[saag] Re: [CFRG] [MSEC]Fwd: New Liaison Statement , "LS on PQC transition for RFC 6509"

On Mon, Nov 17, 2025 at 12:36 AM Liuchunchi(Peter)
<[email protected]> wrote:
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> The cryptography of proof systems you need to do the zkps is very active thanks to cryptocurrency so plenty of options.
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> Any pointers?

For instance we have https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1187 which gets used
in https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/2010
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> I think if would be good if CFRG started discussing quantum-resistant replacements for pairing-based cryptography. In addition to IBE and ABE, there is a lot of interest in zero-knowledge proofs and anonymous credentials with selective disclosure.
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> Compared to their non-quantum-resistant properties, the more criticized aspects of IBE and ABE are that the master key being able to see everything. So a more general (and hopefully efficient) post quantum construction for zkps would be very attractive, permitting way more applications than IBE/ABE, and I do think such discussion in CFRG would be good and useful.
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> Peter
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> From: Watson Ladd <[email protected]>
> Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2025 4:04 AM
> To: John Mattsson <[email protected]>
> Cc: Nick Sullivan <[email protected]>; IETF SAAG <[email protected]>; IRTF CFRG <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected]; Charles Eckel <[email protected]>
> Subject: [saag] Re: [CFRG] [MSEC]Fwd: New Liaison Statement, "LS on PQC transition for RFC 6509"
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> The cryptography of proof systems you need to do the zkps is very active thanks to cryptocurrency so plenty of options. I don't think that was the deployment barrier. That conversation is happening to some extent in privacy pass.
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> On Wed, Nov 12, 2025, 11:59 AM John Mattsson <[email protected]> wrote:
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> I think if would be good if CFRG started discussing quantum-resistant replacements for pairing-based cryptography. In addition to IBE and ABE, there is a lot of interest in zero-knowledge proofs and anonymous credentials with selective disclosure. I would be sceptical to deploy pairing-based crypto at the moment as long as it is uncertain if there will be PQC replacements before 2035 when most organisations will try to phase out all quantum-vulnerable crypto.
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> John
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> From: Nick Sullivan <[email protected]>
> Date: Wednesday, 12 November 2025 at 20:53
> To: Russ Housley <[email protected]>
> Cc: John Mattsson <[email protected]>, Deb Cooley <[email protected]>, IETF SAAG <[email protected]>, IRTF CFRG <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>, Paul Wouters <[email protected]>, Charles Eckel <[email protected]>
> Subject: Re: [CFRG] [MSEC]Fwd: New Liaison Statement, "LS on PQC transition for RFC 6509"
>
> My understanding is that there are a few preliminary options for PQC IBE systems, including this one (https://indico.math.cnrs.fr/event/11948/attachments/5546/9653/5_Julien_Cam.pdf) based on ML-KEM, but they are much less mature than the pairing-based systems.
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> I would even consider the non-PQC pairing crypto we do have as experimental/new/risky. It’s not yet widely deployed in IETF protocols, and the CFRG is still working on a document to specify safe parameters (https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-10.html).
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> If someone in the CFRG wants to tackle the problem of specifying a PQC IBE system, I don’t see it as out of scope for the group. There would be some leg work and support needed by implementers to specify something, but even with that, it’s not clear there’s consensus even in academia about what the right approach is. I would consider it too early for the CFRG to make a considered recommendation today.
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> Nick
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> On Wed, Nov 12, 2025 at 2:31 PM Russ Housley <[email protected]> wrote:
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> I am unaware of any IBE PQC algorithms.  Is this something that CFRG is willing to work on?  Even if they are, I doubt we could give 3GPP a firm completion date.
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> Russ
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> On Nov 12, 2025, at 1:51 PM, John Mattsson <[email protected]> wrote:
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> Hi Deb,
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> Yes, MIKEY (RFC 3830) was updated by three AD sponsored RFCs: MIKEY-TICKET (RFC 6043), MIKEY-IBAKE (RFC 6267), and MIKEY-SAKKE (RFC 6509). My reading of the LS is that 3GPP specifically asked for MIKEY-SAKKE (RFC 6509) which is an optional application layer for use by governments in mission critical 3GPP systems, but to my understanding, it is not widely deployed. RFC 6507 (ECCSI)) and RFC 6508 (SAKKE) are not formally related to MIKEY but are used in RFC 6509 (MIKEY-SAKKE).
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> While 3GPP specifications also refer to RFC 3830 and RFC 6043, 3GPP only use symmetric algorithms/modes, which are already quantum-resistant.
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> (MIKEY-)SAKKE is not using P-256, it uses pairing-based cryptography (E(F_p) x E(F_p) -> F_p^2, where p is a 1024 bit prime, and was not affected by SexTNSF.) Making the identity-based MIKEY-SAKKE quantum-resistant likely involves using not yet standardized lattice-based cryptography and is at least not easy. Any updates should likely be done in corporation with the governments interested in using them. MIKEY-SAKKE was authored by UK NCSC.
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> For the non-identity-based parts of MIKEY, the symmetric parts are already quantum-resistant, and best current practice according to RFC 8862 is to mandate support of DTLS-SRTP, which is already being migrated to PQC by TLS WG.
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> Cheers,
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> John
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> From: Deb Cooley <[email protected]>
> Date: Wednesday, 12 November 2025 at 14:52
> To: IETF SAAG <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]>
> Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>, Charles Eckel (eckelcu) <[email protected]>, Paul Wouters <[email protected]>
> Subject: [MSEC]Fwd: New Liaison Statement, "LS on PQC transition for RFC 6509"
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> SAAG, CFRG and MSEC,
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> The Sec ADs received the enclosed liaison request from 3GPP.  The subject is the PQ transition timeline for MIKEY-SAKKE (MIKEY was originally specified in RFC 3830, then updated and expanded in RFCs 6507, 6508, 6509) and whether the IETF plans to update this protocol to be PQ secure.
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> From a quick skim of the RFCs (where the later RFCs are Informational and were AD sponsored), it appears that the basis of this protocol/algorithm is ECC P256/SHA-256 with a certificate-less Identity Based public key system.
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> If there is anyone who is planning to do the update work, please speak up now.  [I'm not making any comments on how easy/hard this work might be.]
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> Otherwise, we (IETF) will go back to 3GPP stating that we do not plan to update this protocol.
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> Thanks,
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> Deb Cooley
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> Security Area Director
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> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> From: Liaison Statement Management Tool <[email protected]>
> Date: Sat, Nov 1, 2025 at 3:21 PM
> Subject: New Liaison Statement, "LS on PQC transition for RFC 6509"
> To: Deb Cooley <[email protected]>, Paul Wouters <[email protected]>
> Cc: Charles Eckel <[email protected]>, Deb Cooley <[email protected]>, Paul Wouters <[email protected]>, The IETF Chair <[email protected]>, <[email protected]>
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> Title: LS on PQC transition for RFC 6509
> Submission Date: 2025-10-30
> URL of the IETF Web page: https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/2070/
>
> To: Security Area (sec)
> From: 3GPP TSG SA WG3
> Purpose: For action
> Please reply by 2025-11-14
>
> Email Addresses
> ---------------
> From: Zander Lei <[email protected]>
> To: Paul Wouters <[email protected]>,Deb Cooley <[email protected]>
> Cc: Deb Cooley <[email protected]>,Charles Eckel <[email protected]>,The IETF Chair <[email protected]>,Paul Wouters <[email protected]>
> Response Contacts: 3GPP Liaisons Coordinator <[email protected]>
> Peter Schmitt <[email protected]>
> Technical Contacts:
>
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> Body: 1 Overall description
>
> 3GPP SA3 has started a study on “Transitioning to Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in 3GPP”. This is to prepare the PQC transition for security protocols used in 3GPP systems. 3GPP SA3 has identified that the MIKEY-SAKKE protocol, which is used in 3GPP systems to transport cryptographic keys securely for Mission Critical Services, is specified in the IETF RFC 6509. Since it employs asymmetric cryptography for key distribution and may be vulnerable to quantum computing, SA3 would like to know whether there is any plan for IETF to update the RFC 6509 using PQC. If yes, SA3 appreciate if IETF can provide estimated timeline for the protocol update.
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> 2       Actions
> To IETF SEC Area
> ACTION:         SA3 kindly request IETF to provide feedback on the question above.
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> 3       Dates of next TSG SA WG 3 meetings
> SA3#125 17 – 21 November 2025           Dallas, US
> SA3#126 9 – 13 February 2026            India (TBD)
> Attachments:
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>     LS on PQC transition for RFC 6509
>     https://www.ietf.org/lib/dt/documents/LIAISON/liaison-2025-10-30-3gpp-tsg-sa-wg3-sec-ls-on-pqc-transition-for-rfc-6509-attachment-1.docx
>
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