[PATCH] dnsproxy: Address CVE-2025-32366 vulnerability
Michael Trimarchi <[email protected]> Mon, 12 May 2025 10:48:18 +0200
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.connman |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
From: 신윤제(학부생-소프트웨어전공) <[email protected]> In Connman parse_rr in dnsproxy.c has a memcpy length that depends on an RR RDLENGTH value (i.e., *rdlen=ntohs(rr->rdlen) and memcpy(response+offset,*end,*rdlen)). Here, rdlen may be larger than the amount of remaining packet data in the current state of parsing. As a result, values of stack memory locations may be sent over the network in a response. This patch adds a check to ensure that (*end + *rdlen) does not exceed the valid range. If the condition is violated, the function returns -EINVAL. --- V1->V2: - resent using proper inline patch --- src/dnsproxy.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/dnsproxy.c b/src/dnsproxy.c index 7ee26d9f..1dd2f7f5 100644 --- a/src/dnsproxy.c +++ b/src/dnsproxy.c @@ -998,6 +998,9 @@ static int parse_rr(const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *start, if ((offset + *rdlen) > *response_size) return -ENOBUFS; + if ((*end + *rdlen) > max) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(response + offset, *end, *rdlen); *end += *rdlen; -- 2.43.0