Re: Intuitive

On 04/05/2013, at 21:04, "hibbsa" <hibbsa-/[email protected]> wrote:

> 
> 
> --- In [email protected], Alan Forrester wrote:
> >
> > On 3 May 2013 01:14, hibbsa hibbsa@... wrote:
> > > --- In [email protected], "hibbsa" wrote:
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Let's say there was this amazing, unique and complex phenomenon never before seen in human history, that was regarded as hugely important and transformational, but not at all well understood and so important to get a deep explanation about.
> > >>
> > >> Further examination revealed that in terms of the complexity and
> > >> uniqueness the phenomenon clustered in two places: in terms of its
> > >> physical manifestation - the regularities, reccurrent themes,
> > >> organization, approaches - basically everything. All this and then its
> > >> evolution in time as well. The whole thing, its parts its whole, as a
> > >> suite of traits, as a history: in the overwhelming majority was both
> > >> complex and unique - not seen before in human history.
> > >>
> > >> The other cluster was basically everything describing its product, its
> > >> productivity, its influence, its byproducts, and so on. This was also
> > >> complex and unique in human history, and then amazing on top of that as
> > >> well.
> > >>
> > >> So thinking about the various possibilities of how all this was
> > >> explained, what I think I am comfortable to say is that, given this
> > >> complex uniqueness characterized the underlying suite of traits, and
> > >> then shows up again in its product and influence also complex and unique
> > >> (if anything more so), far and away the most intuitive - and reasonable,
> > >> and most promising, hypothesis would be that the underlying unique
> > >> complexity is the major causal force giving rise to the unique and
> > >> complex outcomes. I'd say there'd be every reason to put this at the top
> > >> of the list of the most promising prospects and exploring that would
> > >> reasonably be the first port of call.
> > >>
> > >> Where would others here stand on this matter? Do you see it the same? Do
> > >> you agree it's certainly intuitive and reasonable. I should think it
> > >> would also be the best explanation in the popperian sense too. Or is the
> > >> intuitiveness a worry in your books? Is it a reason to look elsewhere,
> > >> for something more counter-intuitive? I'm being serious.
> > >>
> > >> What about Popper? It's pretty clear I'm talking about something that is
> > >> just like Science. Just like a process of philosophizing science.
> > >>
> > >> Or if let's say you don't experience my view so strongly as I seem to
> > >> be. Let's say for you this would be priority 2, or priority 3. That
> > >> would be fine. But then what about the possibility you or someone else
> > >> would regard this explanation as so unpromising that they didn't put it
> > >> on their to-do list at all. In fact didn't regard any direct examination
> > >> of the phenomenon as useful at all, and didn't put that on his to-do
> > >> list either.
> > >>
> > >> Would that be rational? Would that be appropriate? Yes, it's what Popper
> > >> appears to have done, or something reasonably approximating to that. But
> > >> why? Or am I wrong and badly needing putting out of my misery, in which
> > >> case please let's get it over with :O)
> > >>
> > >
> > > so to summarize. the criticism is not that Popper sought to explain both
> > > the suite of traits characterizing the manifestation of science on the
> > > ground, and also the phenomenal growth of knowledge that was the
> > > product, by the same common thing ( basically C&R ).
> > >
> > > The criticism is that the key principles involved in C&R were selected
> > > largely in a process of elimination, that largely featured the
> > > philosophical components such as Justificationalism, Induction,
> > > Foundationalism, Empiricism, Positivism, and so on, as possible
> > > competing candidates.
> > >
> > > But, those philosophical positions, didn't come from a direct analysis
> > > of what was happening in science itself, but from attempts by scientists
> > > to do philosophy about that underlying science. And, basically for many
> > > of the reasons Popper himself identified about those philosophical
> > > attempts, there is good reason to think the scientists that tried to do
> > > this philosophy, were not at all clear what was happening in Science.
> > >
> > > So the criticism is that of a fragility right at the core of the
> > > philosophy. A dependency on the philosophical impressions of scientists
> > > as to what was happening in Science, where Popper might have seen
> > > something rather different had he analysed the reality of science
> > > directly, from a philosophical standpoint.
> > >
> > > I think this is a fairly straightforward and simple criticism. It should
> > > be possible for David Deutsch or someone suitable to refute the critcism
> > > or ask for more information, or whatever. I will endeavour to keep
> > > looking for ways to make the criticism more clear, working on the
> > > assumption if I'm not getting any kind of 'bite' it's because I haven't
> > > yet made things clear enough.
> > >
> > > So as and when I get the time, this is what I will endeavour to do.
> >
> > What would analysing science "directly" entail
> 
> Minimally it would entail a decision to cut out the philosopher middle
> men and go see for himself.

Whom does "himself" refer to? The scientist? You want the scientist to "go see for himself" how science is done or something?

You haven't answered the question. Not in the slightest. What would analysing science "directly" entail???

Watching a scientist? Is that "directly"? Can you observe anything "directly"? What does directly mean? Does it mean "without interpretation"? Have you read BoI?

Notice that "analysing science" (directly or otherwise - whatever this might mean) puts one squarely into philosophising. I reject the notion you can "cut out the philosopher middle men". Philosophers are not middle men when it comes to analysing how science is done. If you analyse science, you are being a philosopher. I have to implore you to respond to Alan: what does "directly" mean? 

Explain yourself.

> How things would develop would depend on
> what was coming up for Popper and the directions he judged to go.

Confusing. I don't understand. Can you rephrase (note, *many* of your sentences I want to write this exact same comment after).

> Both parts of my answer - I think - in large part arise as consequences
> of the goals Popper had set himself.

What were they? Elaborate, if you can.

> He was there to do fundamental
> work. Popper was a visionary - he seen the possibility to solve the
> puzzles of philosophy
 
No, he rejected Wittgenstein's notion that philosophy was about *puzzles*. Philosophy contained/contains genuine metaphysical and epistemological *problems*. Do you disagree?

> and the Western Enlightenment as part of the same
> approach. Or that's my guess. Whatever his vision was, though, his
> ambition was to do primary top-level problem solving.
 
Yep. But puzzles, as the dispute between Popper and other philosophers seems to have been (still is) in part, is that problems are different to puzzles - the latter being a mere consequence of language. Philosophy is not about language games. That's an error. That's bad philosophy. Agree?
 
> How that's not a goal that can be reconciled with a policy of
> outsourcing top-level judgements off to third parties. To be
> fundamental, Popper had to be at the centre...with full spectrum control
> over third party input at every stage. But the way he structured things
> in the event, had no possibility at all of securing an adequate degree
> of primacy to Popper's judgement in the process. He was effectively
> deferring to the judgements of the philosopher middlemen.

This is almost opaque to analysis. How was Popper "deferring to the judgements of philosopher middlemen"? Can you provide examples?

You seem to suggest Popper was relying upon arguments from authority. I have read Popper, but regard myself as no expert, yet one theme that was prominent was the *rejection* of authority. Yet here you seem to say Popper was deferring to authority. Again, explain yourself. With examples. I might be mistaken...but I do not get this confused with other posts. I think it's you, not me, tbh.
 
> Another way to conceptualize the arrangement he was left with is in
> terms of the scourge of Authority. He could criticize the internal logic
> of what the middlemen were proposing. But he couldn't criticize the
> judgements and decisions and other influences that translated the
> reality of Science, or some part of it, into the proposition being
> recieved by Popper.
 
For example?

> And because he couldn't criticize it,
 
For example? What? What couldn't he criticise? Popper *could* criticise everything. He argued for that stance towards knowledge claims better than anyone...why would something be immune to it...from him?

> by consequence
> those philosophical middlemen manifested as a cluster of Authorities,
> encircling Popper's core.
> 
> It's logically impossible to do fundamental work on something outside
> and wider, like Science or the Englightenment, if the embryonic
> philosophy you are using for a vehicle, defines a set of independent
> authorities for its core.
 
False. And obscurantist. Obscurantist, first, because "a set of independent authorities" isn't well defined, clear terminology. What do you mean? False because "logically impossible" implies some sort of sequence of deductive statements reaching a conclusion via Modus Ponens or Modus Tollens or whatever...and yet I see nothing in what you have typed here that establishes a strict contradiction entitling you to assert Popper has tried to "do fundamental work" which is logically impossible.

Again, more explanation on your part is required.  

> Think about it.
 
Ok. Hmmm. Wait...more thinking. Wait...hmmm....

Do you think such sentences, such commands, are at all useful?

"Think about it."

> It's impossible.
 
You are yet to demonstrate this. 

> All that is
> possible is the creation of a philosophical explanation of the virtual
> reality that structure creates.
 
That sounds so po-mo. Is communication between people *always* possible? I wonder, but do not despair. Keep trying! I am optimistic you can improve! I am hopeful we can communicate. At the moment, we do not seem to be anywhere near on the same level. You say words and I seem to be just saying "please explain?" And "what?" And "I don't understand". A "yawning chasm of nihilism" separates us. I like to make friends - to have a "meeting of minds". Let us keep trying. 

> The world that would be, if the
> Englightenment was fundamentally explicable as a basket of Popper's good
> apples of C&R, and a lot of other bad apples of Inductionism,
> foundationalism, justificationalism, empiricism, etc, etc.
 
Look at the *form* of what you write. Just the logical or grammatical structure of it. You say "That world would be, IF (x & y)..." But you do not complete the conditional.

If....what...?

Write clearly. 

If you say "If" you need to say what would happen "if" or else you shouldn't say "if". Instead just make a claim that can be criticised. 
 
> But is that real?
 
What? Is what real? If....?
> Is it Science or the Englightenment?


What? What does "it" refer to? So, so frustrating to spend time trying to understand this.

> Popper had no way
> of knowing one way or the other, because the matter of the connectedness
 
What's connectedness? I am genuinely asking. Do you know? I don't. Define it. It sounds interesting. People use the word but never really explain it.

> with real Science, and all pertaining to it in its entirety, was in the
> hands of external Authorities....not in some metaphorical sense, but as
> actual realities - the reality of abstractions - at the core of his
> philosophy.
> 
> > results differ from what Popper did?
> 
> Popper's insights and deliberations would have been completely different
> historical manifestations. It's plausible that the final product
> philosophical concepts would bear marked similarities to the product
> manifested in the reality of Popperianism. That is because the product
> of the philosophical middle men had a significant amount of
> authenticity.
 
More po-mo.

Oh...Post-Modernism, if I was being snobby and not defining things.

Let me be direct. You seem to write in a post-modern way, and that is no compliment. I get the impression, and please correct me if I am wrong, but you like big words and long, obscure sentences. You like the greyness of language. You like language above knowledge. You might not even believe in the law of the excluded middle. Just to take that final claim of yours:

> That is because the product
> of the philosophical middle men had a significant amount of
> authenticity.
 

This can be reduced to: 

"The product of (some philosophers) had (authenticity)."

Um...ok. Yes. Some philosophers have said some good stuff that Popper agreed with. Is that your point? If so, what is the revelation or insight here?

> 
> They were frequently individuals close to the heart of Science,
> scientists in their own right. They were even the great pioneers of
> Science.
 
Who were? Again, examples make *all* the difference. Concrete examples of what you are trying to get at will make or break this interjection.

> Truth seekers their efforts sincere.
 
Is that a sentence? Seriously? Ok, I'm going to go all grade school on you now but...english is an SVO language. Subject, Verb, Object. You seem to have a subject and an object. But no verb.  I know I seem to be being harsh and needlessly finicky, but really, this seems to be the way you write - deliberately obscurantist and then somehow faux-offended when people (like David Deutsch and Alan Forrester who are busy pushing the frontiers of knowledge in philosophy and science) don't reply. But what is there to reply to when it is so hard to find something substantive to engage with? This sentence above is - par-excellence - the way you are communicating more generally...but it is too hard to understand. I want to understand, I genuinely do...but you do not write in a way that helps.

> My guess is that they
> typically had good intuitions what the key hubs and axils
 
axils?

Axils!

Really?

AXILS?

From the freedictionary.com:

ax·il  (ksl)
n.
The upper angle between a lateral organ, such as a leafstalk, and the stem that bears it.
[Latin axilla, armpit.]
which the explanation of Science was turning. Foundations, Authority,
 
> empirical and methodological components, and so on. But they were still
> baffled how these hubs and axils defined themselves or what their
> implications were.
> 
> So the result would have similarities with Popper Deutch as it stands,
> just as Popper Deutsch philosophy has similarities with Science as it
> stands. They are connected phenomenon, their histories have a genuine
> intersection, that contains genuine and authentic impressions of Science
> proper. So similarities would be the expectation.
> 
> But to re-iterate the central criticism I am making, setting it in
> context at the same time: And this point is objectively true, by the
> design of things. Popper criticizes the way the philosophical middlemen
> *assemble* that core insight of theirs (that foundations as a concept is
> fundamental in some unrecognized way). Popper criticizes the attempt to
> explain the authentic core insight. And the way each of these 'issues'
> gets proposed to explain, completely defines Popper's own
> conceptualization of each of those fundamental issues.
> 
> In terms of the way foundational reality gets proposed, Popper refutes
> foundational reality, and foundationalism as a philosophical concept (of
> a mistake) is then defined, basically as the key reasoning and
> judgements that made up Popper's refutation.
> 
> I appreciate this is difficult conceptually to get ones head around,
> which is why I'm willing to persevere. It isn't easy to see, because
> there are apparenent subtleties going on. But the implication of the
> causality of reasoning, is that the very conception of these underlying
> issues (foundationalism etc) is entirely encapsulated and contrained, by
> the original proposition that was put forward to explain the part of
> such concepts. Which means for better or for worse, the traits of those
> original propositions are inherited right through into the philosophy.
> 
> And that's fragile.
> 
> I'm going to wind this post down now, but at some future point I will
> add to this context by clarifying the many whole categories of
> discovery, developments, and approaches, that are possible and plausible
> in a direct analysis of the traits of science, but categorically
> impossible out of the arrangement that Popper choose to depen on. It's
> actually feasible to establish the character of many of these
> categories, and in some cases prove some such categories are actually
> manifesting important,influences,
> 
> Unless there is a glaringly hole in my analysis, This is a major
> problem for Popperianism. If it's true, there aren't easy fixes.

I kinda made my point. The rest I have not responded to seems to suffer from the flaws I highlight in the earlier part of your post. I do guess that you are hinting at something interesting...but it simply is not articulated clearly enough to engage with.

I am not a perfect writer, no one is. I don't pretend to be. But I try my very best to write simply and clearly. Do you?
 
> > Also, Popper's philosophy is not solely a description, it also
> > prescribes standards for scientists to live up to. Can you improve on
> > those standards?
 
These are important questions, hibbsa! You should attempt an answer.

Incidentally, do you think Popper, and Deutsch explain epistemology as best as it is currently understood? Or do you think there is some better way of understanding the growth of knowledge?

Thanks,

Brett.