[PATCH bpf v2 1/1] bpf: Check sk_state before sk_protocol in bpf_tcp_*_syncookie
Ren Wei <[email protected]> Tue, 4 Aug 2026 22:29:01 +0800
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.bpf,org.kernel.vger.netdev |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <6218aa3534d0d2d3f448fde70a8dc2769d7a8201.1785823138.git.rakukuip@gmail.com> |
From: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]> bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie and bpf_tcp_check_syncookie accept a socket pointer 'sk' with argument type ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID_SOCK_COMMON. However, they access sk->sk_protocol without validating whether 'sk' represents a full socket. When a BPF program passes a mini-socket (such as struct request_sock or struct inet_timewait_sock obtained via bpf_skc_lookup_tcp), sk_protocol is located beyond the memory boundary allocated for mini-sockets. Directly dereferencing sk->sk_protocol leads to a slab-out-of-bounds kernel read. Fix this issue by checking sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN before inspecting sk->sk_protocol in both bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie and bpf_tcp_check_syncookie. Since mini-sockets are never in the TCP_LISTEN state, the condition short-circuits and prevents dereferencing fullsock-specific fields. Fixes: 399040847084 ("bpf: add helper to check for a valid SYN cookie") Fixes: 70d66244317e ("bpf: add bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie helper") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Vega <[email protected]> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <[email protected]> --- changes in v2: v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ca8d8c570509b02355bb4bd4e56859f3e2564c9c.1785576172.git.rakukuip@gmail.com/ - Check sk_state before sk_protocol instead of adding sk_fullsock() check (Kuniyuki Iwashima) - Correct Fixes tags to point to 399040847084 and 70d66244317e (CI bot) net/core/filter.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index b446aa8be5c3..1a5f1bac0a75 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -7679,7 +7679,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_check_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_len return -EINVAL; /* sk_listener() allows TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV, which makes no sense here. */ - if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP || sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) + if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN || sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP) return -EINVAL; if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies)) @@ -7752,7 +7752,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie, struct sock *, sk, void *, iph, u32, iph_len, if (unlikely(!sk || th_len < sizeof(*th) || th_len != th->doff * 4)) return -EINVAL; - if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP || sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN) + if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN || sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP) return -EINVAL; if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies)) -- 2.43.0