cvs: phpdoc-he /security index.xml
[email protected] ("Noam Giladi") Mon, 04 Aug 2003 14:48:11 -0000
| Newsgroups | php.doc.he |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <cvsnoam1060008491@cvsserver> |
noam Mon Aug 4 10:48:11 2003 EDT
Added files:
/phpdoc-he/security index.xml
Log:
commit
noam-20030804104811.txt
(text/plain, 52.6 KB)
Index: phpdoc-he/security/index.xml
+++ phpdoc-he/security/index.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="window-1255"?>
<!-- edited with XMLSPY v5 rel. 4 U (http://www.xmlspy.com) by noam (i-com) -->
<!-- $Revision: 1.1 $ -->
<chapter id="security.index">
<title>àáèçä</title>
<simpara>
PHP äéà ùôä çæ÷ä, ùäîôòðç ùìä, áéï àí ëîåãåì áúåê ùøú àéðèøðè, àå áîöá ùì
<acronym>CGI</acronym> binary ðôøã, éëåì ìäéëðñ ì÷áöéí, ìäøéõ úåëðéåú, åìôúåç ú÷ùåøåú øùú òì äùøú. äúëåðåú äàìä áäëøç, âåøîåú ìîòøëú ìäéåú ôâéòä, .
PHP îúåëððú áîéåçã, ìäéåú ùôä áèåçä éåúø ìëúéáú úåëðéåú CGI îàùø Perl àå C, åàí áçéøú äâãøåú ÷åðôéâåøöéä ðëåðåú áæîï ä÷éîôåì, åúøâåì ðëåï ùì ÷éãåã, äéà éëåìä ìúú àú äùéìåá äðëåï áéï çåôù ôòåìä, åáèéçåú.
</simpara>
<simpara>
As there are many different ways of utilizing PHP, there are many
configuration options controlling its behaviour. A large
selection of options guarantees you can use PHP for a lot of
purposes, but it also means there are combinations of these
options and server configurations that result in an insecure
setup.
</simpara>
<simpara>
The configuration flexibility of PHP is equally rivalled by the
code flexibility. PHP can be used to build complete server
applications, with all the power of a shell user, or it can be used
for simple server-side includes with little risk in a tightly
controlled environment. How you build that environment, and how
secure it is, is largely up to the PHP developer.
</simpara>
<simpara>
This chapter starts with some general security advice, explains
the different configuration option combinations and the situations
they can be safely used, and describes different considerations in
coding for different levels of security.
</simpara>
<sect1 id="security.general">
<title>General considerations</title>
<simpara>
A completely secure system is a virtual impossibility, so an
approach often used in the security profession is one of balancing
risk and usability. If every variable submitted by a user required
two forms of biometric validation (such as a retinal scan and a
fingerprint), you would have an extremely high level of
accountability. It would also take half an hour to fill out a fairly
complex form, which would tend to encourage users to find ways of
bypassing the security.
</simpara>
<simpara>
The best security is often inobtrusive enough to suit the
requirements without the user being prevented from accomplishing
their work, or over-burdening the code author with excessive
complexity. Indeed, some security attacks are merely exploits of
this kind of overly built security, which tends to erode over time.
</simpara>
<simpara>
A phrase worth remembering: A system is only as good as the weakest
link in a chain. If all transactions are heavily logged based on
time, location, transaction type, etc. but the user is only
verified based on a single cookie, the validity of tying the users
to the transaction log is severely weakened.
</simpara>
<simpara>
When testing, keep in mind that you will not be able to test all
possibilities for even the simplest of pages. The input you
may expect will be completely unrelated to the input given by
a disgruntled employee, a cracker with months of time on their
hands, or a housecat walking across the keyboard. This is why it's
best to look at the code from a logical perspective, to discern
where unexpected data can be introduced, and then follow how it is
modified, reduced, or amplified.
</simpara>
<simpara>
The Internet is filled with people trying to make a name for
themselves by breaking your code, crashing your site, posting
inappropriate content, and otherwise making your day interesting.
It doesn't matter if you have a small or large site, you are
a target by simply being online, by having a server that can be
connected to. Many cracking programs do not discern by size, they
simply trawl massive IP blocks looking for victims. Try not to
become one.
</simpara>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security.cgi-bin">
<title>Installed as CGI binary</title>
<sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.attacks">
<title>Possible attacks</title>
<simpara>
Using PHP as a <acronym>CGI</acronym> binary is an option for
setups that for some reason do not wish to integrate PHP as a
module into server software (like Apache), or will use PHP with
different kinds of CGI wrappers to create safe chroot and setuid
environments for scripts. This setup usually involves installing
executable PHP binary to the web server cgi-bin directory. CERT
advisory <ulink url="&url.cert;">CA-96.11</ulink> recommends
against placing any interpreters into cgi-bin. Even if the PHP
binary can be used as a standalone interpreter, PHP is designed
to prevent the attacks this setup makes possible:
</simpara>
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Accessing system files: <filename role="url">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php?/etc/passwd</filename>
</simpara>
<simpara>
The query information in a url after the question mark (?) is
passed as command line arguments to the interpreter by the CGI
interface. Usually interpreters open and execute the file
specified as the first argument on the command line.
</simpara>
<simpara>
When invoked as a CGI binary, PHP refuses to interpret the
command line arguments.
</simpara>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Accessing any web document on server: <filename role="url">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php/secret/doc.html</filename>
</simpara>
<simpara>
The path information part of the url after the PHP binary name,
<filename role="uri">/secret/doc.html</filename> is
conventionally used to specify the name of the file to be
opened and interpreted by the <acronym>CGI</acronym> program.
Usually some web server configuration directives (Apache:
Action) are used to redirect requests to documents like
<filename role="url">http://my.host/secret/script.php</filename> to the
PHP interpreter. With this setup, the web server first checks
the access permissions to the directory <filename role="uri">/secret</filename>, and after that creates the
redirected request <filename role="url">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php/secret/script.php</filename>.
Unfortunately, if the request is originally given in this form,
no access checks are made by web server for file <filename role="uri">/secret/script.php</filename>, but only for the
<filename role="uri">/cgi-bin/php</filename> file. This way
any user able to access <filename role="uri">/cgi-bin/php</filename> is able to access any
protected document on the web server.
</simpara>
<simpara>
In PHP, compile-time configuration option <link linkend="install.configure.enable-force-cgi-redirect">--enable-force-cgi-redirect</link>
and runtime configuration directives <link linkend="ini.doc-root">doc_root</link> and <link linkend="ini.user-dir">user_dir</link> can be used to prevent
this attack, if the server document tree has any directories
with access restrictions. See below for full the explanation
of the different combinations.
</simpara>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.default">
<title>Case 1: only public files served</title>
<simpara>
If your server does not have any content that is not restricted
by password or ip based access control, there is no need for
these configuration options. If your web server does not allow
you to do redirects, or the server does not have a way to
communicate to the PHP binary that the request is a safely
redirected request, you can specify the option <link linkend="install.configure.enable-force-cgi-redirect">--enable-force-cgi-redirect</link>
to the configure script. You still have to make sure your PHP
scripts do not rely on one or another way of calling the script,
neither by directly <filename role="php">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php/dir/script.php</filename>
nor by redirection <filename role="php">http://my.host/dir/script.php</filename>.
</simpara>
<simpara>
Redirection can be configured in Apache by using AddHandler and
Action directives (see below).
</simpara>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.force-redirect">
<title>Case 2: using --enable-force-cgi-redirect</title>
<simpara>
This compile-time option prevents anyone from calling PHP
directly with a url like <filename role="php">http://my.host/cgi-bin/php/secretdir/script.php</filename>.
Instead, PHP will only parse in this mode if it has gone through
a web server redirect rule.
</simpara>
<simpara>
Usually the redirection in the Apache configuration is done with
the following directives:
</simpara>
<programlisting role="apache-conf"><![CDATA[
Action php-script /cgi-bin/php
AddHandler php-script .php
]]></programlisting>
<simpara>
This option has only been tested with the Apache web server, and
relies on Apache to set the non-standard CGI environment variable
<envar>REDIRECT_STATUS</envar> on redirected requests. If your
web server does not support any way of telling if the request is
direct or redirected, you cannot use this option and you must use
one of the other ways of running the CGI version documented
here.
</simpara>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.doc-root">
<title>Case 3: setting doc_root or user_dir</title>
<simpara>
To include active content, like scripts and executables, in the
web server document directories is sometimes consider an insecure
practice. If, because of some configuration mistake, the scripts
are not executed but displayed as regular HTML documents, this
may result in leakage of intellectual property or security
information like passwords. Therefore many sysadmins will prefer
setting up another directory structure for scripts that are
accessible only through the PHP CGI, and therefore always
interpreted and not displayed as such.
</simpara>
<simpara>
Also if the method for making sure the requests are not
redirected, as described in the previous section, is not
available, it is necessary to set up a script doc_root that is
different from web document root.
</simpara>
<simpara>
You can set the PHP script document root by the configuration
directive <link linkend="ini.doc-root">doc_root</link> in the
<link linkend="configuration.file">configuration file</link>, or
you can set the environment variable
<envar>PHP_DOCUMENT_ROOT</envar>. If it is set, the CGI version
of PHP will always construct the file name to open with this
<parameter>doc_root</parameter> and the path information in the
request, so you can be sure no script is executed outside this
directory (except for <parameter>user_dir</parameter>
below).
</simpara>
<simpara>
Another option usable here is <link linkend="ini.user-dir">user_dir</link>. When user_dir is unset,
only thing controlling the opened file name is
<parameter>doc_root</parameter>. Opening an url like <filename role="url">http://my.host/~user/doc.php</filename> does not
result in opening a file under users home directory, but a file
called <filename role="uri">~user/doc.php</filename> under
doc_root (yes, a directory name starting with a tilde
[<literal>~</literal>]).
</simpara>
<simpara>
If user_dir is set to for example <filename role="dir">public_php</filename>, a request like <filename role="url">http://my.host/~user/doc.php</filename> will open a
file called <filename>doc.php</filename> under the directory
named <filename role="dir">public_php</filename> under the home
directory of the user. If the home of the user is <filename role="dir">/home/user</filename>, the file executed is
<filename>/home/user/public_php/doc.php</filename>.
</simpara>
<simpara>
<parameter>user_dir</parameter> expansion happens regardless of
the <parameter>doc_root</parameter> setting, so you can control
the document root and user directory access
separately.
</simpara>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security.cgi-bin.shell">
<title>Case 4: PHP parser outside of web tree</title>
<para>
A very secure option is to put the PHP parser binary somewhere
outside of the web tree of files. In <filename role="dir">/usr/local/bin</filename>, for example. The only real
downside to this option is that you will now have to put a line
similar to:
<informalexample>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
#!/usr/local/bin/php
]]></programlisting>
</informalexample>
as the first line of any file containing PHP tags. You will also
need to make the file executable. That is, treat it exactly as
you would treat any other CGI script written in Perl or sh or any
other common scripting language which uses the
<literal>#!</literal> shell-escape mechanism for launching
itself.
</para>
<para>
To get PHP to handle <envar>PATH_INFO</envar> and
<envar>PATH_TRANSLATED</envar> information correctly with this
setup, the php parser should be compiled with the <link linkend="install.configure.enable-discard-path">--enable-discard-path</link>
configure option.
</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security.apache">
<title>Installed as an Apache module</title>
<simpara>
When PHP is used as an Apache module it inherits Apache's user
permissions (typically those of the "nobody" user). This has several
impacts on security and authorization. For example, if you are using
PHP to access a database, unless that database has built-in access
control, you will have to make the database accessable to the
"nobody" user. This means a malicious script could access and modify
the database, even without a username and password. It's entirely
possible that a web spider could stumble across a database
administrator's web page, and drop all of your databases. You can
protect against this with Apache authorization, or you can design
your own access model using LDAP, &htaccess; files, etc. and include
that code as part of your PHP scripts.
</simpara>
<simpara>
Often, once security is established to the point where the PHP user
(in this case, the apache user) has very little risk attached to it,
it is discovered that PHP is now prevented from writing any files
to user directories. Or perhaps it has been prevented from accessing
or changing databases. It has equally been secured from writing
good and bad files, or entering good and bad database transactions.
</simpara>
<simpara>
A frequent security mistake made at this point is to allow apache
root permissions, or to escalate apache's abilitites in some other
way.
</simpara>
<simpara>
Escalating the Apache user's permissions to root is extremely
dangerous and may compromise the entire system, so sudo'ing,
chroot'ing, or otherwise running as root should not be considered by
those who are not security professionals.
</simpara>
<simpara>
There are some simpler solutions. By using
<link linkend="ini.open-basedir">open_basedir</link> you can control and restrict what
directories are allowed to be used for PHP. You can also set up
apache-only areas, to restrict all web based activity to non-user,
or non-system, files.
</simpara>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security.filesystem">
<title>Filesystem Security</title>
<simpara>
PHP is subject to the security built into most server systems with
respect to permissions on a file and directory basis. This allows
you to control which files in the filesystem may be read. Care
should be taken with any files which are world readable to ensure
that they are safe for reading by all users who have access to that
filesystem.
</simpara>
<simpara>
Since PHP was designed to allow user level access to the filesystem,
it's entirely possible to write a PHP script that will allow you
to read system files such as /etc/passwd, modify your ethernet
connections, send massive printer jobs out, etc. This has some
obvious implications, in that you need to ensure that the files
that you read from and write to are the appropriate ones.
</simpara>
<simpara>
Consider the following script, where a user indicates that they'd
like to delete a file in their home directory. This assumes a
situation where a PHP web interface is regularly used for file
management, so the Apache user is allowed to delete files in
the user home directories.
</simpara>
<para>
<example>
<title>Poor variable checking leads to....</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
<?php
// remove a file from the user's home directory
$username = $_POST['user_submitted_name'];
$homedir = "/home/$username";
$file_to_delete = "$userfile";
unlink ("$homedir/$userfile");
echo "$file_to_delete has been deleted!";
?>
]]></programlisting>
</example>
Since the username is postable from a user form, they can submit
a username and file belonging to someone else, and delete files.
In this case, you'd want to use some other form of authentication.
Consider what could happen if the variables submitted were
"../etc/" and "passwd". The code would then effectively read:
<example>
<title>... A filesystem attack</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
<?php
// removes a file from anywhere on the hard drive that
// the PHP user has access to. If PHP has root access:
$username = "../etc/";
$homedir = "/home/../etc/";
$file_to_delete = "passwd";
unlink ("/home/../etc/passwd");
echo "/home/../etc/passwd has been deleted!";
?>
]]></programlisting>
</example>
There are two important measures you should take to prevent these
issues.
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Only allow limited permissions to the PHP web user binary.
</simpara>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Check all variables which are submitted.
</simpara>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
Here is an improved script:
<example>
<title>More secure file name checking</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
<?php
// removes a file from the hard drive that
// the PHP user has access to.
$username = $_SERVER['REMOTE_USER']; // using an authentication mechanisim
$homedir = "/home/$username";
$file_to_delete = basename("$userfile"); // strip paths
unlink ($homedir/$file_to_delete);
$fp = fopen("/home/logging/filedelete.log","+a"); //log the deletion
$logstring = "$username $homedir $file_to_delete";
fputs ($fp, $logstring);
fclose($fp);
echo "$file_to_delete has been deleted!";
?>
]]></programlisting>
</example>
However, even this is not without it's flaws. If your authentication
system allowed users to create their own user logins, and a user
chose the login "../etc/", the system is once again exposed. For
this reason, you may prefer to write a more customized check:
<example>
<title>More secure file name checking</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
<?php
$username = $_SERVER['REMOTE_USER']; // using an authentication mechanisim
$homedir = "/home/$username";
if (!ereg('^[^./][^/]*$', $userfile))
die('bad filename'); //die, do not process
if (!ereg('^[^./][^/]*$', $username))
die('bad username'); //die, do not process
//etc...
?>
]]></programlisting>
</example>
</para>
<para>
Depending on your operating system, there are a wide variety of files
which you should be concerned about, including device entries (/dev/
or COM1), configuration files (/etc/ files and the .ini files),
well known file storage areas (/home/, My Documents), etc. For this
reason, it's usually easier to create a policy where you forbid
everything except for what you explicitly allow.
</para>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security.database">
<title>Database Security</title>
<simpara>
Nowadays, databases are cardinal components of any web based application by
enabling websites to provide varying dynamic content. Since very sensitive
or secret informations can be stored in such database, you should strongly
consider to protect them somehow.
</simpara>
<simpara>
To retrieve or to store any information you need to connect to the database,
send a legitimate query, fetch the result, and close the connecion.
Nowadays, the commonly used query language in this interaction is the
Structured Query Language (SQL). See how an attacker can <link linkend="security.database.sql-injection">tamper with an SQL query</link>.
</simpara>
<simpara>
As you can realize, PHP cannot protect your database by itself. The
following sections aim to be an introduction into the very basics of how to
access and manipulate databases within PHP scripts.
</simpara>
<simpara>
Keep in mind this simple rule: defence in depth. In the more place you
take the more action to increase the protection of your database, the less
probability of that an attacker succeeds, and exposes or abuse any stored
secret information. Good design of the database schema and the application
deals with your greatest fears.
</simpara>
<sect2 id="security.database.design">
<title>Designing Databases</title>
<simpara>
The first step is always to create the database, unless you want to use
an existing third party's one. When a database is created, it is
assigned to an owner, who executed the creation statement. Usually, only
the owner (or a superuser) can do anything with the objects in that
database, and in order to allow other users to use it, privileges must be
granted.
</simpara>
<simpara>
Applications should never connect to the database as its owner or a
superuser, because these users can execute any query at will, for
example, modifying the schema (e.g. dropping tables) or deleting its
entire content.
</simpara>
<simpara>
You may create different database users for every aspect of your
application with very limited rights to database objects. The most
required privileges should be granted only, and avoid that the same user
can interact with the database in different use cases. This means that if
intruders gain access to your database using one of these credentials,
they can only effect as many changes as your application can.
</simpara>
<simpara>
You are encouraged not to implement all the business logic in the web
application (i.e. your script), instead to do it in the database schema
using views, triggers or rules. If the system evolves, new ports will be
intended to open to the database, and you have to reimplement the logic
in each separate database client. Over and above, triggers can be used
to transparently and automatically handle fields, which often provides
insight when debugging problems with your application or tracing back
transactions.
</simpara>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security.database.connection">
<title>Connecting to Database</title>
<simpara>
You may want to estabilish the connections over SSL to encrypt
client/server communications for increased security, or you can use ssh
to encrypt the network connection between clients and the database server.
If either of them is done, then monitoring your traffic and gaining
informations in this way will be a hard work.
</simpara>
<!--simpara>
If your database server has native SSL support, consider to use <link
linkend="ref.openssl">OpenSSL functions</link> in communication between
PHP and database via SSL.
</simpara-->
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security.database.storage">
<title>Encrypted Storage Model</title>
<simpara>
SSL/SSH protects data travelling from the client to the server, SSL/SSH
does not protect the persistent data stored in a database. SSL is an
on-the-wire protocol.
</simpara>
<simpara>
Once an attacker gains access to your database directly (bypassing the
webserver), the stored sensitive data may be exposed or misused, unless
the information is protected by the database itself. Encrypting the data
is a good way to mitigate this threat, but very few databases offer this
type of data encryption.
</simpara>
<simpara>
The easiest way to work around this problem is to first create your own
encryption package, and then use it from within your PHP scripts. PHP
can assist you in this case with its several extensions, such as <link linkend="ref.mcrypt">Mcrypt</link> and <link linkend="ref.mhash">Mhash</link>, covering a wide variety of encryption
algorithms. The script encrypts the data be stored first, and decrypts
it when retrieving. See the references for further examples how
encryption works.
</simpara>
<simpara>
In case of truly hidden data, if its raw representation is not needed
(i.e. not be displayed), hashing may be also taken into consideration.
The well-known example for the hashing is storing the MD5 hash of a
password in a database, instead of the password itself. See also
<function>crypt</function> and <function>md5</function>.
</simpara>
<example>
<title>Using hashed password field</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
// storing password hash
$query = sprintf("INSERT INTO users(name,pwd) VALUES('%s','%s');",
addslashes($username), md5($password));
$result = pg_exec($connection, $query);
// querying if user submitted the right password
$query = sprintf("SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE name='%s' AND pwd='%s';",
addslashes($username), md5($password));
$result = pg_exec($connection, $query);
if (pg_numrows($result) > 0) {
echo "Welcome, $username!";
}
else {
echo "Authentication failed for $username.";
}
]]></programlisting>
</example>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security.database.sql-injection">
<title>SQL Injection</title>
<simpara>
Many web developers are unaware of how SQL queries can be tampered with,
and assume that an SQL query is a trusted command. It means that SQL
queries are able to circumvent access controls, thereby bypassing standard
authentication and authorization checks, and sometimes SQL queries even
may allow access to host operating system level commands.
</simpara>
<simpara>
Direct SQL Command Injection is a technique where an attacker creates or
alters existing SQL commands to expose hidden data, or to override valuable
ones, or even to execute dangerous system level commands on the database
host. This is accomplished by the application taking user input and
combining it with static parameters to build a SQL query. The following
examples are based on true stories, unfortunately.
</simpara>
<para>
Owing to the lack of input validation and connecting to the database on
behalf of a superuser or the one who can create users, the attacker
may create a superuser in your database.
<example>
<title>
Splitting the result set into pages ... and making superusers
(PostgreSQL and MySQL)
</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
$offset = argv[0]; // beware, no input validation!
$query = "SELECT id, name FROM products ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET $offset;";
// with PostgreSQL
$result = pg_exec($conn, $query);
// with MySQL
$result = mysql_query($query);
]]></programlisting>
</example>
Normal users click on the 'next', 'prev' links where the <varname>$offset</varname>
is encoded into the URL. The script expects that the incoming
<varname>$offset</varname> is decimal number. However, someone tries to
break in with appending <function>urlencode</function>'d form of the
following to the URL
<informalexample>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
// in case of PostgreSQL
0;
insert into pg_shadow(usename,usesysid,usesuper,usecatupd,passwd)
select 'crack', usesysid, 't','t','crack'
from pg_shadow where usename='postgres';
--
// in case of MySQL
0;
UPDATE user SET Password=PASSWORD('crack') WHERE user='root';
FLUSH PRIVILEGES;
]]></programlisting>
</informalexample>
If it happened, then the script would present a superuser access to him.
Note that <literal>0;</literal> is to supply a valid offset to the
original query and to terminate it.
</para>
<note>
<para>
It is common technique to force the SQL parser to ignore the rest of the
query written by the developer with <literal>--</literal> which is the
comment sign in SQL.
</para>
</note>
<para>
A feasible way to gain passwords is to circumvent your search result pages.
What the attacker needs only is to try if there is any submitted variable
used in SQL statement which is not handled properly. These filters can be set
commonly in a preceding form to customize <literal>WHERE, ORDER BY,
LIMIT</literal> and <literal>OFFSET</literal> clauses in <literal>SELECT</literal>
statements. If your database supports the <literal>UNION</literal> construct,
the attacker may try to append an entire query to the original one to list
passwords from an arbitrary table. Using encrypted password fields is
strongly encouraged.
<example>
<title>
Listing out articles ... and some passwords (any database server)
</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
$query = "SELECT id, name, inserted, size FROM products
WHERE size = '$size'
ORDER BY $order LIMIT $limit, $offset;";
$result = odbc_exec($conn, $query);
]]></programlisting>
</example>
The static part of the query can be combined with another
<literal>SELECT</literal> statement which reveals all passwords:
<informalexample>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
'
union select '1', concat(uname||'-'||passwd) as name, '1971-01-01', '0' from usertable;
--
]]></programlisting>
</informalexample>
If this query (playing with the <literal>'</literal> and
<literal>--</literal>) were assigned to one of the variables used in
<varname>$query</varname>, the query beast awakened.
</para>
<para>
SQL UPDATEs are also subject to attacking your database. These queries are
also threatened by chopping and appending an entirely new query to it. But
the attacker might fiddle with the <literal>SET</literal> clause. In this
case some schema information must be possessed to manipulate the query
successfully. This can be acquired by examing the form variable names, or
just simply brute forcing. There are not so many naming convention for
fields storing passwords or usernames.
<example>
<title>
From resetting a password ... to gaining more privileges (any database server)
</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
$query = "UPDATE usertable SET pwd='$pwd' WHERE uid='$uid';";
]]></programlisting>
</example>
But a malicious user sumbits the value
<literal>' or uid like'%admin%'; --</literal> to <varname>$uid</varname> to
change the admin's password, or simply sets <varname>$pwd</varname> to
<literal>"hehehe', admin='yes', trusted=100 "</literal> (with a trailing
space) to gain more privileges. Then, the query will be twisted:
<informalexample>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
// $uid == ' or uid like'%admin%'; --
$query = "UPDATE usertable SET pwd='...' WHERE uid='' or uid like '%admin%'; --";
// $pwd == "hehehe', admin='yes', trusted=100 "
$query = "UPDATE usertable SET pwd='hehehe', admin='yes', trusted=100 WHERE ...;"
]]></programlisting>
</informalexample>
</para>
<para>
A frightening example how operating system level commands can be accessed
on some database hosts.
<example>
<title>Attacking the database host's operating system (MSSQL Server)</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
$query = "SELECT * FROM products WHERE id LIKE '%$prod%'";
$result = mssql_query($query);
]]></programlisting>
</example>
If attacker submits the value
<literal>a%' exec master..xp_cmdshell 'net user test testpass /ADD' --</literal>
to <varname>$prod</varname>, then the <varname>$query</varname> will be:
<informalexample>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
$query = "SELECT * FROM products
WHERE id LIKE '%a%'
exec master..xp_cmdshell 'net user test testpass /ADD'--";
$result = mssql_query($query);
]]></programlisting>
</informalexample>
MSSQL Server executes the SQL statements in the batch including a command
to add a new user to the local accounts database. If this application
were running as <literal>sa</literal> and the MSSQLSERVER service is
running with sufficient privileges, the attacker would now have an
account with which to access this machine.
</para>
<note>
<para>
Some of the examples above is tied to a specific database server. This
does not mean that a similar attack is impossible against other products.
Your database server may be so vulnerable in other manner.
</para>
</note>
<sect3 id="security.database.avoiding">
<title>Avoiding techniques</title>
<simpara>
You may plead that the attacker must possess a piece of information
about the database schema in most examples. You are right, but you
never know when and how it can be taken out, and if it happens,
your database may be exposed. If you are using an open source, or
publicly available database handling package, which may belong to a
content management system or forum, the intruders easily produce
a copy of a piece of your code. It may be also a security risk if it
is a poorly designed one.
</simpara>
<simpara>
These attacks are mainly based on exploiting the code not being written
with security in mind. Never trust on any kind of input, especially
which comes from the client side, even though it comes from a select box,
a hidden input field or a cookie. The first example shows that such a
blameless query can cause disasters.
</simpara>
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Never connect to the database as a superuser or as the database owner.
Use always customized users with very limited privileges.
</simpara>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Check if the given input has the expected data type. PHP has
a wide range of input validating functions, from the simplest ones
found in <link linkend="ref.variables">Variable Functions</link> and
in <link linkend="ref.ctype">Character Type Functions</link>
(e.g. <function>is_numeric</function>, <function>ctype_digit</function>
respectively) onwards the
<link linkend="ref.pcre">Perl compatible Regular Expressions</link>
support.
</simpara>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
If the application waits for numerical input, consider to verify data
with <function>is_numeric</function>, or silently change its type
using <function>settype</function>, or use its numeric representation
by <function>sprintf</function>.
<example>
<title>A more secure way to compose a query for paging</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
settype($offset, 'integer');
$query = "SELECT id, name FROM products ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET $offset;";
// please note %d in the format string, using %s would be meaningless
$query = sprintf("SELECT id, name FROM products ORDER BY name LIMIT 20 OFFSET %d;",
$offset);
]]></programlisting>
</example>
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Quote each non numeric user input which is passed to the database with
<function>addslashes</function> or <function>addcslashes</function>.
See <link linkend="security.database.storage">the first example</link>.
As the examples shows, quotes burnt into the static part of the query
is not enough, and can be easily hacked.
</simpara>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Do not print out any database specific information, especially
about the schema, by fair means or foul. See also <link linkend="security.errors">Error Reporting</link> and <link linkend="ref.errorfunc">Error Handling and Logging Functions</link>.
</simpara>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<simpara>
You may use stored procedures and previously defined cursors to abstract
data access so that users do not directly access tables or views, but
this solution has another impacts.
</simpara>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
<simpara>
Besides these, you benefit from logging queries either within your script
or by the database itself, if it supports. Obviously, the logging is unable
to prevent any harmful attempt, but it can be helpful to trace back which
application has been circumvented. The log is not useful by itself, but
through the information it contains. The more detail is generally better.
</simpara>
</sect3>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security.errors">
<title>Error Reporting</title>
<para>
With PHP security, there are two sides to error reporting. One is
beneficial to increasing security, the other is detrimental.
</para>
<para>
A standard attack tactic involves profiling a system by feeding
it improper data, and checking for the kinds, and contexts, of the
errors which are returned. This allows the system cracker to probe
for information about the server, to determine possible weaknesses.
For example, if an attacker had gleaned information about a page
based on a prior form submission, they may attempt to override
variables, or modify them:
<example>
<title>Attacking Variables with a custom HTML page</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
<form method="POST" action="attacktarget?username=badfoo&password=badfoo">
<input type="hidden" name="username" value="badfoo">
<input type="hidden" name="password" value="badfoo">
</form>
]]></programlisting>
</example>
</para>
<para>
The PHP errors which are normally returned can be quite helpful to a
developer who is trying to debug a script, indicating such things
as the function or file that failed, the PHP file it failed in,
and the line number which the failure occured in. This is all
information that can be exploited. It is not uncommon for a php
developer to use <function>show_source</function>,
<function>highlight_string</function>, or
<function>highlight_file</function> as a debugging measure, but in
a live site, this can expose hidden variables, unchecked syntax,
and other dangerous information. Especially dangerous is running
code from known sources with built-in debugging handlers, or using
common debugging techniques. If the attacker can determine what
general technique you are using, they may try to brute-force a page,
by sending various common debugging strings:
<example>
<title>Exploiting common debugging variables</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
<form method="POST" action="attacktarget?errors=Y&showerrors=1"&debug=1">
<input type="hidden" name="errors" value="Y">
<input type="hidden" name="showerrors" value="1">
<input type="hidden" name="debug" value="1">
</form>
]]></programlisting>
</example>
</para>
<para>
Regardless of the method of error handling, the ability to probe a
system for errors leads to providing an attacker with more
information.
</para>
<para>
A function error can indicate whether a system may be running a
specific database engine, or give clues as to how a web page or
programmed or designed. This allows for deeper investigation into
open database ports, or to look for specific bugs or weaknesses
in a web page. By feeding different pieces of bad data, for example,
an attacker can determine the order of authentication in a script,
(from the line number errors) as well as probe for exploits that
may be exploited in different locations in the script.
</para>
<para>
A filesystem or general PHP error can indicate what permissions
the webserver has, as well as the structure and organization of
files on the web server. Developer written error code can aggravate
this problem, leading to easy exploitation of formerly "hidden"
information.
</para>
<para>
There are three major solutions to this issue. The first is to
scrutinize all functions, and attempt to compensate for the bulk
of the errors. The second is to disable error reporting entirely
on the running code. The third is to use PHP's custom error
handling functions to create your own error handler. Depending
on your security policy, you may find all three to be applicable
to your situation.
</para>
<para>
One way of catching this issue ahead of time is to make use of
PHP's own <function>error_reporting</function>, to help you
secure your code and find variable usage that may be dangerous.
By testing your code, prior to deployment, with E_ALL, you can
quickly find areas where your variables may be open to poisoning
or modification in other ways. Once you are ready for deployment,
by using E_NONE, you insulate your code from probing.
<example>
<title>Finding dangerous variables with E_ALL</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
<?php
if ($username) { // Not initialized or checked before usage
$good_login = 1;
}
if ($good_login == 1) { // If above test fails, not initialized or checked before usage
readfile ("/highly/sensitive/data/index.html");
}
?>
]]></programlisting>
</example>
</para>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security.registerglobals">
<title>Using Register Globals</title>
<para>
Perhaps the most controversial change in PHP is when the default value
for the PHP directive <link linkend="ini.register-globals">
register_globals</link> went from ON to OFF in PHP
<ulink url="&url.php.release4.2.0;">4.2.0</ulink>. Reliance on this
directive was quite common and many people didn't even know it existed
and assumed it's just how PHP works. This page will explain how one can
write insecure code with this directive but keep in mind that the
directive itself isn't insecure but rather it's the misuse of it.
</para>
<para>
When on, register_globals will inject (poison) your scripts will all
sorts of variables, like request variables from html forms. This
coupled with the fact that PHP doesn't require variable initialization
means writing insecure code is that much easier. It was a difficult
decision, but the PHP community decided to disable this directive by
default. When on, people use variables yet really don't know for sure
where they come from and can only assume. Internal variables that are
defined in the script itself get mixed up with request data sent by
users and disabling register_globals changes this. Let's demonstrate
with an example misuse of register_globals:
</para>
<para>
<para>
For example, the very style of a generic PHP error indicates a system
is running PHP. If the attacker was looking at an .html page, and
wanted to probe for the back-end (to look for known weaknesses in
the system), by feeding it the wrong data they may be able to
determine that a system was built with PHP.
</para>
<example>
<title>Example misuse with register_globals = on</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
<?php
// define $authorized = true only if user is authenticated
if (authenticated_user()) {
$authorized = true;
}
// Because we didn't first initialize $authorized as false, this might be
// defined through register_globals, like from GET auth.php?authorized=1
// So, anyone can be seen as authenticated!
if ($authorized) {
include "/highly/sensitive/data.php";
}
?>
]]></programlisting>
</example>
</para>
<para>
When register_globals = on, our logic above may be compromised. When
off, <varname>$authorized</varname> can't be set via request so it'll
be fine, although it really is generally a good programming practice to
initialize variables first. For example, in our example above we might
have first done <literal>$authorized = false</literal>. Doing this
first means our above code would work with register_globals on or off as
users by default would be unauthorized.
</para>
<para>
Another example is that of <link linkend="ref.session">sessions</link>.
When register_globals = on, we could also use
<varname>$username</varname> in our example below but again you must
realize that <varname>$username</varname> could also come from other
means, such as GET (through the URL).
</para>
<para>
<example>
<title>Example use of sessions with register_globals on or off</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
<?php
// We wouldn't know where $username came from but do know $_SESSION is
// for session data
if (isset($_SESSION['username'])) {
echo "Hello <b>{$_SESSION['username']}</b>";
} else {
echo "Hello <b>Guest</b><br />";
echo "Would you like to login?";
}
?>
]]></programlisting>
</example>
</para>
<para>
It's even possible to take preventative measures to warn when forging is
being attempted. If you know ahead of time exactly where a variable
should be coming from, you can check to see if the submitted data is
coming from an inappropriate kind of submission. While it doesn't
guarantee that data has not been forged, it does require an attacker to
guess the right kind of forging. If you don't care where the request
data comes from, you can use <varname>$_REQUEST</varname> as it contains
a mix of GET, POST and COOKIE data. See also the manual section on
using <link linkend="language.variables.external">variables from outside
of PHP</link>.
</para>
<para>
<example>
<title>Detecting simple variable poisoning</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
<?php
if (isset($_COOKIE['MAGIC_COOKIE'])) {
// MAGIC_COOKIE comes from a cookie.
// Be sure to validate the cookie data!
} elseif (isset($_GET['MAGIC_COOKIE']) || isset($_POST['MAGIC_COOKIE'])) {
mail("[email protected]", "Possible breakin attempt", $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);
echo "Security violation, admin has been alerted.";
exit;
} else {
// MAGIC_COOKIE isn't set through this REQUEST
}
?>
]]></programlisting>
</example>
</para>
<para>
Of course, simply turning off register_globals does not mean your code
is secure. For every piece of data that is submitted, it should also be
checked in other ways. Always validate your user data and initialize
your variables! To check for unitialized variables you may turn up
<function>error_reporting</function> to show
<constant>E_NOTICE</constant> level errors.
</para>
¬e.superglobals;
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security.variables">
<title>User Submitted Data</title>
<para>
The greatest weakness in many PHP programs is not inherent in the
language itself, but merely an issue of code not being written with
security in mind. For this reason, you should always take the time
to consider the implications of a given piece of code, to ascertain
the possible damage if an unexpected variable is submitted to it.
<example>
<title>Dangerous Variable Usage</title>
<programlisting role="php"><![CDATA[
<?php
// remove a file from the user's home directory... or maybe
// somebody else's?
unlink ($evil_var);
// Write logging of their access... or maybe an /etc/passwd entry?
fputs ($fp, $evil_var);
// Execute something trivial.. or rm -rf *?
system ($evil_var);
exec ($evil_var);
?>
]]></programlisting>
</example>
You should always carefully examine your code to make sure that any
variables being submitted from a web browser are being properly
checked, and ask yourself the following questions:
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Will this script only affect the intended files?
</simpara>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Can unusual or undesirable data be acted upon?
</simpara>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Can this script be used in unintended ways?
</simpara>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Can this be used in conjunction with other scripts in a negative
manner?
</simpara>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<simpara>
Will any transactions be adequately logged?
</simpara>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
By adequately asking these questions while writing the script,
rather than later, you prevent an unfortunate re-write when you
need to increase your security. By starting out with this mindset,
you won't guarantee the security of your system, but you can help
improve it.
</para>
<para>
You may also want to consider turning off register_globals,
magic_quotes, or other convenience settings which may confuse
you as to the validity, source, or value of a given variable.
Working with PHP in error_reporting(E_ALL) mode can also help warn
you about variables being used before they are checked or
initialized (so you can prevent unusual data from being
operated upon).
</para>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security.hiding">
<title>Hiding PHP</title>
<para>
In general, security by obscurity is one of the weakest forms of security.
But in some cases, every little bit of extra security is desirable.
</para>
<para>
A few simple techniques can help to hide PHP, possibly slowing
down an attacker who is attempting to discover weaknesses in your
system. By setting expose_php = off in your &php.ini; file, you
reduce the amount of information available to them.
</para>
<para>
Another tactic is to configure web servers such as apache to
parse different filetypes through PHP, either with an &htaccess;
directive, or in the apache configuration file itself. You can
then use misleading file extensions:
<example>
<title>Hiding PHP as another language</title>
<programlisting role="apache-conf"><![CDATA[
# Make PHP code look like other code types
AddType application/x-httpd-php .asp .py .pl
]]></programlisting>
</example>
Or obscure it completely:
<example>
<title>Using unknown types for PHP extensions</title>
<programlisting role="apache-conf"><![CDATA[
# Make PHP code look like unknown types
AddType application/x-httpd-php .bop .foo .133t
]]></programlisting>
</example>
Or hide it as html code, which has a slight performance hit because
all html will be parsed through the PHP engine:
<example>
<title>Using html types for PHP extensions</title>
<programlisting role="apache-conf"><![CDATA[
# Make all PHP code look like html
AddType application/x-httpd-php .htm .html
]]></programlisting>
</example>
For this to work effectively, you must rename your PHP files with
the above extensions. While it is a form of security through
obscurity, it's a minor preventative measure with few drawbacks.
</para>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security.current">
<title>Keeping Current</title>
<simpara>
PHP, like any other large system, is under constant scrutiny and
improvement. Each new version will often include both major and
minor changes to enhance and repair security flaws, configuration
mishaps, and other issues that will affect the overall security
and stability of your system.
</simpara>
<simpara>
Like other system-level scripting languages and programs, the best
approach is to update often, and maintain awareness of the latest
versions and their changes.
</simpara>
</sect1>
</chapter>
<!-- Keep this comment at the end of the file
Local variables:
mode: sgml
sgml-omittag:t
sgml-shorttag:t
sgml-minimize-attributes:nil
sgml-always-quote-attributes:t
sgml-indent-step:1
sgml-indent-data:t
indent-tabs-mode:nil
sgml-parent-document:nil
sgml-default-dtd-file:"../../manual.ced"
sgml-exposed-tags:nil
sgml-local-catalogs:nil
sgml-local-ecat-files:nil
End:
vim600: syn=xml fen fdm=syntax fdl=2 si
vim: et tw=78 syn=sgml
vi: ts=1 sw=1
-->