Re: Test/Examinations: The Eisen Effect
[email protected] Wed, 17 Apr 2002 18:29:57 EDT
| Newsgroups | gmane.psychology.behavior-analysis |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
In a message dated 04/17/2002 6:05:46 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [email protected] writes: << In any of these cases, had the instructors made very clear to their students what they were _expected_ to learn and should/would learn? No, they made assignments, lectured, and so on and left it to the students to figure out what was and was not 'important.' >> OK, first how do we know that they didn't make clear to their students what they were "expected" to learn? Do you have copies of their syllabi? Were you present the first day of class? Second, how do we know that they were less clear than any of their colleagues practicing the same sort of lecture-assign-test instructional system? << The lack of this instruction at the beginning of the course, with planned repetition of major concepts and skills, will make almost any test/exam "too hard." >> While making things clear to students may make things better for them -- again we don't know that these professors made things unclear -- I don't see how this would drive grade inflation, or select it. If you wanted students to have higher grades, instead of clarifying what they are "expected" to know, it would be easier to drop the work load, to make the tests easier, to lower the grading requirements, and to really, really grade on that ol' curve. If one did any of these latter then it would stand to reason, and be useful for determining experimentally, that these are the causes of grade inflation. << When we "explain" grading policies by appealing to Flexner, and to "corporate greed," forget about it. >> The "corporate greed" would reflect, I take it, the complex array of metacontingencies that define a changed institution. The point being, that universities evolved, as one would expect any social institution to evolve over time, from a noncorporate or precorporate system into one predicated on a corporatist model. The "greed" would manifest itself in terms of who runs the university, who defines its priorities and how these get defined, how its policies change, and by other changes that affect the cash-flow into and through the system. (At the university level of analysis, as distinguished from the instructional system or classroom level of analysis, the inputs to the system include revenues brought in, outputs include costs, including payroll.) Accordingly, if the policies, priorities, and practices of the entire university system evolves over time toward that "corporate greed" system, you might find this manifesting itself in other ways. For instance, it might manifest itself in the hiring of more temporary and adjunct faculty as opposed to the hiring of people with full-time positions. It might manifest itself in having more courses taught by G.A.'s and T.A.'s instead of instructors and professors with Ph.D.s. It might manifest itself in lower frequencies of tenure or greater difficulty in obtaining it. It might manifest itself in the creation of more pedestrian and maybe popular programs, perhaps things like hotel management and the like, where graduates can learn how to run a Courtyard by Marriott, but who may not have a clue about what the Monroe Doctrine was or where Mongolia is located. And, it might manifest itself in the evolution towards grade inflation to the degree that this functions to simultaneously retain students in the university by not making it worth their while to go elsewhere, and to the retention of faculty who inflate grades. Now then, ask yourself a question, are any of these changes things that have happened? -- JE