Re: SPF I-D for review: draft-schlitt-spf-classic-01.txt
Richard Clayton <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.rfc822 |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 In article <[email protected]>, wayne <[email protected]> writes >>> To put it another way, the >>> only people who see malicious explanation strings are people whose >>> messages claim to be from domains that publish such strings in their >>> SPF records. >> >> the other people who will see them are people who know nothing of SPF >> but forward them to a machine that applies SPF to the forwarded email; >> their MTA will display the SMTP conversation in the DSN generated, which >> they will receive. Text that was misleading could then mislead :( > > >Ok, I'm not entirely sure what you are saying here. Let me rephrase >it as an example and see if my understanding is right. > > >Say [email protected] sends email to [email protected] and >forwarder.org rewrites the MAIL FROM to >alice#example.org#[email protected], and forwards it on to >where Bob directed it to go. I was specifically assuming that the mail would not be forwarded with fancy new things like # marks and crypto-tokens... I meant a scenario like this [email protected] sends an email to [email protected] naive.org have never heard of SPF (so who can say who really sent the email? just trust me, it was probably Alice herself). They accept the email. However, when they decide where to deliver it they find that they should forward all of Bob's email automatically to [email protected] BigIsp have indeed heard of SPF and take one look at the incoming email and see that foulmouth.org's policy is very restrictive. They refuse the email because naive.org is not a suitable place for it to come from. The MTA at naive.org now generates a DSN, and manages (huzzah!) to deliver this to Bob (who they know from internal state was "responsible" for the forwarding and hence is the right person to receive the DSN; forwarding systems _can_ get this sort of thing right and not back-scatter!) Bob receives: We said: MAIL FROM: [email protected] they said: OK we said RCPT TO: [email protected] they said: SPF fail: not handling email for idiots Bob is one of insulted, confused, and potentially entirely misled. With some thought I suspect you could do some interesting social engineering with URLs... If you're really unhappy about where the DSN goes then consider the postmaster at naive.org receiving it instead of Bob... The deep problem here is that you're getting one machine to repeat a message on behalf of another. This is always risky and arguing that only the recipient sees it is not really fixing it all that much. Everyone thought that having badly constructed HTML reflected back to people wasn't a problem until people discovered "cross-site scripting" :( >When the email reaches >[email protected], it for some reason fails the SPF check and >the explanation string from forwarder.org is used. This DSN is then >sent back to forwarder.org, which returns it to [email protected]. in a world where forwarding has been souped up maybe it does go back to Alice ... I rather think your document needs to explain what can happen in this world as well BTW: whilst I'm being helpful, I'd suggest you the third sentence of the introduction: While this feature is desirable in some circumstances, it is a major obstacle to reducing Unsolicited Bulk E-mail (UBE, aka "spam"). and perhaps the next one as well. I think the sentence is unnecessarily contentious and adds nothing to the rest of the document. You're proposing a scheme to tackle impersonation, no more no less -- I don't think you need to go out of your way at all to provoke an argument as to whether it is good for anything. - -- richard Richard Clayton They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety. Benjamin Franklin -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBQpHyMpoAxkTY1oPiEQLoKACg/3UqC6Y4WmkuR5Wpzfn3nxRCE+oAoPXD TQlE0XYtbnFhovnQ8Ib3KclI =qyMP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----