Re: How to fix problems with the sashiko review model
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> Wed, 22 Jul 2026 17:09:01 +0200
| Newsgroups | dev.linux.lists.ksummit,dev.linux.lists.sashiko-reviews,org.kernel.vger.linux-scsi |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <20260722170901.30bdae6a@localhost> |
On Wed, 22 Jul 2026 10:17:40 -0400 James Bottomley <[email protected]> wrote: > On Wed, 2026-07-22 at 16:00 +0200, Johannes Berg wrote: > > On Wed, 2026-07-22 at 09:42 -0400, James Bottomley wrote: =20 > > >=20 > > > Well, I noted that in my reply above.=C2=A0 The way I was thinking of > > > implementing it was to add a general instruction file for drivers > > > which would make hardware trusted for pretty much everything and > > > then instruct the AI to consult driver specific files for overrides > > > to this so we could add the additional threat checks to usb.md and > > > virt.md =20 > >=20 > > I guess it's a question which way around it should be - but I'll note > > that generally for wifi customers tend to not trust the "hardware" > > because it's mostly firmware, is generally buggy and can be attacked > > over the air too... > >=20 > > Personally (with that background) I'd tend to lean towards saying the > > high-performance stuff that does want/need to trust the device should > > opt out, it's harder to get that wrong. If we generally opt out as > > you describe and then forgot to include something, we might have > > issues. =20 >=20 > So this is just an efficiency thing. There are 144 driver subsystems, > so if most of the want to trust the hardware it makes more sense to > have this as default but overriden by subsystems. However, if most of > the 144 don't trust their hardware then absolutely, I agree, it should > be per-subsystem opt in. Part of the reason for the post was to gauge > this ... and so far I count three opt outs. I don't trust hardware/firmware. They can be buggy.=20 For instance, there's currently a bug at UEFI spec affecting RAS where one particular field may have 3 different meanings because UEFI changed its meaning on different versions of the spec without changing the version field inside the CPER record: https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/issues/12708=09 If even firmware specs can't be trusted, I don't think it is safe to assume that any particular implementation of the firmware or hardware would be safe. Thanks, Mauro