Re: Seeking consensus on draft-elwell-sip-e2e-identity-important

"Elwell, John" <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.sip
Message-ID <0D5F89FAC29E2C41B98A6A762007F5D0019BFF6F@GBNTHT12009MSX.gb002.siemens.net>
 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gilad Shaham [mailto:[email protected]] 
> Sent: 04 March 2009 14:32
> To: Elwell, John; SIP List; Cullen Jennings; Jon Peterson
> Subject: RE: [Sip] Seeking consensus on 
> draft-elwell-sip-e2e-identity-important
> 
> Hi John,
> 
> I personally think your conclusions are correct. One comment I have is
> regarding From and To headers. It's possible that the comment is a bit
> ahead of time as this draft is not yet aimed at the solutions, but I
> believe that when we come to a solution, the endpoints 
> themselves should
> enforce some rules on the From and To headers if they want to support
> end-to-end identity.
> For example, the endpoints should not (or MUST not) place an 
> IP address
> in these fields if they request end-to-end identity to be enabled.
> Making this a requirement on the endpoint behalf would help 
> coping with
> the dilemma of the intermediate device as to whether or not it should
> break the identity.
[JRE] That would be good, but on the other hand this sort of fix-up can
in practice be done in the originating domain prior to the
authentication service. In fact replacing an IP address with a domain
name must be done before the authentication service.

John

> 
> Thanks,
> Gilad
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of
> Elwell, John
> Sent: Tuesday, March 03, 2009 6:47 PM
> To: SIP List; Cullen Jennings; Jon Peterson
> Subject: [Sip] Seeking consensus on
> draft-elwell-sip-e2e-identity-important
> 
> Draft 03:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-elwell-sip-e2e-identity-important-03
> includes for the first time an analysis of changes to SIP requests by
> B2BUAs (section 8). Also the Conclusions (section 9) have 
> been extended.
> 
> I and a number of people who have assisted in revising this 
> draft would
> like to seek consensus on a number of the points. We aim to ask these
> questions in San Francisco, but obviously it would help to 
> get opinions
> from the list in advance.
> 
> 1. Tolerance to changes of certain elements as a SIP request is
> forwarded through intermediate domains.
> 
> Section 8 analyses a number of elements of SIP messages that 
> are signed
> by the present RFC 4474 solution to end-to-end (or near end-to-end)
> authenticated identification. For some elements it claims that any
> solution for end-to-end authenticated identification needs to be
> tolerant of changes by intermediate domains, since there appear to be
> valid reasons why B2BUAs (including but not limited to SBCs) change
> these elements. Picking on some of these:
> 
> A) Is there agreement that a solution needs to be tolerant of 
> changes to
> IP addresses and ports in c- and m-lines in SDP? In other words, that
> intermediate domains can legitimately modify these fields (e.g., for
> media steering) and a solution is needed for end-to-end authenticated
> identification in such circumstances?
> 
> B) Is there agreement that a solution needs to be tolerant of 
> changes to
> Contact (addr-spec), Call-Id (call-id) and CSeq (digit) header fields?
> In other words, that intermediate domains can legitimately 
> modify these
> fields (e.g., for topology hiding) and a solution is needed for
> end-to-end authenticated identification in such circumstances?
> 
> C) Is there agreement that a solution does not need to be tolerant of
> changes to the addr-spec of From and To header fields? In other words,
> that intermediate domains should not modify these fields and 
> can expect
> to break end-to-end authenticated identification if they do so?
> 
> 
> 2. Are people in broad agreement with the conclusions in section 9
> concerning the importance of end-to-end identification and in 
> particular
> end-to-end authenticated identification?
> 
> John
> 
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