Fwd: [FYI] FITUG Statement on Crypto Policy

----- Forwarded message from Axel H Horns <[email protected]> -----

*>Date: Tue, 18 Sep 2001 21:30:25 +0200
*>From: "Axel H Horns" <[email protected]>
*>To: [email protected]
*>Subject: [FYI] FITUG Statement on Crypto Policy
*>
*>http://www.fitug.de/news/crypto-long-010918.html
*>
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*>FITUG Statement on crypto policy                         2001-09-18
*>
*>FITUG expresses its deepest sympathy for the victims of the heinous
*>attacks in the U.S.  
*>
*>FITUG calls upon the governments around the world to ensure combating
*>of terrorism and other forms of crime on the basis of proper law
*>enforcement on the basis of law and justice in order to protect those
*>basic values constituting a free and democratic world.    
*>
*>The tragic events have sparked off an increasing debate on 
*>legislative measures suitable to help preventing future acts of 
*>terrorism, in particular with regard but not limited to potential
*>future casualties including utilisation of weapons of mass destruction
*>(WMD).    
*>
*>One option recently proposed by various circles concerned comprises a
*>re-strengthening of the signal intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities of
*>the intelligence services and measures to facilitate the communication
*>eavesdropping of law enforcement agencies in order to be able to
*>uncover and monitor communication links of distributed groups of
*>terrorists or other criminals. When following this argumentation, the
*>availability of strong "unckrackable" encryption products to everybody
*>can be identified as a major obstacle blocking further progress in
*>anti-terrorism and anti-crime policy.       
*>
*>Such view is, however, misleading, and any resulting legislative
*>activity based thereon will inevitably fail to reach its goal but
*>instead undermine the basic values of freedom and democracy which we
*>all do need to protect against terrorism in these grievous times.    
*>
*>In particular, FITUG issues a number of observations as set out 
*>below:    
*>
*>- Over-reliance of intelligence services and law enforcement agencies
*>on technology-based surveillance may well lead to a lack of awareness
*>of relevant facts. It has come to be known that frequently in
*>terrorist or other criminal groups some of the most important
*>information is relayed non-technologically, often carried by human
*>couriers. Oftenly, the communications methods employed by such
*>organisations are designed to defy technological surveillance.   
*>
*>- Hence, the proper way to enhance the capabilities of the 
*>intelligence services and law enforcement agencies is to effect a
*>major reform of these institutions, abandoning contemporary visions of
*>defeating terrorism and other crime by monitoring the outside world by
*>masses of officials staring on countless computer screens installed
*>within high-security fortresses and displaying data gathered by SIGINT
*>techniques. The SIGINT hybris has to be stopped. What the services
*>actually need isn't more and more electronic access to private raw
*>information but more brain power in order to derive proper
*>conclusions. Let them then get out to mess with real terrorists and
*>other criminals in real life. This is where a solution of the current
*>crisis can be found.        
*>
*>- Cryptography is now well established as a basic technology for
*>countless products of the emerging Information Society and, hence, a
*>complete ban thereof is deemed to be completely infeasible. Moreover,
*>in the late 90ies of the past centuries many recognised experts in the
*>field of cryptography have demonstrated that mandatory GAK is not a
*>real option on a technical level; countless technical problems of
*>large-scale GAK systems are still completely unresolved.     
*>
*>- Some have said that the tragic events in the U.S. are an example of
*>high-tech terrorism. This is completely wrong. Although the captured
*>planes surely are high-tech, the way of capturing them by rogue
*>brutality exercised with knifes is absolutely low-tech. By no means
*>society should forget that there is a real risk of a very severe high-
*> tech assault on the data networks of the wired world. However, 
*>widespread use of strong cryptography is a crucial brick in a 
*>framework to protect the sensitive technical network infrastructure of
*>the Information Society against attacks. Obstruction of free usage of
*>strong cryptography means irresponsibly weakening the infrastructual
*>framework of the emerging Information Society.     
*>
*>- Last but not least, the right to privacy of the ordinary citizen is
*>one of the core values of a free democracy. Destroying the technical
*>basis for preserving privacy in the Information Society means to
*>deteriorate one of the essential characteristics of the free world.   
*>
*>Whatever legislative steps are taken in response to the recent 
*>attacks, terrorists and other criminals will come up with effective
*>techniques to conceal what and with whom they communicate from where
*>to where, or even whether they store and communicate at all. Thus, if
*>legal restrictions are placed on the privacy permitted by the IT
*>infrastructure, only criminals will enjoy unrestricted privacy.   
*>
*>In the current situation, law enforcement agencies should only be
*>allowed and enabled to exploit security weaknesses of IT systems still
*>present on the basis and within the limits of an explicit warrant
*>issued by a competent court. No duty to implement additional
*>weaknesses should be imposed by legislation whatsoever.    
*>
*>Therefore, FITUG rejects all attempts to impose upon the citizens any
*>restrictive regulations of cryptography, i.e. in particular, but not
*>limited to, by demanding Governmental Access to Keys (GAK) schemes.  
*>Moreover, FITUG urges all policymakers as well as all relevant NGOs in
*>this field     
*>
*>- to support any suitable measures to stop the current SIGINT hybris, 
*>
*>- to support development of alternative effective measures to 
*>strengthen societies against the threats of terrorism and other 
*>crime, and      
*>
*>- to strongly oppose any proposals to impose restrictive regulations
*>upon encryption.    
*>
*>About FITUG
*>
*>FITUG creates connections to the virtual world of new media and data 
*>networks. From our statues: "The association's purpose is the 
*>fostering of the integration of new media with society, public 
*>education about technologies, risks, and dangers of these media, and 
*>the fostering of human rights and consumer interests with respect to 
*>computer networks." FITUG is a member of the Global Internet Liberty 
*>Campaign (GILC).  
*>
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*>
*>
*>
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