Re: [rfc] change default setuid permissions from 4755 to 4711
Thorsten Kukuk <[email protected]> Thu, 4 Aug 2005 07:41:55 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.pld.shadow.general |
|---|---|
| Organization | SuSE Linux Products GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Wed, Aug 03, Mike Frysinger wrote: > > Hint: if for example one of shadow setuid tools will have known security > > bug. How do think .. how many seconds intruder will stop for checkin is > > attacked binary is readable or not ? (before runing exploit) and/or is > > in this case removing read atrubutes will help or not ? > > i never said that obscuring the data would protect the binaries. it will > simply make it harder for the cracker (depending on the attack vector of > course) to exploit the vulnerability (whatever it may be). This may be a dream of you, but has nothing to do with reality. > a readable setuid binary can be copied to a local directory or machine for analysis with > gdb/whatever to figure out the exact parameters needed for a successful > attack. And if he cannot copy it, he extract it from the installation media or recompile it. Does not make a real difference. > why export this information to all users if restricting it makes no difference > to the functionality ? on binary-based distros such as > Debian/Redhat/SuSe/etc... this changes nothing since an attacker can simply > grab the package from somewhere else, but on source based systems such as > Gentoo/Sorcerer/ROCK/etc... the binaries in use are not available anywhere > else for analysis. You are wrong. If I have the same sources and compiler, the result will be exactly the same. I don't need a binary package. Thorsten -- Thorsten Kukuk http://www.suse.de/~kukuk/ [email protected] SUSE LINUX Products GmbH Maxfeldstr. 5 D-90409 Nuernberg -------------------------------------------------------------------- Key fingerprint = A368 676B 5E1B 3E46 CFCE 2D97 F8FD 4E23 56C6 FB4B