Re: [Spam] neodome [Spam] back [Spam] to [Spam] the [Spam] same [Spam] shit.

Pseudonymous Claas wrote:

>On 26 Oct 2025, Anonymous User <[email protected]> posted some
>news:[email protected]: 
>
>> Stupid Claas wrote:
>>>A pretty much lying Fritz Wuehler user wrote:
>>>> Nomen Nescio <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> > On 25 Oct 2025, Radio Eriwan <[email protected]> posted
>>>> > some news:[email protected]: 
>>>> > 
>>>> > > Fritz Wuehler once wrote, without thinking too much beforehand:
>>>> > > > Radio Claashole <[email protected]> sent:
>>>> > > > > A stupid YAMN user wrote:
>>>> > > > > > Nomen Nescio <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> > > > > > > On 24 Oct 2025, Anonymous <[email protected]>
>>>> > > > > > > posted some
>>>> > > > > > > news:[email protected]: 
>>>> > > > > > > 
>>>> > > > > > > > [Spam] same [Spam] censoring [Spam] shit [Spam]
>>>> > > > > > > > different [Spam]. 
>>>> > > > > > > > 
>>>> > > > > > > > Apparently it's okay for a particular sporging asshole
>>>> > > > > > > > to destroy groups and services for all, but not okay
>>>> > > > > > > > to use YAMN / neodome to counter the jerk.
>>>> > > > > > > 
>>>> > > > > > > yamn is not so anonymous after all.  
>>>> > > > > > > 
>>>> > > > > > > what does that say about "anonymous messaging" hmm?
>>>> > > > > > 
>>>> > > > > > Tor is an unsecure real-time system.
>>>> > > > > > Type I remailing fails to hide message size.
>>>> > > > > > Only Type II remailing (Mixmaster / YAMN) is secure!
>>>> > > > > > 
>>>> > > > > 
>>>> > > > > Did you know that YAMN/OmniMix users are the dumbest Usenet
>>>> > > > > users? 
>>>> > > > 
>>>> > > >   We just know that you, fascist Claas, and your buddy GabX
>>>> > > >   are the 
>>>> > > > stupidest snake oil peddlers over here ignoring even the most
>>>> > > > basic principles of secure anonymous remailing. Good luck to
>>>> > > > your victims. 
>>>> > > > 
>>>> > > 
>>>> > > Ah, ok. So pseudonymous remailing with Mixmaster and YAMN, in
>>>> > > your eyes, is secure 'anonymous' remailing. Mind you, you must
>>>> > > use Tor or you would shit in your pants without it. So much for
>>>> > > TypeII 'anonymous' remailing. 
>>>> > 
>>>> > It all works with Tor.   No Tor, no work.  
>>>> 
>>>> Remailers don't need Tor at all.  Tor was developed long after the
>>>> invention of anonymous remailing in order to have something similar
>>>> for from the anonymity perspective inherently problematic real-time
>>>> (web) communication.
>>>> 
>>>> You send some packets to the entry remailer and nobody can figure
>>>> out which mail message at some exit remailer they represent, if any,
>>>> as you just may have sent dummy packets. That isn't pseudonymity,
>>>> it's true anonymity no matter what shithead Claas tells you.
>>>> 
>>>
>>>I think you are the liar and real shithead! Why? Because these
>>>pseudonymous remailers are publicity run and known as old fashioned
>>>TypeII clearnet smtp networks where Eve and her friends only need to
>>>append the secret keys from remailers, to decrypt the incomming
>>>messages at an entry.  This can be done with gag orders. If you would
>>>know how the internals work from such old and outdated TypeII
>>>technology you would not speak such rubbish. 
>> 
>> The same BS once again?  Really?  For how long will you play that
>> game? 
>> 
>> First of all, when you need your anonymizers to be anonymous
>> themselves then you have a really severe problem.  And those who have
>> to trust in your shadow gang are in even bigger trouble.
>> 
>> And how will you get the private keys and passphrases of all remailers
>> worldwide to compromize remailer chains, as that's what you have to
>> achieve?  Dumbo, with Type II remailing there are no timing or message
>> size correlation attacks or further vulnerabilities your light-weight
>> Tor network suffers from.
>> 
>>>
>>>And secondly when looking at the pools Eve and her friends see in
>>>clear the remailer packets and the To: header, 
>> 
>> The packet's To: header after removing the current remailer's
>> encryption layer aka its next remailer stop has to be known.  How else
>> will you forward it?
>
>An IP packet doesn't have a "To:" header, it has source and destination
>fields.

Wasn't it about electronic mail thus about remailer packets?  You're
truly stupid in terms of Einstein.

>
>>> while messages at exits are held in an
>>>decrypted state.
>> 
>> Once again, how can an exit remailer forward the original message to
>> its final destination when it doesn't restore it?
>
>The arriving message header is stripped, the destination retained.  The 
>messge body remains encrypted.

That's what you do with your flawed Tor hack.  With anonymous remailing
the message as a whole is decrypted either, at a middle man remailer,
resulting in a completely different dataset of uniform size, now
revealing the next remailer, or, at the exit remailer, unveiling one of
n parts of the mail message destined for the final recipient.

-- 
'Two things are infinite: the universe and human stupidity; and I'm not
sure about the universe.' (Albert Einstein)