, whatever? > Reverts to insecure? > > > > > Thanks! > > Regards, > Uri