Re: MTS transparency and anonymity

Tony Finch wrote:
 
>> ideally, return-paths would be authenticated (in the sense
>> that the sender needs to be able to demonstrate he has the
>> right to use that return-path), and MTAs wouldn't bounce
>> messages that failed authentication.
 
> This is the fallacy of universal deployment: you can't assume
> that everyone will upgrade their systems to conform to best 
> current practice, so you can't rely on BCP to eliminate
> backscatter.

There's no fallacy and no FUSSP if you can get the spammers 
to think that it's not in their best interest to forge any
authenticated return-paths.  It's a self-fulfilling prophecy
for the "collateral spam" part of the problem.  Without it
the best 3834 application would be "shoot [Auto] on sight."

                          Bye, Frank