Please clear draft-ietf-vrrp-unified-spec number 2
Stephen Nadas <[email protected]> Fri, 2 Oct 2009 08:18:24 -0400
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.vrrp |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <450AE4BEC513614F96969DDA34F3593497639A45@EUSAACMS0701.eamcs.ericsson.se> |
Hi Jari, Regarding this discuss, will the below clear it (I hope so as it's based on your suggestion :-) Thanks, Steve Discuss: Thirdly, I do not understand why there is no issue, because the backup taking over, because then the backup has to authoratively sign the NAs and RAs it is sending, for the primary's address. If the "trust anchor and cga" mode from RFC 3971 is used, the private key would have to be shared, or this would not work at all. And private key sharing is not necessarily a good idea. I would recommend saying this: - VRRP is compatible with "trust anchor" and "trust anchor or cga" modes of SEND - The configuration needs to give the two routers the same prefix delegation in the certificates - But still, the routers should have their own key pairs Text added at end of section 9: In the context of IPv6 operation, if SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) is deployed, VRRP is s compatible with the "trust anchor" and "trust anchor or cga" modes of SEND [RFC3971]. The (SEND) configuration needs to give the master and backup routers the same prefix delegation in the certificates so that master and backup routers advertize the same set of subnet prefixes. However, the master and backup routers should have their own key pairs to avoid private key sharing. _______________________________________________ vrrp mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/vrrp