[saag] Re: On path Active Attackers, and Meddlers in the M iddle
Deb Cooley <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.saag |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAGgd1OeGZOXQR0bP=mP=YAA_Q5Z_6oLhkQHkU358QRxX10qSWw@mail.gmail.com> |
Just a couple of observations... On Sun, Jan 5, 2025 at 5:33 PM Eric Rescorla <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sun, Jan 5, 2025 at 2:06 PM Michael Richardson <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> Carsten Bormann <[email protected]> wrote: >> > I remember doing a quick informal survey of the usage of related >> terms >> > in research papers at some time in the late 2010s, and there was a >> > clear consensus for MITM, and, incredibly, still for the >> > “man-in-the-middle” expansion. >> >> > For what RFC 4949 describes as MITM, we should stick with MITM, but >> > maybe update with the better expansion. (For other active on-path >> > attacks, and specifically for describing the capability instead of >> the >> > attack, we can use the more general term.) >> >> Yes, so MITM properly is Active On-Path Attacker. >> The idea is that MITM is a CNAME for Active On-Path Attacker. >> > > While I agree with you that we should mostly just stop saying "MITM", > I don't think that this is strictly correct, for two reasons: > > 1. Classically, a MITM attacker impersonates Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice, > (hence the DH example), though I agree that 4949 is kind of vague on this > point. However, not all on-path impersonation attacks involve impersonation > in both directions; many involve impersonating (for instance) a server to > the > client without connecting to the server at all. > [DC] I would have called this Masquerading. > > 2. There are active on-path attacks that don't involve any impersonation > at all. For example, consider the case of TLS 1.3 0-RTT replay, where > the attacker is just retransmitting valid data from the client to the > server. > [DC] I would have said this was just a Replay attack. > > With that said, I like the term "Active On-Path Attacker" for capabilities. > I just think we ought to use more precise names for the attacks themselves > (e.g., "server impersonation") if we do that, I doubt we will need to use > the > term MITM much if it all. > > -Ekr > _______________________________________________ > saag mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] > _______________________________________________ saag mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]