Re: SPF I-D for review: draft-schlitt-spf-classic-00.txt
Bruce Lilly <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.rfc822 |
|---|---|
| Organization | Bruce Lilly |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Fri March 4 2005 10:50, wayne wrote: > > In <[email protected]> Bruce Lilly <[email protected]> writes: > > From my perspective (as a mobile > > user (i.e. connecting via an unpredictable IP address) with need > > to use only a few domain names) I'd phrase the issue as "being > > able to use any IP address"; and that's where SPF utterly fails. > > I don't believe that SPF utterly fails for roaming users. There are > many options for you to use. > > For example, you can use SMTP AUTH over the SMTP submission port to > always submit your email to an acceptable MSA instead of using your > ISP's MTA. Which MSA? operated by whom? Using AUTH based on what prearranged information? > Another option is to give neutral results on other IP addresses. You > can even do something like: > > v=spf1 mx -exists:%{ir}.xbl.spamhaus.org ?all No, I can't, because I don't own my ISP's domain name (which appears as the domain of my mailbox). > you can use pretty aggressive DNSBLs with out fear of > the domain's MTA being listed on the DNSBLs. No, same reason as above. > With more work, you can create specialized DNS servers and use the > exists: mechanism to do some fancy things. About a year ago, someone > created a "rate limiting" DNS server, so you could do something like: Again no and no; same reason. > Similar techniques can be used check for a special token in the return > path and allow email using it. Most UAs set the SMTP return path using the sender's mailbox; there's no "special token" there. > One person was working on creating > something similar to SMTP-after-POP, which would authorize an IP > address via a specialized DNS server after a POP. Sending and retrieving are separate operations; many ISPs provide separate servers. Moreover, it is sometimes necessary to send mail w/o using the ISP's SMTP relay, for example to work around temporary DNS botches [which is why blocking port 25 is unreasonable]. > All of these techniques have been known/discussed for well over a > year. And (as has also been discussed/is well known) none of them are applicable in the vast majority of cases (i.e. in general).