Re: Intuitive

--- In [email protected], Alan Forrester wrote:
>
> On 3 May 2013 01:14, hibbsa hibbsa@... wrote:
> > --- In [email protected], "hibbsa" wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> Let's say there was this amazing, unique and complex phenomenon
never before seen in human history, that was regarded as hugely
important and transformational, but not at all well understood and so
important to get a deep explanation about.
> >>
> >> Further examination revealed that in terms of the complexity and
> >> uniqueness the phenomenon clustered in two places: in terms of its
> >> physical manifestation - the regularities, reccurrent themes,
> >> organization, approaches - basically everything. All this and then
its
> >> evolution in time as well. The whole thing, its parts its whole, as
a
> >> suite of traits, as a history: in the overwhelming majority was
both
> >> complex and unique - not seen before in human history.
> >>
> >> The other cluster was basically everything describing its product,
its
> >> productivity, its influence, its byproducts, and so on. This was
also
> >> complex and unique in human history, and then amazing on top of
that as
> >> well.
> >>
> >> So thinking about the various possibilities of how all this was
> >> explained, what I think I am comfortable to say is that, given this
> >> complex uniqueness characterized the underlying suite of traits,
and
> >> then shows up again in its product and influence also complex and
unique
> >> (if anything more so), far and away the most intuitive - and
reasonable,
> >> and most promising, hypothesis would be that the underlying unique
> >> complexity is the major causal force giving rise to the unique and
> >> complex outcomes. I'd say there'd be every reason to put this at
the top
> >> of the list of the most promising prospects and exploring that
would
> >> reasonably be the first port of call.
> >>
> >> Where would others here stand on this matter? Do you see it the
same? Do
> >> you agree it's certainly intuitive and reasonable. I should think
it
> >> would also be the best explanation in the popperian sense too. Or
is the
> >> intuitiveness a worry in your books? Is it a reason to look
elsewhere,
> >> for something more counter-intuitive? I'm being serious.
> >>
> >> What about Popper? It's pretty clear I'm talking about something
that is
> >> just like Science. Just like a process of philosophizing science.
> >>
> >> Or if let's say you don't experience my view so strongly as I seem
to
> >> be. Let's say for you this would be priority 2, or priority 3. That
> >> would be fine. But then what about the possibility you or someone
else
> >> would regard this explanation as so unpromising that they didn't
put it
> >> on their to-do list at all. In fact didn't regard any direct
examination
> >> of the phenomenon as useful at all, and didn't put that on his
to-do
> >> list either.
> >>
> >> Would that be rational? Would that be appropriate? Yes, it's what
Popper
> >> appears to have done, or something reasonably approximating to
that. But
> >> why? Or am I wrong and badly needing putting out of my misery, in
which
> >> case please let's get it over with :O)
> >>
> >
> > so to summarize. the criticism is not that Popper sought to explain
both
> > the suite of traits characterizing the manifestation of science on
the
> > ground, and also the phenomenal growth of knowledge that was the
> > product, by the same common thing ( basically C&R ).
> >
> > The criticism is that the key principles involved in C&R were
selected
> > largely in a process of elimination, that largely featured the
> > philosophical components such as Justificationalism, Induction,
> > Foundationalism, Empiricism, Positivism, and so on, as possible
> > competing candidates.
> >
> > But, those philosophical positions, didn't come from a direct
analysis
> > of what was happening in science itself, but from attempts by
scientists
> > to do philosophy about that underlying science. And, basically for
many
> > of the reasons Popper himself identified about those philosophical
> > attempts, there is good reason to think the scientists that tried to
do
> > this philosophy, were not at all clear what was happening in
Science.
> >
> > So the criticism is that of a fragility right at the core of the
> > philosophy. A dependency on the philosophical impressions of
scientists
> > as to what was happening in Science, where Popper might have seen
> > something rather different had he analysed the reality of science
> > directly, from a philosophical standpoint.
> >
> > I think this is a fairly straightforward and simple criticism. It
should
> > be possible for David Deutsch or someone suitable to refute the
critcism
> > or ask for more information, or whatever. I will endeavour to keep
> > looking for ways to make the criticism more clear, working on the
> > assumption if I'm not getting any kind of 'bite' it's because I
haven't
> > yet made things clear enough.
> >
> > So as and when I get the time, this is what I will endeavour to do.
>
> What would analysing science "directly" entail

Minimally it would entail a decision to cut out the philosopher middle
men and go see for himself. How things would develop would depend on
what was coming up for Popper and the directions he judged to go.

Both parts of my answer - I think - in large part arise as consequences
of the goals Popper had set himself. He was there to do fundamental
work. Popper was a visionary - he seen the possibility to solve the
puzzles of philosophy and the Western Enlightenment as part of the same
approach. Or that's my guess. Whatever his vision was, though, his
ambition was to do primary top-level problem solving.

How that's not a goal that can be reconciled with a policy of
outsourcing top-level judgements off to third parties. To be
fundamental, Popper had to be at the centre...with full spectrum control
over third party input at every stage. But the way he structured things
in the event, had no possibility at all of securing an adequate degree
of primacy to Popper's judgement in the process. He was effectively
deferring to the judgements of the philosopher middlemen.

Another way to conceptualize the arrangement he was left with is in
terms of the scourge of Authority. He could criticize the internal logic
of what the middlemen were proposing. But he couldn't criticize the
judgements and decisions and other influences that translated the
reality of Science, or some part of it, into the proposition being
recieved by Popper. And because he couldn't criticize it, by consequence
those philosophical middlemen manifested as a cluster of Authorities,
encircling Popper's core.

It's logically impossible to do fundamental work on something outside
and wider, like Science or the Englightenment, if the embryonic
philosophy you are using for a vehicle, defines a set of independent
authorities for its core. Think about it. It's impossible. All that is
possible is the creation of a philosophical explanation of the virtual
reality that structure creates. The world that would be, if the
Englightenment was fundamentally explicable as a basket of Popper's good
apples of C&R, and a lot of other bad apples of Inductionism,
foundationalism, justificationalism, empiricism, etc, etc.

But is that real? Is it Science or the Englightenment? Popper had no way
of knowing one way or the other, because the matter of the connectedness
with real Science, and all pertaining to it in its entirety, was in the
hands of external Authorities....not in some metaphorical sense, but as
actual realities - the reality of abstractions - at the core of his
philosophy.

> results differ from what Popper did?

Popper's insights and deliberations would have been completely different
historical manifestations. It's plausible that the final product
philosophical concepts would bear marked similarities to the product
manifested in the reality of Popperianism. That is because the product
of the philosophical middle men had a significant amount of
authenticity.

They were frequently individuals close to the heart of Science,
scientists in their own right. They were even the great pioneers of
Science. Truth seekers their efforts sincere. My guess is that they
typically had good intuitions what the key hubs and axils were, around
which the explanation of Science was turning. Foundations, Authority,
empirical and methodological components, and so on. But they were still
baffled how these hubs and axils defined themselves or what their
implications were.

So the result would have similarities with Popper Deutch as it stands,
just as Popper Deutsch philosophy has similarities with Science as it
stands. They are connected phenomenon, their histories have a genuine
intersection, that contains genuine and authentic impressions of Science
proper. So similarities would be the expectation.

But to re-iterate the central criticism I am making, setting it in
context at the same time: And this point is objectively true, by the
design of things. Popper criticizes the way the philosophical middlemen
*assemble* that core insight of theirs (that foundations as a concept is
fundamental in some unrecognized way). Popper criticizes the attempt to
explain the authentic core insight. And the way each of these 'issues'
gets proposed to explain, completely defines Popper's own
conceptualization of each of those fundamental issues.

In terms of the way foundational reality gets proposed, Popper refutes
foundational reality, and foundationalism as a philosophical concept (of
a mistake) is then defined, basically as the key reasoning and
judgements that made up Popper's refutation.

I appreciate this is difficult conceptually to get ones head around,
which is why I'm willing to persevere. It isn't easy to see, because
there are apparenent subtleties going on. But the implication of the
causality of reasoning, is that the very conception of these underlying
issues (foundationalism etc) is entirely encapsulated and contrained, by
the original proposition that was put forward to explain the part of
such concepts. Which means for better or for worse, the traits of those
original propositions are inherited right through into the philosophy.

And that's fragile.

I'm going to wind this post down now, but at some future point I will
add to this context by clarifying the many whole categories of
discovery, developments, and approaches, that are possible and plausible
in a direct analysis of the traits of science, but categorically
impossible out of the arrangement that Popper choose to depen on. It's
actually feasible to establish the character of many of these
categories, and in some cases prove some such categories are actually
manifesting important,influences,

Unless there is a  glaringly hole in my analysis, This is a major
problem for Popperianism. If it's true, there aren't easy fixes.




>
> Also, Popper's philosophy is not solely a description, it also
> prescribes standards for scientists to live up to. Can you improve on
> those standards?
>
> Alan
>