Re: WSJ/gmail/ML, was a permission to...
Bart Schaefer <[email protected]> Sun, 4 May 2014 11:39:26 -0700
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.rfc822 |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CABkvzctXVrDiy_GkkAPPOe6gJu22LjxRjOQotzXFqrd3-XnpYA@mail.gmail.com> |
On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 8:40 AM, John R Levine <[email protected]> wrote: > FWIW, I agree with Arnt on this one. In fact the case has yet to be made >> that >> DKIM-based whitelisting of list mail is more than a nice-to-have; per-user >> whitelisting on the basis of List-id alone along with the usual checks for >> blatent viruses and whatnot seems to work pretty well. >> > > Currently, I agree with you. But if List-ID always meant to skip the > DMARC rejection checks, how long would it take for every paypal.com phish > to include a List-ID? Presumably competent filters would subsequently > catch it, but it would make DMARC, which is intended to be a cheap > anti-phish technique, totally pointless. > For paypal and other institutional senders, wouldn't it suffice to have a special DMARC policy that forbids mailing lists from forwarding messages? Then anyone who receives a message from such a sender that also has a List-ID can still reject the message, and compliant mailing lists can reject before forwarding. Then the problem boils down to impersonating both an individual sender and a list to which he is supposedly subscribed. If a List-ID is present and the list exploder has re-DKIM-signed the message, a DMARC check that the message really did come through the list exploder should be enough? Filters could combine this with a day-old-bread strategy to treat brand-new List-ID sources as suspicious until a reputation is established. _______________________________________________ ietf-822 mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-822