[saag] Re: Fragmentation, crypto drafts, and a way forwa rd

Haven't we been here before? Many times in the past 30 years?

1) Protocol $a needs an algorithm, the WG uses $p, which is recommended by NIST, because the WG believes that it is well-studied and secure.

2) A WG member who is a cryptographer suggests that $a should also allow algorithm $q. $q is inherently less studied than $p because more people want to find a problem with a NIST-recommended algorithm than some other algorithm.

3) Hilarity ensues.

3a) People question whether the IETF should even have a second possible algorithm for $a because doing so would confuse "the market".

3b) People say that the WG should even consider $q until it has more study (note the lack of actual goalposts).

3c) People say that the WG is too focused on NIST algorithms, and since $q was developed by good cryptographers in {Europe | Asia} it should have equal footing as $p for $a.

3d) Someone produces a paper that shows an attack that indicates that $p is {better | worse} than $q for a reason that only a small handful of people can understand. The WG goes wild with speculation about how important that attack is for $a, or for $b that relies on $a. Later papers that describe the effects of the attack come out 6-18 months later; they disagree on the severity of the attack. (If the initial paper did not reserve a cute name for the attack, the later papers will pick more than one.)

3e) Some of the above appears, badly summarized, on some technical social media site. Many people who have never been active in the WG, much less the IETF, now have strong opinions that they want to be heard. At least a few people use the lack of action in the WG to accept these opinions as proof that the IETF is dying.

3f1) As the above evolves, $a has been successfully deployed with just $p for a few years. Many of the WG members start to believe "why should we bother with anything else". Others still feel strongly about the not-NIST arguments. Some still think that the attack might be significant. The discussions polarize.

3f2) The WG allows the registration of $q with a bit of taint of "experimental" or "informational". As the above evolves, $a has been successfully deployed mostly with just $p being used, but with a small amount of use of $q. People argue about whether that is enough deployment to make $q have equal standing with $p. Some people still talk about the attack paper.

I'm sure there are other things with multiple instantiations for different WGs that can be added above. (I have purposely omitted bullying and conspiracy theories, for example.)

There are no guardrails that can prevent this. People will people, and the IETF will certainly IETF. Wg participants showing kindness, patience, and compassion will reduce some of the damage, but the end results will still likely be the same.

--Paul Hoffman

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