[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 0/2] more sampling fun 0
Greg KH <[email protected]> Thu, 20 Feb 2020 09:14:20 +0100
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.lore.historical-speck |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Wed, Feb 19, 2020 at 02:45:22PM -0800, speck for mark gross wrote: > From: mark gross <[email protected]> > Subject: [PATCH 0/2] Special Register Buffer Data Sampling patch set > > Special Register Buffer Data Sampling is a sampling type of vulnerability that > leaks data across cores sharing the HW-RNG for vulnerable processors. > > This leak is fixed by a microcode update and is enabled by default. > > This new microcode serializes processor access during execution of RDRAND > or RDSEED. It ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it > is released for reuse. > > The mitigation impacts the throughput of the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions > and latency of RT processing running on the socket while executing RDRAND or > RDSEED. The micro bechmark of calling RDRAND many times shows a 10x slowdown. Then we need to stop using RDRAND internally for our "give me a random number api" which has spread to more and more parts of the kernel. Here's a patch that does so: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ which I'm going to advise get merged now and backported to the stable branches. thanks, greg k-h