Re: WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to...

Bart Schaefer <[email protected]> Sun, 4 May 2014 11:39:26 -0700
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.rfc822
Message-ID <CABkvzctXVrDiy_GkkAPPOe6gJu22LjxRjOQotzXFqrd3-XnpYA@mail.gmail.com>
On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 8:40 AM, John R Levine <[email protected]> wrote:

>  FWIW, I agree with Arnt on this one. In fact the case has yet to be made
>> that
>> DKIM-based whitelisting of list mail is more than a nice-to-have; per-user
>> whitelisting on the basis of List-id alone along with the usual checks for
>> blatent viruses and whatnot seems to work pretty well.
>>
>
> Currently, I agree with you.  But if List-ID always meant to skip the
> DMARC rejection checks, how long would it take for every paypal.com phish
> to include a List-ID?  Presumably competent filters would subsequently
> catch it, but it would make DMARC, which is intended to be a cheap
> anti-phish technique, totally pointless.
>


For paypal and other institutional senders, wouldn't it suffice to have a
special DMARC policy that forbids mailing lists from forwarding messages?
 Then anyone who receives a message from such a sender that also has a
List-ID can still reject the message, and compliant mailing lists can
reject before forwarding.

Then the problem boils down to impersonating both an individual sender and
a list to which he is supposedly subscribed.   If a List-ID is present and
the list exploder has re-DKIM-signed the message, a DMARC check that the
message really did come through the list exploder should be enough?

Filters could combine this with a day-old-bread strategy to treat brand-new
List-ID sources as suspicious until a reputation is established.

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