[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 20 26-07-08)

Peter Gutmann <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.tls
Message-ID <SYBPR01MB6336E55BD2B0693C3E8A9816EEFE2@SYBPR01MB6336.ausprd01.prod.outlook.com>
Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL writes:

>>>"In my opinion the issue is not implementation errors, they can be avoided
>>>with the right discipline”
>>
>> Has there ever been a vulnerability with a crypto, ah, implementation that
>> *wasn't* an implementation error?
>
>Yes. The most recent example is SIKE.

I meant actual deployed, in-use code, in TLS, SSH, IPsec, PGP, S/MIME, X.509,
whatever.  It doesn't matter if WOMBAT-128 is insecure if that affects
approximately zero instances of TLS, SSH, and so on.

(MD5 is a grey-area case.  It was known to be completely broken when it was
still being used, so implementing MD5 when you should have been implementing
SHA-256 is arguably an implementation error).

Peter.

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