Re: [rfc] change default setuid permissions from 4755 to 4711
Mike Frysinger <[email protected]> Thu, 4 Aug 2005 22:24:51 -0400
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.pld.shadow.general |
|---|---|
| Organization | wh0rd.org |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Thursday 04 August 2005 01:41 am, Thorsten Kukuk wrote: > On Wed, Aug 03, Mike Frysinger wrote: > > > Hint: if for example one of shadow setuid tools will have known > > > security bug. How do think .. how many seconds intruder will stop for > > > checkin is attacked binary is readable or not ? (before runing exploit) > > > and/or is in this case removing read atrubutes will help or not ? > > > > i never said that obscuring the data would protect the binaries. it will > > simply make it harder for the cracker (depending on the attack vector of > > course) to exploit the vulnerability (whatever it may be). > > This may be a dream of you, but has nothing to do with reality. no point in replying, this is just turning into garbage > > a readable setuid binary can be copied to a local directory or machine > > for analysis with gdb/whatever to figure out the exact parameters needed > > for a successful attack. > > And if he cannot copy it, he extract it from the installation media > or recompile it. Does not make a real difference. that may apply for binary distros and early releases of source based ones, but with Gentoo, the install media and the installed systems start to develop differences rather quickly > > why export this information to all users if restricting it makes no > > difference to the functionality ? on binary-based distros such as > > Debian/Redhat/SuSe/etc... this changes nothing since an attacker can > > simply grab the package from somewhere else, but on source based systems > > such as Gentoo/Sorcerer/ROCK/etc... the binaries in use are not available > > anywhere else for analysis. > > You are wrong. If I have the same sources and compiler, the result > will be exactly the same. I don't need a binary package. assuming same toolchain, same ./configure options, and same optimizations, yes ... but this sort of illustrates the point of why make it dirt easy for an attacker when it does not cripple the host system in the least really the thread is turning into more into flaming than anything worth reading and it's clear that people wont be changing their minds about any of it, so might as well drop it -mike