CTP Issue 22: Authorization Token is obtained by truncating the results of the HMAC_SHA1 computation to retain only the leading 32 bits
"James Kempf" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.seamoby |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <020d01c37c79$a8ecbcc0$956015ac@dclkempt40> |
Issue 22 suggests that 32 bits isn't enough for the authorization token. See http://danforsberg.info:8080/draft-ietf-seamoby-ctp/issue22 for details. Possible resolutions: 1) Make the authorization token longer, say 64 bits. 2) Keep the authorization token at 32 bits. Suggested resolution: Make the authorization token longer, say 64 bits. Justification: The probability of a birthday attack is proportional to 2**(sqrt(n)), where n is the number of bits in the identifier. If n is 32, then sqrt(n) is 16, which is not enough protection (65536). Making n equal 64 means sqrt(n) is 32 (over 4 billion) which should be enough.