Re: Re: lo and intension (was: essentials of a gadri system)

xod:
> On the subway, reading Nick's article, I realized another place where he
> had already answered a question that we were chewing today. He says
> 'Likewise, the generic statement "Dogs make good pets" ignores the
> distinction between Fido, Rover, and Azor; it even ignores the exceptions
> like Fifi...'
>
> And there is also my previous argument: that a Mr. Bird who satisfies the
> exact characteristics of every real bird in turn is a trippy idea but no
> different from discussing the actual birds taken as individuals.
>
> Therefore, I no longer think that Mr. Bird is sometimes a carnivore and
> sometimes an herbivore. Such a question should be answered na'i.

Whatever the answer is, it should be the same answer as we give for "xod".

> Mr. Bird
> has 2 wings, feathers, and a beak, and flies. The cases of single-winged
> or flightless birds are ignored like Fifi.

You can encounter Mr Bird when he is flightless, just as you can encounter
xod when he is dreadlockless. But out of context, I would not describe
Mr Bird as flightless or xod as dreadlockless.

> I now see 3 concepts.
>
> a) The quality of birdness; kamcipni. Abstract.
>
> b) The Prototype Bird. Claims about b are claims about the definition of
> "cipni". Intensional? Uncountable, or countably one.
>
> c) A Prototype-Instance of Bird. Claims about an instance do not reflect
> upon the definition or any other instances. Extensional? Countable.

OK. But none of these are Mr Bird.

> Now for some bold, unfounded claims.
>
> 1) b = CLL-lo'e = lo'e'e.

CLL-lo'e is not as specifically psychologized as (b). A zoologist can make
empirical statements about lo'e cinfo which are zoological rather than
psychological, i.e. about lions in general rather than about the
psychological
lion prototype.

> And that c = Jorge-lo'e = lo'e'a = Mister = lo
> jai ka broda.

Jorge-lo'e = Mister != c. Mr Bird treats birdkind as a single individual
bird, just as we generally treat xodkind as a single individual xod. As for
{lo jai ka broda}, it is hard to see what that would mean, apart from
something unfathomably vague.

> 2) b is almost useless, and can indeed be better expressed by ka'u lo'e'a
> na'o broda cipni.

Prototype-theorists, i.e. some cognitive psychologists, would want to talk
about (b), but it needn't be built into the fabric of the language.

> 3) The intensional/extensional relationship between these 2 should
> be explored and exploited, unless I'm mistaken and it doesn't really
> exist. But it seems to me that b is some sort of a symbol for the members
> of c, such that some LAhE applied to b should give us an instance of b
> which is a c.

b is a variety of a. Do we mentally represent birdiness as a list of
properties, or do we represent it as something that is itself birdlike?
When deciding whether something is a bird, do we run through the checklist
of properties seeing whether the thing satisfies each property, or do we
compare the thing against the birdlike image? That's a question that
matters psychologically, but not so much linguistically.

> 4) If the nonspecificity of lo is ever going to be taken seriously, we
> will see that it relates to interchangable prototype instances, and is so
> closely related to lo'e'a that there is no need for both to exist.

I don't understand. I think we all take the nonspecificity of lo seriously.
(c) is not equivalent to {lo}, since (c) adds an element of ordinariness,
unexceptionality. Kind/Mr is not equivalent to {su'o lo}, because Kind?Mr
involves no quantification. I can't say whether Kind/Mr is equivalent to
{tu'o lo}, because as yet we have no idea of what, if anything, {tu'o lo}
should mean. (The outer quantifier of Kind/Mr must be {tu'o}, though --
that is beyond question.)

--And.