Re: 'Justified' Developments in Philosophy of Science..? are we getting there?

On 18 Feb 2013, at 20:03, JAG wrote:

>
>
> --- In [email protected], Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >
> > Yes. But I think this might be our consciousness here and now. All
> > other conscious content can be doubted.
> > But I do agree that elementary arithmetic is almost not doubtable,
> > although, strictly speaking, it can.
> >
>
> >
> > OK. (To be sure I don't believe in "philosophy of science", except
> > conventionally for the curriculum. Either we tackle problems with a
> > scientific attitude, or we don't).
> >
>
> >
> > Bruno
> >
>
> yes, but don't forget that tackling problems with a scientifc  
> attitude is also the goal;
>
OK.



> sometimes we do take things for granted
>
And the problems arrive. Better never take anything for granted,  
especially in public discourse.



> and we beleive that we do deal with problems with the appropriate  
> attitude and method, but that is not always the case, and that is  
> exactly where Philosophy of Science aims -and becomes important:
>
> To make sure that we are in line with a truly 'scientific' attitude  
> and at the same to point out various problems and implications.
>
But it is not difficult, except for the people who believes that they  
know the truth.
Faking confidence might still be a social game, probably due to our  
long biological evolution, but I think we can learn to put the  
interrogation marks and become more and more aware ... of our basic  
ignorance, and become aware of the hypothetical nature of all our  
public theories.

And that's concerns also philosophy of science. It should be a branch  
of science too. Science is mainly doubts make clear and public. It  
needs courage only.




>
> Furthermore, i will argue that Philosophy of Science is about  
> 'testing' and even discovering more appropriate=valid attitudes  
> towards that goal.
>
Yes, but not in any normative way. A philosopher of science should not  
try to tell a scientist how to do science. That would be like a  
zoologist trying to tell a centipede how to walk.



>
> Now, the next logical question is how scientifc attitude deals with  
> *meaning* and what aspects should be included, both to have a  
> functional scientific approach and then DEFINE what a scientific  
> approach is and/or should be all about!
>
> Is *meaning*(and asking *why*) outside the scope and method of  
> Science?
>
If by "meaning" you mean something like the "meaning of life", I think  
that, assuming the comp theory, we can show that it is not part of  
science, but something private. But in some other theory things can be  
different.

If by "meaning" you mean semantic, then a lot of procedure can be  
described and be amenable to public studies, like the denotational  
semantics of Scott for attributing semantic to computer program, or  
model theory (a branch of mathematical logic) to study the semantic of  
formal mathematical theories, or the attempt by Montague to build  
semantics for large part of "natural languages".



>
> or is it that we haven't developed, yet, a truly scientific method  
> good enough to include aspects that were so far excluded/'prohibited'?
>
There is no prohibition in science, just fashion, and bad habits, and  
concerning some domain, we can only hope and wait that people get less  
emotional. Such domain are often in the hand of people who makes money  
with lies, and who exploits the reasonable fear that we, the animals,  
can have toward basic fundamental things, like life, death,
values.
This leads to give authority to other people, and, despite it has been  
a useful natural strategy, it is embarrassing for the long term.

Computer science can be used to explain that all ideally  
arithmetically correct machines, get conflicting view about themselves  
when looking inward, and this makes them intrinsically unsatisfied  
most of the time. That kind of discovery might help to accept that  
once alive we face problems, and are ignorant, and makes us modest,  
trying to be less wrong and to reduce the harms, instead of defending  
naive idea about truth and false.



>
> what is the true nature of this problem?
>
The many conflicts between the cortex, the limbic system, the cerebral  
stem, the left hemisphere, the right hemisphere, in each of us, and  
then the many conflicts with the colleagues, the boss, the employees,  
etc.

About numbers, machines, and a fortiori the humans, there are no  
simple solutions.





>
> what is exactly the goal here?
>

Science can study its limitation, and recognize that some things are  
beyond its method. Like "truth". Science, or fundamental science can  
be said to be the best tool in the quest of truth, but it is also the  
worst one when trying to define it.
The goal is multiple. But for fundamental science we can say it is the  
quest of truth, keeping in mind that we can only hope for being less  
wrong, at least in some "theory". meanwhile we can try to be just as  
clear as possible to make higher the probability of being shown false.  
This is in line with David.




>
> "Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set  
> of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the  
> equations and makes a universe for them to describe? The usual  
> approach of science of constructing a mathematical model cannot  
> answer the questions of why there should be a universe for the model  
> to describe. Why does the universe go to all the bother of  
> existing?"Stephen W. Hawking
>
Why indeed? But did some Universe bother to "really" exist? Or are  
they just appearance in number's dreams?

On that question, (why there is something instead of nothing) I can  
argue that, assuming computationalism,  arithmetic provides the best  
solution we can hope for. It explains why we cannot understand why we  
believe in arithmetic without assuming arithmetic at the start, and  
then it explains why universes becomes apparent, stable, and having  
communicable sharable parts (quanta) and non communicable parts  
(qualia). And if you add the classical theory of "knowledge", the way  
the universe(s) arise becomes testable/refutable.
The numbers remains mysterious, but the fact that "the numbers remain  
mysterious" can be entirely explained (again, in that theory).



>
> "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not  
> certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to  
> reality." -Albert Einstein
>
Absolutely so, and even provably so for the ideally correct machine,  
in their "toy theology".

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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