[saag] Re: Fragmentation, crypto drafts, and a way forwa rd
Stephen Farrell <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.saag |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hiya, On 23/10/2025 03:00, Paul Hoffman wrote: > Haven't we been here before? Many times in the past 30 years? I don't think so. The closest I can recall was back when someone turned up wanting to add about 70 TLS ciphersuites, being the cross-product of ECC with everything else, which IIRC got laughed at back then. The number of new algorithm IDs/code-points we're adding in all the PQ stuff is getting silly. [1] adds 18, [2] adds 12, between [3,4] we'd be adding 17 code-points in a one-octet range. And the same I guess must be happening in other WGs. Seems bad for interop to me and bad for security with all the likely unused code. And then there's the "it can't be hybrid"/"it must be hybrid" stuff from NIST and other regulators. And then there's the fact that we don't really know how all this will play out with PKI. I won't go on and on, but I could. We're doing it wrong. Cheers, S. PS: To be clear: I'm not saying e.g. those wanting [4] are bad actors or doing some kind of process end-run. I'm saying we're collectively getting this wrong. [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs/ [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem/ [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc/ [4] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-nist-bp-comp/ _______________________________________________ saag mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
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